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ABSTRACT 
 
A recent shift in Australian government policy has led to the establishment of a new statutory council - 
Infrastructure Australia (IA). IA will advise infrastructure stakeholders on a range of issues including creating 
a more consistent approach to Public Private Partnerships (PPP). This research presents a case study of a 
landmark PPP project in the Northern Territory, Australia to evaluate Australian PPP practices with world’s 
best practice. This analysis yields results in the form of recommendations to improve the efficiency of the 
delivery of PPPs for major public infrastructure. 
Methods 
A PPP benchmarking modelling criteria was developed from the literature review on PPPs and PPP projects 
which addressed the following areas: 
- Project procurement process and structure 
- Roles of stakeholders contributing to those projects 
- Contractual relationships and arrangements 
- Design and construction risk 
- Public interest and perception 
- Maturity of the marketplace 
- Examination of PPP deals within Australia 
Qualitative and quantitative data was gathered through private consortium participant observations of the 
Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) project throughout the entire procurement process spanning nearly three 
years and was presented as a case study representing Australian PPP practise. 
 
Analysis and Results  
Evaluation of benchmarking modelling criteria against the case study to formulate recommendations to 
structure and enhance the approach for utilisation of PPPs in the Australian context form the research 
results. The discussed findings uncovered that underneath the complex structure of PPPs traditional design 
& construct contracts underpin the agreements among construction partners. These contractual 
arrangements are imposed by private financiers whose involvement diminishes at the commencement of 
construction. 
Conclusion 
This research achieved its objectives of 
- Identify key attributes and variables that influences the design of a PPP Project 
- Identify key actions and events that influence the outcomes generated by a PPP project 
- Model design attributes and variables, and actions and outcomes found in PPP literature 
- Evaluate Australian practice as demonstrated in a case study, using the benchmark model 
- Discuss findings and present conclusions 
 
Whilst PPP’s develop long term relationships the strength of this relationship comes into question. 
Incorporation of alliance partnering approaches to alleviate “adversarial contractual relationships” and 
moves to service provider led consortiums rather than finance-led, provide enhanced value-for-money and 
public perception outcomes. Incorporating the presented matrix of recommendations including adoption of 
standardised processes in structuring PPPs affords greater public acceptance and use across a broader 
range of public sectors. 
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Alternative procurement structures such as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are selectively used to 
provide large scale public infrastructure and services in Australia.  
 
PPPs can be defined as a complex arrangement between the public (government) and a private sector 
consortium in which one or multiple traditional construction contracts are formed as a means for 
governments to maintain its public commitment to supply major infrastructure needs. Some of these 
arrangements may also include private sector financing and subsequent operation and maintenance 
responsibilities (Akintoye, Beck & Hardcastle 2003). PPPs are placed to become more widely used for the 
following reasons: 
• The gap between infrastructure capacity and demand continues to widen and existing infrastructure is 
unable to meet public needs 
• Insufficient public investment in infrastructure and services requires private sector involvement 
• Government’s mandate to concurrently provide core services and capital development. 
 
In Australia the PPP market is not governed by standardised national guidelines instead unique 
requirements for each project are developed by each state jurisdiction. This may lead to a reduction in 
outcome efficiencies. If considered from the outset, maximum benefits from a PPP procurement route are 
achieved through incorporation of appropriate and clear project structure which avoids adversarial contract 
forms. 
 
The public expectation for a higher standard of living can only be met by government without impacting 
upon health, law and order, and education ’core services’ through increased private sector participation. 
This leads to the predicament of the public having to adjust to a ’user pays’ system for traditional public 
services as more control is passed to the private sector through mechanisms such as PPPs involving 
private finance. 
 
Governments are now more aware that the procurement route selected for the delivery structure of a large 
public project has a major bearing upon its success (Miller et al. 2000). Government equally considers PPPs 
and traditional procurement routes to establish the appropriate project structure. The benefits of using PPPs 
include: 
• Utilisation of private sector finance without drawing down on public funds reserved for core services 
• Transfers delivery and operational risk to the private sector 
• Reduces time and cost of the project, delivering integrated and innovative solutions. 
 
Data gathering, analysis and interrogation into the use of the PPP procurement route are warranted 
because they are: 
• A new concept with less than ten years in mainstream use by Australian Governments  
• Tend to be Projects of large nature in excess of $100m which take several years of planning and 
construction  
• An infrequent occurrence with limited public disclosure of details and arrangements agreed with the 
private sector 
• Restricted by confidentiality clauses of the contract struck between public and private parties 
• A small portion of Australia’s infrastructure expenditure only accounting for 10 percent of the national 
market 
• A mechanism for government infrastructure needs without recourse to financing and long lead times. 
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The research identified the benchmark for structuring a PPP project by examining the following areas: 
• Project procurement process and structure 
• Roles of stakeholders contributing to those projects 
• Contractual relationships and arrangements 
• Design and construction risk 
• Public interest and perception 
• Maturity of the marketplace 
• Examination of PPP deals within Australia 
 
An extensive literature review of PPP project design and outcomes was completed to support the 
development of benchmark criteria accepted as best practice for PPP projects. 
 
Participation in the successful consortium awarded the Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) concession allowed 
for presentation of the workings of the first PPP delivered by the Northern Territory Government under the 
Territory Partnerships guidelines as a case study project - representing Australian PPP practice. 
 
The research results were formed through evaluation of the case study against the benchmark criteria, to 
provide insight into suggested frameworks to improve PPP project practices. Resultant frameworks are 
reached by discussion of the results and take the form of a matrix of results and recommendations that 
addressed each of the benchmarking criteria.  
 
The matrix provides direction for future projects and/or further investigation to address strengthening the 
relationship of the PPP project. This matrix forms the contribution made by this research with the resultant 
recommendations listed as follows. 
• Contract using Partnering and Target Cost procurement methodology to alleviate adversarial 
relationships  
• Minimise participant interfaces in contractual arrangements to enhance time, cost and risk outcomes 
provided by a PPP procurement route 
• Tender process costs to be reduced to facilitate competition through standardisation of responses and 
processes for participation 
• Nil cost to government outcomes are inequitable and should focus rather on public perception of Value-
for-Money (VfM) through adequate consultation 
• Unnecessary risk premiums can be avoided if equitable risk sharing through development of a pain/gain 
mechanism 
• Where public charges (ie. tolls) are payable, free alternatives are provided to allow freedom of choice 
by citizens 
• Establish service-provider led consortiums during procurement to structure a deal to suit long term 
commitments rather than short term broker commissions. 
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2. INTRODUCTION 
2.1 Purpose and Objective 
The purpose of this research was to benchmark Australian PPP practices against the world’s best practice. 
Examination of the bid process of a major public infrastructure project delivered through a PPP procurement 
route provides insight into the workings of Australian PPP practices. Presenting this project as a case study 
allows subsequent evaluation against PPP project benchmark criteria derived from literature written by 
academics and practitioners. 
 
The objectives of this research were to: 
• Identify key attributes and variables that influences the design of a PPP Project 
• Identify key actions and events that influence the outcomes generated by a PPP project 
• Model design attributes and variables, and actions and outcomes found in PPP literature 
• Evaluate Australian practice as demonstrated in a case study, using the benchmark model 
• Discuss findings and present conclusions 
 
Through the course of examining the PPP literature, secondary issues of the shortcomings and benefits 
suggested common issues within current industry practice. This collective of issues formed the research 
questions listed as follows: 
• Which procurement methods and consortium roles are more suited for PPPs?  
• How should governments structure the PPP deal? 
• How can PPP projects provide value-for-money (VfM) in achieving the best outcome for the public? 
• Is the allocation of design and construction risk entirely to the private sector the best project outcome? 
• What are the unique benefits for participants under the PPP approach? 
• What are the drawbacks for PPPs? 
• Which particular consortium arrangements lead to successful PPPs? 
 
The outcome provides results of a new insight into the existing body of knowledge of PPP delivery. 
2.2 Background 
Further insight into the Australian domestic PPP market was warranted to understand the application and to 
expand the use of PPPs and contribute to bridging the gap in Australia’s existing infrastructure and 
demands upon it.  
 
Peak industry bodies of Australia (Poulter 2004) have identified that such a significant additional investment 
is required by governments into public infrastructure, that it would impede the capabilities of governments to 
concurrently provide other essential core services; such as law and order, social, heath and education 
services (Banks 2005; Treasury 2002; Vann et al. 2004). Years can pass by the time it takes governments 
to establish traditional construction contracts and secure adequate funds, in which time the resulting 
infrastructure need and environment may have greatly changed. PPPs can address both these issues faced 
by government, by transferring time and cost risk to the private sector. 
 
PPPs have gained momentum and currently represent 7-8 percent of major project capital in Australia with 
forecast growth up to 15 percent of the market (Banks 2005), the problem for both public and private 
players alike considering PPP procurement includes: 
• Relatively new (<10 years) as a mainstream procurement structure utilised for all facets of public 
services, 
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• Costly to setup and procure, therefore only major projects in excess of $100M prove economical to 
deliver, 
• Untested – a public comparator study (PSC) for delivery via traditional methods is not always 
undertaken, proving to tax payers that a PPP is the most economical approach. Leaving tax payers with 
doubts that this is the best use of public funds, 
• Balance between public interest and probity during the bid process, particularly at financial close, 
• Debatable public benefit without full disclosure of private sector arrangements, 
• Only large corporations from the ‘big end of town’ are involved in bidding due to the high costs, 
• Competition is reduced to fewer participants in consortium arrangements, and 
• The potential end of free public services, opting for a user pays mechanism (ie. tolls) to provide an 
income to the private operator (concession holder) of the asset. 
 
The PPP market in Australian is now considered to have matured (Banks et al. 2004, Larocca 2004) with 
fifty projects contracted by Australian governments since the late 1990’s (Table 3-4). The focus of these 
projects have been in the transport and social industry sectors, providing Health, Corrective Services, Public 
Order & Safety, Education, Recreation, Culture, Road and Rail Infrastructure. Such is the small pipeline of 
PPP projects nationally that private sector PPP participants (presented in Table 3-7) across Australia, that 
the case study project presented in this research based in Darwin would present similar observations had 
the project been located in Melbourne. Therefore this case study can be considered as a ‘typical’ example of 
the Australian PPP market for its time. 
 
Fundamentally PPPs provide a vehicle for governments to deliver pubic assets and services ’off-the-balance 
sheet’ by utilising private financing arrangements that ultimately expedite the time for raising capital. Other 
benefits include the greater potential to deliver public infrastructure in a shorter duration and execution of 
multiple projects without the budget constraints of government coffers (Grimsey et al. 2005; Robinson et al. 
2000). 
2.3 Limitations and exclusions 
As PPPs are a recent development for delivery of significant public infrastructure projects, limited discussion 
material was available and this research will add to that discussion in an Australian context. 
 
By nature the lengthy construction and concession period of large infrastructure projects presents 
constraints, limitations and exclusions for this research. 
 
To truly judge the effectiveness of the PPP approach, the entire life cycle of the project post construction, 
through operation for the concession period of some 20-30 years should be examined. However this was 
not possible for this research. For the scope of this research the procurement phase of the case study 
project was the time span of the PPP deal examined concluding at financial close. 
 
Because of commercial in confidence issues on a project by project deal for PPP arrangements, contractual 
details are often limited to marketing material that provide only a general account. 
 
PPPs are a relatively new mainstream approach taken by governments around the world and consequently 
few texts are available on the subject. Those that exist are from the UK and focus on UK policies and project 
case studies. For this reason Australian government policies serve as the best outline of how PPPs are 
undertaken on a domestic basis. Much debate into the effectiveness of PPPs is currently circulating in the 
Australian media, as the momentum builds in the domestic market. Similarly this was reflected in industry 
key note publications provided on the internet by advisors who consult to both public and private sectors. 
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2.4 Benchmarking Criteria 
Key aspects examined in the literature review provide a benchmark PPP structure. The benchmark criteria 
presented in section 3 is summarised in Table 2-1. 
Table 2-1 Benchmarking Criteria Model 
Attribute Description Explanation of Attribute Reference from Literature 
(Section 3) 
Project procurement process and 
structure. 
PPPs typically use BOOT or a DBFO 
contractual arrangement where private 
finance is involved. 
 
PPPs can utilise a range of 
traditional procurement 
approaches depending on the 
nature of the project risks 
which often involves private 
sector finance for projects in 
excess of $100m value.  
Section 3.2 
Akintoye et al. 2003 finds 
responsibilities and risks are 
diminished in the package-
deal type of procurement such 
in as BOOT structures. 
von Branconi (2004) finds that 
the LSTK contracts like the 
BOOT and DBFO are more 
favoured by clients for large 
infrastructure projects 
Contractual relationships and 
arrangements. 
Private sector forms a consortium and 
establishes a Special Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) to deliver project elements. SPVs 
are complex and set up only for the 
project following a competitive bidding 
process which vary from each 
jurisdiction. 
 
The make up of the 
consortium involves designers, 
constructors and operators in 
addition to financiers and 
sponsors. The team is 
assembled upfront through the 
bidding process and remains 
in place through the delivery 
phase until the facility is 
placed in operation and the 
performance or availability 
payments commence. 
Section 3.3 
To service the private debt 
tolls or charges on users of the 
facility indefinitely or for a set 
period, other variants involve a 
series of contractual payments 
(Burrow 2002, para.4).  
Australian government PPP 
policies are similar across all 
jurisdictions as they draw 
heavily on the State 
Government of Victoria’s 
manuals (Sharp 2005). 
Cost of PPP and the public sector 
comparator.  
The PSC is prepared through an outline 
business case (OBC) process to 
provide government with the gateway 
check that a PPP is an appropriate 
delivery mechanism (Leiringer 2001) 
and Value-for-Money (VfM). 
 
To offset the key issue of 
increased costs borne by the 
private sector borrowings - risk 
transfer, innovation and other 
considerations are to be 
factored into the VfM equation 
for PPPs. 
Section 3.4 
PPP form will not always be an 
appropriate form of project 
delivery “as they are too 
complex and costly for many 
small projects” (Grimsey et al. 
2005,pp.376). 
VfM includes effectiveness, 
stakeholder satisfaction, 
performance, skills transfer, 
accountability, transparency 
and auditable financials 
(Clifton 2006). 
Design and construction risk. 
Government when reviewing major 
project risk seek to transfer as a 
general rule - design, construction and 
operation risk to the private sector  
 
Allocation of risk appropriately 
such that each party is able to 
effectively manage the risk at 
an economical cost is at the 
heart of the PPP arrangement. 
Typically these risks are those 
Section 3.5 
In order to secure the private 
finance for a PPP arrangement 
the private sector require a 
fixed capital figure for the 
project, with no open liability 
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Attribute Description Explanation of Attribute Reference from Literature 
(Section 3) 
which under traditional 
arrangements have led to 
major cost blow outs. 
 
(Clifton 2006). 
Stakeholder benefits. 
PPPs are long term relationships (20-30 
years) whereby time and costs are 
reduced by packaging and transferring 
design, construction, commissioning, 
operating and ownership risks to the 
private sector. 
Benefits to government and 
the community focus on time 
and cost, however the 
innovation allowed in the 
design and construction 
process provide long-term 
benefits to the whole-of-life 
consideration of the asset 
operation and maintenance.  
Section 3.6 
Governments look to utilise 
PPPs to allow them to deliver 
infrastructure with our the 
confines of public coffers 
(Perspective 2004) and 
allowing government focus 
more on core services. The 
community benefits by 
provision of infrastructure 
sooner, more regularly and of 
a better standard (Akintoye et 
al. 2003). 
Issues against PPPs. 
Negative issues result due to perceived 
increased transaction costs and through 
loss of control. 
Specifically borrowing and 
tender costs, and legal fees 
are greater for PPPs 
compared to traditional 
approaches. Core services 
(such as teaching and clinical 
services) must be retained by 
government to ensure the 
standard of quality is 
maintained. 
Section 3.7 
Public sector loses control of 
PPP projects in exchange for a 
better level of service (Burrow 
2002, Sheil 2002) through risk 
transfer to the private sector 
however at greater cost. 
Examination of PPP deals within 
Australia. 
Several convention centres have been 
delivered (Table 3-8, Table 3-9) and 
other similar large infrastructure 
projects in Australia have used an 
investment bank-led model  (Larocca, 
2004)  
The average value of PPP 
projects delivered in Australia 
has been $400m and there is 
scope for the number of PPPs 
to double to meet demand. 
Section 3.8 
Unlike the UK, there is no 
requirement in Australia for the 
long-term service providers to 
be part of the financing 
arrangements (Banks 2005). 
 
To demonstrate the workings of a PPP project in Australia this research presents a case study based on 
observations made from the private sector consortium team involved in the Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) 
project in the Northern Territory. This project was unique in several ways because it was: 
• The first project to be delivered by the Northern Territory Government (NTG) using a PPP approach 
under the NTG developed PPP policy framework. 
• A true mixed-used development comprising both residential and social infrastructure, with value-added 
components on top of the usual BOOT arrangement. 
• A complicated contractual deal involving ‘multiple arms’ of the private consortium  
• A contract involving unresolved scope from the financial close deal carried forward as provisional sums 
into the delivery phase, required the scope to be developed and resolved during delivery. 
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To support the benchmark model criteria presented in Table 2-1, development of a comprehensive literature 
review of available industry and government approaches world-wide to PPPs has been undertaken in the 
following section.  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
To benchmark PPP practices from around the world a literature review of available texts, industry and 
government approaches is presented to model design attributes and variables, and actions and outcomes 
that influence PPP projects. 
 
The following areas from the literature review are categorised as identifying design attributes and variables 
that influence the design of a PPP Project. 
• Procurement Approaches for Large Projects 
• Structure, Contractual Arrangements and Government Frameworks 
• Costs of PPP and the Public Sector Comparator 
• Design and Construction Risk 
 
The remaining study areas examined are considered as key actions and events that influence the outcomes 
generated by a PPP project. 
• Stakeholder benefits entering into a PPP 
• Issues against PPPs 
• Australian PPP Market 
 
Examination of these elements allow the establishment of a benchmark best practice model that considers 
design and outcome of a PPP project which is used in evaluation of the Australian practice presented in 
proceeding sections. 
3.1 Introduction 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) originated in the UK during the late 1980’s and have subsequently 
developed into the framework now commonly used both in Australia and world wide. Although PFI/PPPs are 
synonymous with the 1980’s privatisation era from the UK, Carthey (2005, pp. 2) finds that PPPs are “unlike 
a full privatisation scheme, in which the new venture is expected to function like any other private business, 
the government continues to participate in some way“. This view was also supported by Grimsey (et al. 
2005) and Vann et al. (2004) who find PPPs place an emphasis on long term rather than one-off contracts. 
 
The concept of government participating as a partner with the private sector has been around for a long 
time. Government policies for a homogeneous approach to PPPs have only recently been established in the 
UK and Australia since 1992 and 2001 respectively. Australian PPP policy has developed independently in 
each state and territory. They have originated in response to the numerous projects contracted since the 
1990’s. Investigation was therefore needed to show if these policies prove more efficient than a traditional 
procurement approach and how should PPPs be structured. 
 
A PPP is a complex arrangement between government or a public agency / authority and a private sector 
consortium. One or multiple traditional construction contracts are formed to deliver the asset or service, 
some involving financing and/or subsequent operation and maintenance responsibilities; such that 
government can maintain its commitment to supply major infrastructure to community needs (Allen et al. 
2007; Grimsey 2001; Ng et al. 2002; Spackman 2002).  
 
It is useful at this juncture to outline the difference between a PPP and Privately Financed Project (PFP). 
The following definition is taken from the NSW Parliament Joint Select Committee into the Cross City Tunnel 
project (Infrastructure Implementation Group NSW 2005, citied in NSW Parliament 2006b, glossary): 
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“Public Private Partnership  A Public Private Partnership (PPP) is an arrangement for the provision 
of assets or services, often in combination and usually for a substantial 
or complex ‘package’, in which both private sector supplier and public 
sector client share the significant risks in provision and/or operation. 
 
Privately Financed Project  Privately Financed Projects (PFP) are a subset of PPPs, and involve 
provision by investors of equity capital and debt capital to fund what 
might otherwise be wholly publicly funded projects financed from NSW 
Government borrowings and/or budget revenue”  
 
Before governments embark on delivery of a major project using the PPP model, a Public Sector 
Comparator (PSC) study in the form of an Outline Business Case (OBC) is usually undertaken to indicate 
that value for money is provided through a PPP delivery and more traditional procurement means should not 
be pursued. However time and risk transfer, key benefits of PPP, are arguably difficult to cost outright within 
this study (Jones 2002; Allen Consulting 2007). 
 
Miller (et al. 2000) identifies procurement best practice by benchmarking 60 major large engineering 
projects throughout the world. Miller (et al. 2000) finds that governments utilise PPPs arrangements to 
appropriately allocate and share risks because of the significant impact major projects impose, irreversibly 
transforming the landscape and changing the quality of human life. Such projects include dams, airports, 
railways and stations, arterial roads and tunnels, schools, hospitals, public housing, water and sewage 
treatment, power generation and the like(Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2007). 
 
In subsequent journal articles, Miller (et al. 2001) goes on further to point out large infrastructure projects 
are notoriously problematic and can take up to ten years once built, before revenue is generated. Such large 
and often complex projects have high stakes with skewed reward structures in case of success and high 
probabilities of failure (Miller et al. 2001). 
 
Governments in charge of such large projects under traditional project procurement look to shed risk by 
engaging competent specialist management and advisors. They are necessary to ensure structured delivery 
and understanding of the complexities of long-term large scale infrastructure projects (Miller et al. 2000). 
Much of this skill set is drawn from the private sector.  
 
PPPs are unique in that they are an arrangement made at the front-end of a project in which risks are 
allocated to either the public or private partner best suited to manage such risk. This front-end structuring 
has an important bearing on the success or failure of large infrastructure projects. This view was shared by 
both von Branconi (2004) and Miller (et al. 2000). However Miller (et al. 2000) goes further to state project 
structure is more important than the project engineering and management elements of the project itself.  
 
By encouraging greater private sector participation in large infrastructure projects communication and 
contractual lines can become over complex. Layering or multiple interfaces placed into the project structures 
to accommodate the myriad of participants in the project can lead to its detriment or inflexibility. A lump sum 
turn key (LSTK) fixed price approach however addresses these concerns according to von Branconi (2004) 
by reducing both complexity and interfaces, and by having the proponent bear most of the risk. 
3.2 Procurement Approaches for Large Projects 
Examination of available traditional methods finds that three methods are available and Al Khalil (2002) 
considers selection of the appropriate project delivery method may be a key project success factor, options 
are: 
1. Design-Bid-Build (DBB) or Design, Tender and Build 
2. Design and Construct (D&C) (also known as Design-Build) 
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3. Construction Management (CM).  
 
Furthermore when faced with the procurement of large projects in excess of $100M, governments seek to 
share more risks with the private sector outside the confines of the above traditional means by developing  
(since the 1980’s) further options which have a broader focus outside the procurement / construction phase 
of a project, these are: 
4. Build-Own-Operate-Transfer (BOOT) structures 
5. Design-Construct and Maintain (DCM) 
6. Project Alliancing (PA). 
 
While the client bears more responsibilities and thus risk in the traditional form of procurement, 
responsibilities and risks are diminished in the ’package-deal’ types of procurement (Akintoye et al. 2003), 
such as the BOOT, DCM and PA structures.  
 
These six contractual mechanisms for delivery of large projects are now examined in more detail. 
3.2.1 DBB, D&C, CM and DCM approaches 
The traditional and most familiar method of project delivery according to Al Khalil (2002) is the DBB 
approach, in which the government contracts with a designer and contractor separately.  
 
For the D&C approach the government contracts with a single entity for the design and construction, 
this is successful in cases where the scope is clearly defined and of a standard design, according to 
Al Khalil (2002). Furthermore a combination of DBB and D&C approaches can occur when the client 
chooses to novate the designer from preliminary works over to the construction contractor to form the 
Design, Novate & Construct (DN&C) parties. 
 
The use of D&C and other traditional procurement approaches expend substantial bidding costs to 
provide the client requesting tenders, with a fixed price or lump sum (LS) proposal. Each D&C 
proponent inefficiently uses resources to reproduce a preliminary design (Lin 2005). However the 
benefit the D&C process avails the client is a “reduction in total delivery time” (Lin 2005). 
 
In the CM procurement approach, the construction manager is a consultant hired by the owner to 
oversee, on his behalf, the process of project development according to Al Khalil (2002). 
 
“Traditionally in this country (Australia), the private sector has played a major role in the construction 
phase of public infrastructure provision, even in those distant times when substantial ‘Public Works’ 
departments of the state existed” (Burrow 2002, para. 2). 
 
A Design, Construct and Maintain (DCM) arrangement “..encourages the contractor to take all care in 
the design and construction phase.”(Jones 2002, pp. 7) This is an extension of the D&C form, also 
assuming a maintenance responsibility for a significant period of the newly constructed asset. 
 
Traditional approaches have no recourse to adverse contractual relationships with the client. This 
situation can potentially develop as each party seeks to protect their own interests established 
through the initial competitive bidding process (Lin 2005). 
3.2.2 Partnering and Alliance arrangements 
The ACEA (2005) finds the term ‘alliancing’ is applied to a broad range of collaborative 
arrangements, some of which are developed to suit particular sets of circumstances.  
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 “The project alliance model creates a commercial framework where all participants win or all lose, 
depending on their collective performance against agreed project objectives. This creates both an 
incentive to achieve project objectives and a ‘best for project’ focus among participants. In 
comparison with traditional forms of procurement, project alliances rely more on developing trust and 
strong relationships to drive performance than on the legal and contractual relationship between 
participants” (Department of Treasury and Finance VIC 2006, pp. 8). 
  
Partnering is a radical overhaul of the conventional (traditional) “contractual form of relationship, so 
as to encourage collaboration and trust” according to Jones (2002, pp. 7). Cheung et al (2003) points 
out the potentially complex nature of project relationship building, identifying trust between contractor 
and client as crucial to successful partnering.  
 
Cheung (2003) explains the wider use of partnering in the last decade by governments seeks to 
reduce the confrontations between parties thus enabling an open and non-adversarial contracting 
environment. The goal for partnering (Cheung, 2003) is to improve relationships among contracting 
entities which is achieved through a management approach to align project goals of all members of 
the supply chain.  Ultimately the benefits of adopting a partnering philosophy at the outset of the 
project will lead to “..mechanisms that reduce some of the undesirable side effects of traditional 
contractual relationships” (Hobbs et al. 2001,pp.466). 
 
Alliances are formed for long-term strategic roles, where as partnerships tend to be for a single 
project or one-off special case. Jones (2002), points out that Alliancing contracts between 
government and the private sector has been the most genuine form of partnership within PPPs.  
 
The Alliance practitioners guidelines produced by the Victorian state government defines a project 
alliance as a commercial/legal framework between a government and private sector company for 
delivering one or more capital works projects. This arrangement is “characterised by; collective 
sharing of (nearly) all project risks; and no fault, no blame and no dispute between the alliance 
participants” (Department of Treasury and Finance VIC 2006, pp.2). 
 
An Alliance like the D&C approach offers the combined upfront services of a designer and contractor, 
however the Alliance’s compensation structure provides greater incentive to perform according to Lin 
(2005). There is no competitive bid provided in an Alliance tender, instead the successful proponent 
works up a target cost of the works. The target cost is used to measure an equitable sharing of risk 
and reward built around a set of behaviours between all contracting parties (ACEA 2005). 
 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs), Build, Own, Operate, Transfer (BOOT), and Build Own Operate 
(BOO) are particular forms of collaborations that are more like business partnerships than alliances 
developed generally to involve private sector participation in government developments (ACEA 
2005). 
3.2.3 BOOT and Operating Franchise arrangements 
The contractual mechanism for a PPP is usually a BOOT contract, also known as DBFO (Design, 
Build, Finance and Operate). The construction sub-contractor is commonly engaged through a D&C 
contract as stated by editors Akintoye (et al. 2003). For these reasons it is important to examine what 
a BOOT contract is and how it is utilised within a PPP project. 
 
A BOOT arrangement can be defined as where “…the contractor takes larger financing and 
operation responsibility for the project and in return gets a long-term engagement with guaranteed 
return on capital“ (Hallmans et al 1999, pp.109). Contractually a BOOT normally includes a traditional 
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D&C arrangement for construction (Hallmans et al, 1999) with ongoing operational responsibilities. 
The focus of procuring private finance and risk allocation for a project may well be the sole intent and 
starting point for negotiation of a PPP, however the build and operate elements of the BOOT contract 
are equally if not more important overall due to the length of operational agreement. 
 
BOOT arrangements for public infrastructure projects provide the means for the investment, 
operation and maintenance costs “to be recovered by way of charges from the ultimate beneficiaries: 
the public” (Hallmans et al, 1999). Jones (2002) finds that where operation is taken over from the 
public to a private sector for an agreed concession period for existing infrastructure (ie no 
construction) that an operating franchise is established. Other variants of BOOT whereby a private 
financing element is not involved, service quality is enforced through performance remuneration 
mechanisms.  
 
BOOT type projects combine the design, financing, construction and operation into one undertaking 
as a private sector initiative (Hallman et al, 1999) or consortium. “The private financing of public 
projects offers new challenges and roles for all parties involved: contractors, consulting engineers, 
operating companies, the financial sector, legal contract specialists, the international funding 
agencies and of course national and local governments” (Hallmans et al 1999, pp.109).  
 
Underneath the surface of a BOOT arrangement, key consultants are engaged using adversarial 
traditional forms of contract. Collaborative partnerships are not extended beyond the key client-
project sponsor / contractor relations. Ng (2002) highlights that time and budget issues of novated 
D&C arrangements abbreviated as a DN&C, being associated with BOOT type contracts can catch-
out the D&C team leading to poor performance. These issues are both relevant to PPP delivery. 
3.3 Structure, Contractual Arrangements and Government Frameworks  
“Under the PFI/PPP model the private sector (often a consortium of firms) raises the finance from private 
capital markets to plan, build, own and operate infrastructure commissioned by Government ” (Burrow 2002, 
para.4). 
 
PPPs do not replace or form a new arrangement to complement traditional construction contracts discussed 
in section 3.2. PPPs result from adapting the partnering principles outlined in government’s policy 
frameworks, to a specific project to engage the private sector. This is structured utilising a range of 
traditional methods, in which services not assets are purchased. Initially PPPs were more favoured for 
infrastructure development however all facets of public services which are subject to outsourcing to private 
enterprise, may utilise a form of PPP delivery. 
 
PPPs do not have to include private financing and simply contract using BOOT arrangements and according 
to Jones (2002) many options are available to government to partner with the private sector based on the 
project characteristics best suited to the procurement framework. Traditional procurement methods have 
evolved into forms and combinations which promote greater risk transfer and partnering (Jones 2002).  
 
“The public sector can contract with several private sector organisations for the delivery of a given service, 
the formation of a consortium by the private sector in a PFI(PPP) project is the distinguishing feature of this 
form of procurement” (Akintoye et al. 2003,pp.96). 
 
PPPs are commonly used by governments as a project delivery vehicle from private industry. Such vehicles 
or Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) are complex and set up only for the project. They usually comprise 
private consortia of financiers, construction contractors and specialist technical advisors which partner with 
government to finance, Build-Own-Operate-and-Transfer (BOOT) public infrastructure and services for 
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government agencies. Jones (2002) concedes that BOOT has formed the backbone of Australia’s PPP 
experience. The contracting structure of the project participants is outlined in Figure 3-1below as the typical 
PPP project setup. 
Figure 3-1 A typical PPP project set-up (adapted from Leiringer 2001) 
 
 
The way a PPP functions is presented in Figure 3-1, characterised by its reliance on direct revenues to pay 
for operating costs and cover debt financing while giving the desired service and return on risk capital 
(Grimsey et al. 2001). Finance, Design, Construction & Operations are key services provided through PPP 
projects, delivered by the sponsors, client, constructors, facilities managers and financiers. In addition, there 
are designers who form part of the Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV) (Akintoye et al. 2003). 
 
“The community enjoys the infrastructure provided, and to service the private debt indirectly through a 
contractual arrangement between the state and the private debt provider. One variant gives the private 
infrastructure provider rights to collect tolls or charges on users of the facility (road or bridge or power), 
indefinitely or for a set (concession) period. Other variants involve a series of contractual payments from the 
government to the private infrastructure provider (prison or detention centre or public transport), for the 
services provided” (Burrow 2002, para.4). 
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Figure 3-2 Typical PPP Characteristics (adapted from Larocca 2004) 
 
 
 
Grimsey et al. (2001 and 2005) outlines the many forms and features in which a PPP may take and this is 
shared by Jones (2002), that the PFI emanation of the PPP form will not always be an appropriate form of 
project delivery “as they are too complex and costly for many small projects” (Grimsey et al. 2005,pp.376). 
Therefore Governments have been responsible for development of guidelines and policy for methods of 
procuring PPPs which suit their methods of contracting and as such these policies need to be examined.  
 
Table 3-1 summarises characteristics of Australian government PPP policies, which are similar across all 
jurisdictions as they draw heavily on the State Government of Victoria’s manuals (Sharp 2005). This 
summary is useful in understanding structure of PPP delivery in Australia for comparison with the case 
study project presented in section 5. 
 
 
Table 3-1 Australian PPP Government Policy (adapted from Sharp 2005) 
Policy Scope 
Business Case Project Type: 
Infrastructure / services / non-core services / measurable service 
outputs / specification 
Thresholds, value and  time: 
Value for money > $10M  
Long term > 5 years 
 
Public Interest Test Government transparency and accountability, public rights to 
infrastructure and services, consideration of the environment, heritage, 
native title and quality of life.  
 
Public Sector Achieving value for money using a comparative device against the cost 
Continuing Public Sector Spending Support 
Payment for Performance 
or Availability 
 
Service 
D&C 
Skills 
GOVERNMENT 
 Sub-Contractors 
 Deliver Core Services  
             (eg teaching, doctors + nurses, 
PRIVATE SECTOR 
 Build / Renew Facilities 
 Support Services 
FM 
Skills 
 
Finance 
Typical characteristics: 
 
 Long-term contract (20 to 30 
years) 
 Supply and maintenance of 
social infrastructure asset 
(School, Hospital, Prison) 
 No usage risk transferred 
 Performance-based 
payments 
 CPI indexed annuity stream 
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Policy Scope 
Comparator (PSC) of undertaking the project in the public sector. 
 
Development Process 
 
Order of Tasks: 
(a) Project Definition 
(b) Expression of Interest (EoI) 
(c) Evaluate (EoI) and development of shortlist 
(d) Call for Detailed Proposals (CDP) 
(e) Evaluation of detailed proposals (bids) 
(f) Negotiations with preferred bidders 
(g) Best and final offer (BAFO) or Request for detailed further 
offers (RFDFO) 
(h) Announcement of Preferred Proponent 
(i) Contractual agreement and financial close 
 
External approvals Typical cabinet approval is required at each development process stage: 
(a) Project initiation based on business case prior to EoI call 
(b) Selection of EoI short-list / CDP 
(c) Financial close 
 
Risk Allocation General Principles 
(a) Allocated to party best able to manage at least cost 
(b) Private sector allocated commercial risk 
(c) Public sector allocated regulatory risk 
(d) Shared risk – force majeure 
 
Preferred risk allocation 
According to the specific requirements of each project. Although 
generally allocated through classification of risk categories and 
expressing the governments preferred allocation. 
 
 
The overall approach for evaluation and establishment of a PPP is detailed in Figure 3-3 where before 
embarking on the development phase involving the bidding by the private sector, a business case 
establishes the need for the project. The business case would also involve assessment of the community’s 
interest through a public interest test and thereafter a financial benefits analysis. This is quantified through 
the establishment of a reference project and measured using the PSC (Clifton 2006). 
 
Standard documentation has been developed for local authorities in the UK by ‘4ps’ - Public Private 
Partnerships Programmes (4ps 2006) established in 1996. Comprehensive procurement support comprising 
hands-on project support, Gateway Reviews, skills development and ‘know-how’ procurement guidance in 
the form of procurement packs, case studies and extranets for local authorities is provided by ‘4ps’ (4ps 
2006). The key differences under the ‘4ps’ approach compared to the Australian Development Process (in 
Table 3-1) is that the bidding process is a more open two way Q&A dialogue surrounding project outline 
solutions in order to reduce pre-qualified  bidders down to a short-list of 3-4. Detailed solutions are then 
invited for development by each bidder in the form of method statements, financial models, design 
submissions and commentary of the model contract. The output specification and the payment mechanism 
are part of the proposed model contract terms. Whilst the timeframes are similar the effort on the part of the 
bidder is greatly reduced under the ‘4ps’ process. 
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The UK has had a single national approach in producing PFI policy through ‘4ps’ and HM Treasury however 
in Australia the Commonwealth, State and Territory governments have each independently developed their 
own policies, although common sharing of information has occurred. Sharp et al (2005) provides a 
comparison of Australian Federal (incl. Department of Defence), State and Territory government policy 
documents governing PPPs. According to Sharp, the Victorian government leads the way in policy 
development of PPPs and has lobbied to standardise policies nationally to minimise bidding costs by private 
sector concerns. The need to standardise PPP policy is also identified by Banks (2005), from his survey of 
the key players in the Australian market. 
 
Figure 3-3 PFI/PPP relationship continuum (Clifton 2006) 
 
 
The typical timeframe for each of these procurement stages leading to construction & commissioning of the 
project is presented in Table 3-2. 
 
 
 
Table 3-2 PPP Procurement Timeframes (adapted from Larocca 2004) 
 
Stage Timeframe 
 
Business case / Project 
development 
3-6 months 
Expression of Interest (EoI) 
 
1-2 months 
 
CDP or Bid Phase 
 
6-8 months 
 
Best & Final Offer (BAFO or 
DFO) 
 
3 months 
 
Financial Close 
 
1-2 months 
 
Business case & 
project 
development 
Bidding process, 
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commissioning 
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3.4 Costs of PPP and the Public Sector Comparator 
“Compared to conventional financed procurement, the PFI approach has brought both benefits and costs. 
The balance of advantage is often unclear, and at the strategic level the main drivers appear still to be 
ideology and accounting” (Spackman 2002, pp.283). 
 
PPPs should not be considered as the be all and end all solution or a silver bullet nor be heavily influenced 
by private finance aspects. A holistic approach to partnering between client (public) and contractor (private) 
needs to drive the value for money (VfM) comparison rather than the simple need for private finance. This 
way the Outline Business Case (OBC) assessment that determines if the PPP approach is suitable for the 
project, will be more accurate (Jones 2002, NSW Parliament 2006b). 
 
Demonstrating VfM to justify the procurement approach such as a PPP is not a straight comparison with the 
PSC nor should the PSC replace the need for competition between bidders wherever it can be achieved 
(Grimsey et al 2005). “More PPP-PSC comparisons are criticised for the seeming arbitrariness with respect 
to the risk transfer and the discount rate, down playing uncertainty and over emphasising financial factors 
relative to issues of long-term service delivery” (Grimsey et al 2005,pp.375). For a PPP, VfM assessment 
goes further to include effectiveness, stakeholder satisfaction, performance, skills transfer, accountability, 
transparency and auditable financials (Clifton 2006). According to Akintoye et al. (2003) the unitary or 
availability charge and the Net Present Value (NPV) of the services are the main inputs to build the PPP 
cost to compare with the PSC which uses more traditional contracting means.  
 
Lin (2005, pp.49) also considers that VfM includes: 
• “Reduced resources consumed 
• Increase functional performance 
• Time and whole of life 
• Relationships 
• Risk allocation 
• Incentive schemes” 
 
“Once the procurement route is well established, competition in the bidding process is relied upon to ensure 
VfM” (Grimsey et al 2005, pp.359). “What has to be achieved for a PPP to provide best VfM is therefore that 
the increased costs of finance are compensated in other ways such as appropriate risk transfer and 
innovations in technology as well as in working procedures” (Leiringer 2001, pp.6). This is the case as 
“banks generally consider borrowing by the state as a low risk business and in most cases it is cheaper for 
the state to borrow than it is for a private sector actor.” (Leiringer 2001, pp.6). 
 
Figure 3-4 shows the cash flow benefits to government in comparing a traditional approach to a PPP 
approach.  Under a PPP government does not fund the construction phase. Instead availability payments 
are made only when the facilities are completed. Government is therefore not exposed to construction cost 
overruns (e.g. through design or scope changes) and time overruns. Similarly government is not exposed to 
operational cost overruns through maintenance costs due to poor workmanship and material quality. Instead 
service payments are locked in at financial close.  
 
Value for money will only be delivered if public sector funding exceeds the additional funding cost 
associated with the margin of private sector cost of funds over government cost of funds. Furthermore the 
public sector funding amount must include the risk-adjusted benefit associated with the increased funding 
certainty resulting from risk transfer to the private sector. (ABN-AMRO 2003) 
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Leiringer (2001) points out that not much literature is available on the cost savings beyond the risk transfers 
by the deal breakers at financial close, since cost savings must be realised in the costs of construction and 
operation to compensate for the more expensive private finance.  
 
3.5 Design and Construction Risk 
Although the aim of PPP is to transfer many risks to the private sector, the ideal objective is to allocate risks 
optimally such that each party bears those risks it is best to cope with (Private Finance Panel 1995), with 
payment proportioned to that party which carries that associated risk.  
Figure 3-4 Cash flow PPP vs Traditional Approach Compared (ABN AMRO 2003) 
  
 
It was established in section 3.2.3, that PPPs commonly engage the construction and technical team 
members through a DN&C contract under a BOOT arrangement ( Akintoye et al. 2003) which is executed 
and in position after financial close.  PPP as large complex projects by nature, create increased risks to 
DN&C contractors as it is difficult to anticipate all the design problems during the short bid preparation 
period (Ng et al 2002) leading to design development of the elements of maximum influence of the project; 
e.g. to develop 20 precent of the key design risks which affect 80 percent of the price (Lin 2005 and 
Akintoye et al. 2003). 
 
In order to secure the private finance for a PPP arrangement the private sector require a fixed capital figure 
for the project, with no open liability (Clifton 2006).  Furthermore Clifton’s industry consultations show that 
PPP contracts are less flexible compared to other approaches such as Alliancing (section 3.2.2). Since a 
PPP contract requires up front cost certainty during the bid phase in order for the constructor partner to 
provide a guaranteed maximum price (GMP), the common form of contracting used is an adversarial form 
such as Design and Construct. 
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A study of 60 large engineering projects referenced by Miller (2001), identified that technical risk constitutes 
37.8 percent of all risk faced by managers, second only to market related risks (41.7 percent).  Also a 
survey of PPP participants ranking project risks by Bing et al (2004) found that Contractors, Clients and 
Lenders, whilst having differing risk profiles, found that overall design risk was ranked most important.  
 
PPPs may well serve a better mechanism for government in transferring cost and risk as they see fit, but 
ultimately the success of the project transfers down the line to the many consortium members once the 
financing deal is struck and delivery of the project commences. Akintoye et al. (2003) review of construction, 
legal and financial perspective on application of effective risk management shares Malhotra’s (1997) view 
that risk sharing is often at the heart of most private sector projects. Yet as a general rule PFI/PPP schemes 
should always transfer (not share) to the private partner “design, construction and operation risks (both cost 
and performance)” (Akintoye et al. 2003,pp.8).  
 
“Experiences with PPP contacts show that they really do transfer risk to the private sector when they 
manage design, construction, operation and financing. If a private partner underestimates that risk, it has to 
sort the problem out (at their expense). The cost to the state is set upfront. All of this should mean better 
value for taxpayers than higher taxes” (Perspective 2004, para.13). 
 
3.6 Stakeholder benefits entering into a PPP 
“What matters for the community is the quality of the physical and social infrastructure available to it and its 
cost” (Burrow 2002, para.2).  Stakeholders, citizens and taxpayers benefit when provision of new 
infrastructure occurs sooner, more regularly and of a better standard, purports  Akintoye et al. (2003). 
 
Private Finance Initiatives (PFI) originated in the UK during the late 1980’s and the newly adopted term 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) is commonly used by governments as a project delivery vehicle from 
private industry involving various combinations of traditional design and construction contracting, operating, 
maintenance and financial arrangements. It would seem the “Finance Initiative” in PFI has been removed 
from the PPP title, as Jones (2002) points out PPPs do not have to include private finance and suggest an 
emphasis on “Partnering” is adopted within the contractual mentality. 
 
Skotnicki (2001, pp.72) writes “PPPs initially emerged out of the continued budgetary and borrowing 
constraints faced by the various governments, and the exhaustion of opportunities for outright privatisation 
of major public infrastructure.” Government benefit most by reduction of risk, time and cost through a PPP 
delivery. “The fact that privately financed capital spending is off-budget is often the main reason advanced 
for private financing. It is a politically attractive argument” Spackman (2002,pp.288). “With historically 
accepted accounting conventions, the PPP/PFI model also keeps the infrastructure project and its financing 
off the public accounts, giving the appearance of smaller government and lower public debt” (Burrow 2002, 
para. 4).  
 
“Private financing of public services has produced clearer objectives, new ideas, better planning and the 
incentives of wider competitive tendering.” Spackman (2002,pp.296). 
 
Akintoye et al. (2003) finds that the primary benefits of the PPP procurement method is the reduction in time 
to implement the project when compared to more traditional methods commonly used by government, and 
goes on further to outline six key areas below where government benefits from choosing PPPs, which is 
also shared from many other sources such as Jones (2002), Poulter (2004) and Sharp (et al. 2005). 
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3.6.1 Enhance government’s capacity to develop integrated solutions 
PPPs allow government to procure infrastructure without the restrictions of public coffers, according 
to Poulter (Perspective 2004). Poulter of PricewaterhouseCoopers consults to government and 
private sectors in a financial and legal advisory capacity explains this by outlining how governments 
when using traditional procurement methods, focus on reducing costs such as the upfront 
construction costs, which ultimately reduce the facilities life-span.  
 
Goldsmith (1997) the mayor of the US city Indianapolis explores utilisation of private sector 
engagement in public sector services and finds “..citizens in many countries are demanding ever 
higher levels of services from governments, and funds are usually insufficient to meet all these 
demands…” (Goldsmith 1997 pp.110) without federal government level grants or other forms of 
privatisation. Efficiencies for provision of public sector services are being explored such as 
outsourcing, in order to match what citizens have come to expect elsewhere in dealing with private 
sector companies (Goldsmith 1997). 
 
PPPs provide a better output through the private sector involvement through all stages of the project 
life cycle. “In a conventional procurement process, projects with a broad scope are generally broken 
down into their component parts and managed as separate units that have to be implemented 
sequentially due to budget limitations” ( Akintoye et al. 2003, pp.7) 
 
 Akintoye et al. (2003) outlines key benefits of PPPs lead to a greater number of projects being able 
to be delivered by Government and of a better standard, through greater engagement with the 
private sector. Furthermore multiple projects can be procured at any one time provided government 
has in place management structures and policies that are adequate enough. 
 
Specialist PPP advisors to Australian public and private sectors highlights the problems with 
government using Traditional  or non-PPP procurement processes for projects, as: 
• “Focused on procurement of assets not services 
• Spend depends on budget available 
• Assuming risks that be better handled by private sector” (Lacorra 2004,pp.4) 
3.6.2 Facilitate creative and innovative approaches 
When governments purchase outputs rather than inputs, this provides the best opportunity for 
savings by engaging private sector’s creativity and management expertise. In the case of a prison 
the output is the beds for a number of inmates.  By changing the public perception of the more beds 
the more expensive the prison, innovative thinking has been achieved by including operation of the 
facility in the private sector contract of which rents are charged per bed and also outsourced to other 
governments  (Goldsmith 1997). This outcome would not have been possible under traditional design 
and construction arrangements. 
 
Re-structuring the construction sector involvement through PPPs can facilitate innovation into the 
nature of collaboration between design, construction and operations. (Leiringer, 2001) 
 
According to Larocca (2004), PPPs can promote innovation, attract long-term private investment and 
expertise, and allow government to retain public provision of services. 
3.6.3 Reduce the cost to implement the project 
When the private sector is involved (Perspective 2004) more money can be spent up front to provide 
greater flexibility through provision of additional built-in functionality, or increased lifespan, through 
use of more durable materials, as typical value-add examples. 
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The problems faced by public sector delivery of major projects causing cost and time over runs 
involves, “…gold-plating ..without a sensible balance between cost, return and risk…” providing 
“…little incentive for public officials to take commercial risks” ( Akintoye et al. 2003,pp.164). 
Furthermore “…capital projects are too often hijacked by technical specialists when they should be 
run by professional project managers” ( Akintoye et al. 2003, ,pp.164). 
 
Initial project cost is not reflective of value for money (Jones 2002 and Perspective 2004), “private 
sector finance may cost more than government borrowing” (Perspective 2004, para. 10), however 
PPPs structure provides greatest cost benefit because of the reductions in project time-frames and 
risk allocation. Larocca (2004) points to the fact that a PPP deal can often include incentives for early 
completion of the construction program. Typically a PPP will utilise a D&C procurement method 
within the over arching contractual framework, which is known as an expedient means for completion 
of the construction phase. 
 
The recent Allen Consulting and Melbourne University report commissioned by Infrastructure 
Partnerships Australia – IPA (Allen Consulting et. al. 2007) compared PPPs to traditional government 
delivery and identified cost overruns were significantly lower under a PPP approach. The Allen 
Consulting (2007, pp.1) report quotes for PPPs, “cost efficiency over traditional procurement, which 
can range from 30.8 percent when measured from project inception, to 11.4 percent when measured 
from contractual commitment to final outcome.” Contractual commitment is equivalent to the project 
milestone of financial close, implying PPPs provide greatest efficiencies in the upfront tendering and 
documentation phase.  
3.6.4 Reduced Project Timeliness 
The long-term private sector involvement provides efficiencies which “often saves 20 or 30 per cent 
for the taxpayer compared to traditional (government procurement) methods” (Perspective 2004, 
para.9).  This is also supported by Akintoye et al.(2003) and Allen Consulting (2007), concluding that 
the greatest benefits of the PPP procurement method is the reduction in time to implement the 
project when compared to more traditional methods used by governments in the past.  
 
The Allen Consulting (2007) report concluded that significant timeliness outcomes using PPPs over 
traditional approaches can be achieved. Statistically this report found that PPPs where completed 
3.4 percent ahead of time on average with Traditional projects completed 23.5 percent behind time 
(Allen Consulting 2007). Similarly in the UK, PPPs have turned around the condition of late delivery 
and over budget for the case of 75 percent of projects to now “75 percent of projects are on time and 
to budget“ (Grimsey et al. 2005,pp.376) under a PPP/PFI arrangement. 
3.6.5 Transfer certain risks to the private project partner 
Risk allocation is a primary motivation of PPP policy according to Bing (et al. 2004).  Yet Sheil (2002) 
claims construction risks have already been privatised through the traditional procurement approach 
of tendering design and construct contracts. This approach captures the major opportunity of 
construction phase cost efficiencies.  
 
The actual way in which construction works are managed may not change significantly in a PPP(PFI) 
setting. It is therefore the procurement procedure that primarily distinguishes a PPP construction 
product from a non-PPP product.  However the risks in a particular PPP project are higher than if the 
same project were done using traditional forms, the reason being the scope of responsibilities of the 
participants in a PPP project are higher (Akintoye et al. 2003). 
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PPP transfers the time and cost risk and media attention to the private sector. Grimsey (et al. 2001) 
finds that the greatest risk to the commercial viability of a PPP project is that the predicted revenues 
do not materialise at the operational phase of the infrastructure. We now have examples of this in 
Sydney’s cross city tunnel. 
 
The key benefits to governments of adopting a PPP approach over a traditional government-funded 
approach are best illustrated by comparing the risk allocation between the two frameworks (ABN-
AMRO 2003). Table 3-3 illustrates the broad parameters within which the risk allocation will take 
place and the transfer of risk to the private sector under the PPP approach providing a VfM solution 
to government to delegate such project risk. 
 
Table 3-3 Traditional vs PPP Delivery Risk Allocation (ABN-AMRO 2003) 
Traditional Delivery PPP Delivery Model Risk 
Government Private 
Sector 
Government Private 
Sector 
Design Risk     
Construction Risk     
Commissioning Risk     
Sponsor Risk N/A N/A   
Financial Risk     
Operating Risk     
Market Risk     
Ownership Risk      
Legislative Risk      
Force Majeure Risk     
 
3.6.6 Attract larger, potentially more sophisticated bidders to the project 
Business’s from the big end of town are those best suited to bid for PPPs as they can absorb the 
expenses if the bid is unsuccessful, hence there is a restriction on who participates. “Any company 
planning to bid for a sizeable PFI (PPP) contract is looking at costs running into the millions (sterling) 
and has to be sure it can bear that cost, should the bid fail” (Sutherland 2002, pp.32) A consortium of 
construction and financial specialists is formed such that all necessary aspects of the major project 
are covered, broadens the horizons of public procurement, and effectively commits those involved to 
long-term contacts (Spackman 2002). 
 
“The fusion of upfront engineering of the design and the finance with the downstream management 
of construction and service delivery” (Grimsey et al. 2005, pp.376) from the project inception creates 
a unique incentive among the partners to perform and get it right more often than not in achieving the 
project’s objectives (Grimsey et al. 2005). 
3.6.7 Access skills, experience and technology 
Through the engagement of major private sector firms with access to large labour pools, advanced 
technical solutions are actively explored to reduce costs and improve efficiency in order to  raise the 
bar above ’good enough for government’ to be the standard (Goldsmith 1997).  
 
Government employees can focus on core-service provision in PPP projects, rather than the 
concerns of on going building maintenance which is left to the private sector provider (Perspective 
2004). The consortium approach used for a PPP creates a one stop shop with all the necessary skills 
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and experience to more effectively inform the team of the issues through direct access to applicable 
technology.  
 
In the UK, PPPs “are the main mechanism for extending the role of the private sector in the supply of 
public services. Private financing has produced better-defined contracts, better contract 
management, and design innovation.” (Spackman 2002,pp.298) 
 
3.7 Issues against PPPs 
3.7.1 Cost and Resource Efficiencies 
The UK concept of public–private partnerships “…incurs extra costs, in senior staff time, consultancy 
and legal fees, tendering costs, new risks, higher costs from concentration of existing risks, central 
support structures, and some distortion of priorities in expenditure allocation. Where the balance 
between these benefits and costs lies, to date, will never be known.“(Spackman 2002, pp.299). 
 
The heart of the public policy debate on PPPs according to Burrow (2002) is the objective basis on 
which PPPs are given precedence over other traditional delivery methods of procurement.  
 
“Transaction costs… of each PPP bid requires significant time and effort to produce” (Tobin 
2002,pp.26) that they finish up more expensive than traditional forms of procurement of private 
sector services. Furthermore the cost of governments using PPPs involving private financing is 
arguably costing the tax payer more in addition to transfer of risk from government to the private 
sector, Burrow (2002) asserts. 
 
Arguably PPPs reduce the cost of raising the finance for a large infrastructure project because of the 
use of private sector borrowings. Sheil (2002) claims is it “inescapable arithmetic” as government’s 
will be lent money from funds for a return of less than 4 per cent, yet the private sector are charged 
this premium plus additional risk premiums of 6-8 per cent. Either way, the funding is sourced from 
the nation’s superannuation funds according to Sheil (2002). This is also supported by Larocca 
(2004) where the current Australian PPP market trend is for investment bank-led private consortium 
focused on front-end fees brought about by the debt raising and equity placement. Furthermore Sheil 
(2002) claims the private consortium charge consulting fees for raising capital, structuring and risk 
evaluation which is usually 3 to 4 percent of the total project cost.  
 
Sheil (2002) claims “that the cost to the public of capital under privatisation is a least double… 
between 9 and 16 per cent”, instead of the government rate of less than 4 per cent. Burrow (2002) 
also supports this claim as the private sector charge the long term bond rate plus 5 percent, plus 
margins and a long list of fees. 
 
Governments also face issues when deciding upon a PPP route. In dealing with the private sector 
government must possess the necessary in-house experience and expertise to successfully 
negotiate PPP arrangements (NSW Parliament 2006b). This was particularly evident in the failed 
PPP called the Oasis project between the NSW Liverpool City Council and a private consortium. 
 
“The dilemma for the public sector when deciding upon a PPP is whether it is a procurement device 
that is either intended to avoid public sector expenditure controls, or intended for the provision of 
services that can bring about risk transfer and yield value-for-money” (Robinson et al 2000, pp.26). 
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3.7.2 Project control lost to private sector 
Burrow’s (2002) main concern as a trade unionist, is that to use a PPP is to lose control and place all 
decision making into the hands of the private sector with no concern other than their own. 
Furthermore PPPs are long term contracts entered into with the private sector of 20 plus years for 
ongoing operation and maintenance, which still requires commitment of public coffers that can’t 
otherwise be diverted to other services that may arise in the future. 
 
Problems with PPPs….”usually fall into two categories: either the private partner can’t deliver on the 
contract and runs into financial problems because it’s not being paid; or sometimes it makes too 
much money, which earns a bad name for everyone” (Perspective 2004, para.11). PPPs when 
examined closely are a policy of privatisation of assets and services and not a partnership as they 
claim to be, according to Sheil (2002, para.11) “politicians…have scrubbed out ‘privatisation’ and 
replaced it with a new descriptor called ‘partnership’ and continued to advance their privatisation 
policies.” Sheil (2002) adds that the Australian public is against privatisation and insistent that sound 
governance prevail by retaining assets and services in government control.  
 
The argument is - what are the core services government must retain responsibility for when some 
state PPP policies as indicated by Sheil (2002) exclude education and health services. 
 
Criticisms have been raised about the Sydney Cross City Tunnel PPP project which became 
insolvent after only 16 months of operation. Several issues contributed to this event, one primary 
matter was the impact it imposed on the ill-consulted motoring public. The public decided to avoid 
patronising the tunnel so much so that less than one third of the expected revenue was being 
collected through tolls (NSW Parliament 2006b).This project is examined further in section 3.8.1.4. 
 
A number of other PPPs in Australia have encountered difficulties these include the Latrobe Regional 
Hospital (VIC), the Robina Hospital (QLD), the Port Macquarie and Hawkesbury Hospitals (NSW) 
and the Sydney Airport Rail Link (Banks 2005). These projects were delivered before respective 
state governments had in place PPP policies. These policies have led to the private sector now only 
delivering ’non-core’ services such as buildings and maintenance, and leaving governments to 
continue delivering core services such as clinical services in a Hospital (Banks 2005) and subsidising 
train fares to ensure patronage targets. 
3.8 Australian PPP Market 
“According to the 2001 Infrastructure Report Card prepared by Engineers Australia and other groups 
including the Australian Council for Infrastructure Development (AusCID now merged into Infrastructure 
Australia - IPA), an estimated $150 billion of additional investment is required to repair, upgrade and 
complete Australia's water, energy, road and rail infrastructure. That sum alone would mean spending 
another one per cent of GDP annually for at least 20 years before any investment in schools, hospitals and 
other assets” (Poulter 2004, para.2). 
 
Banks (2005) anticipates that such is the demand for infrastructure at local, state and federal government 
level in Australia that the fiscal resources of governments will be overwhelmed. “Australia has big distances 
between communities and relatively few people to pay for its essential infrastructure. So our governments 
need to spend taxpayer’s money carefully” (Perspective 2004, para.1). Ernst and Young as participants in 
the PPP market, find that PPPs can meet this “funding gap and the increased focus on service delivery” 
(Banks 2005, pp.4).  
 
There are calls by industry peak bodies such as IPA, to increase the use of PPPs to address two fronts; to 
provide savings in both time and money to government and as a means to fill the identified gaps in 
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Australia’s infrastructure needs which are currently on hold due to lack of available government funding. 
Historically PPPs in Australia have accounted for only 7-8 percent of total investment in public infrastructure 
considered a small percentage which can grow to contribute 10-15 percent of the market (Banks 2005). The 
Australian infrastructure market will have approximately a $400bn budget (Figure 3-5) over the next ten 
years according to a report by Allen Consulting (2007). 
 
Banks (et al. 2004, pp.40) noted from their review of the Australian PPP market that “deals in social 
infrastructure have been predominantly finance-led, which is unusual given that the quality of the long term 
service is contingent on the contractor delivering the asset“. 
 
Larocca (2004) finds the Australian experience to date is of a good track record of Private Finance in 
Economic Infrastructure. Several completed projects are evidence to this claim across energy, transport (toll 
roads) and environment (water) industry sectors, with reference to Table 3-6 industry sectors. 
 
Australian State governments have embraced the PPP approach and in recent years have each released 
their own PPP policy guidelines as Sharp (2005) discussed in section 3.3. Government policies have now 
been utilised and ’pathfinder’ transactions have closed or are underway leading to a mature domestic 
market. “In a mature PFI market the typical ex post cost of capital will be fairly close to the private sector 
average” according to Spackman (2002,pp. 295).  
 
The late 1990’s has seen Australian state, territory and federal governments tentatively commit to PPPs as 
the project delivery structure for large infrastructure projects. The emergence of this form of project delivery 
is likely to gain momentum domestically as the UK has experienced since the late 1990’s with at least 50 
projects now delivered annually through a PPP structure in the UK (Operis Group 2003). Australia can look 
forward to claiming at least 4 PPP projects delivered annually, based on Table 3-4 from the late 1990’s. 
Table 3-4 is based on figures from the National PPP forum in 2005 updated from various sources. An 
examination of current PPP projects in Australia by industry is summarised in Table 3-5 from various market 
sources. A major concise list is the ’PPP Project Pipeline’ produced for the National PPP Forum. A full 
project listing by state and industry category is provided in Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 for VIC, ACT/Federal, 
NSW, SA and QLD, TAS, NT, WA respectively. 
 
PPP projects in Australia continue to grow with an estimated value of $20 billion completed to date (2005). 
This includes more than $4 billion worth of PPP projects in the national economy and over $6 billion worth of 
projects currently under consideration, according to the NSW Finance Minister (Costa 2005, National PPP 
Forum 2005). 
 
According to Larocca (2004) from Australian PPP projects completed, the typical transaction size has been 
$50 million to $200 million with a total potential in excess of $10 billion. More recently from the research to 
compile the data in Table 3-8 and Table 3-9, the value of PPPs completed in Australia has reached nearly 
$20 billon with approximately 50 projects contracted at an average value of nearly $400 million. 
 
A bi-annual PPP forum is now held by federal and state bodies to provide a national focus for PPP delivery, 
given the importance of this market to the nations economy and infrastructure requirements. 
 
Larocca quotes (2004, pp.12) “An Unusual Market: our primary concern is that the services continue to be 
delivered year after year. We need strong and competent long-term operators for PPPs to be successful. 
John Pierce – Secretary of NSW Treasury”. The reason the Australian market has developed under an 
investment bank led approach is because no mandate exists in Australia, unlike the UK, for a long-term 
financial commitment from the long-term service provider (Banks 2005). The major equity players in the 
Australian market are provided in Table 3-7 with the largest being the investment banks for the 
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aforementioned reasons. Advisors and consultants are not provided as they do not take an equity position in 
projects. 
 
Table 3-4 Australian PPP Projects Contracted and Forecast  
 
State No. PPP Projects 
Contracted
No. Projects Forecast to 
Market (2008+)
Total
VIC 17 5 22
NSW 18 18
QLD 2 6 8
SA 1 5 6
WA 6 2 8
NT 2 - 2
TAS 1 - 1
ACT / Federal 3 1 4
Total 50 19 69  
 
Figure 3-5 Forecast Government Spending on National Infrastructure Projects  
(Source: Construction Forecasting Council 2008) 
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Table 3-5 Australian PPP Projects Contracted by State and Industry Sector 
 
STATE Industry Sector # 
VIC ACT / 
Federal 
NSW SA QLD TAS NT WA Total 
Social 10   7 1 1 1 1 5 26 
Energy     2   1     1 4 
Environment 5   1           6 
Transport 2   8       1   11 
Defence   3             3 
Total 17 3 18 1 2 1 2 6 50 
 
# - Refer  Table 3-6 for description of industry sector coverage 
 
Table 3-6 Description of Industry Sector Categories for PPP Projects  
Industry Sector # Description 
Social Healthcare, Corrective Services, Public Order & Safety, Education, Recreation 
and Culture (incl. residential housing and public spaces such as marinas) 
Energy Power Generation and Transmission 
Environment Water and Sewerage Infrastructure 
Transport Port, Airport, Road and Rail Infrastructure 
Defence R&D, IP development, Materiel Procurement (Aircraft etc), Capital Development 
 
# - summarised form each state / territory major project industry sectors 
 
 
Table 3-7 Australian PPP Market Major Players (Banks 2005) 
Investment-Bank Led Focused on front-end fees, exits and arbitrage opp/s 
ABN AMRO 
Macquarie Bank 
Deutsche Bank 
Westpac 
Babcock & Brown 
Contractor Led  Focused on construction contract, developing FM capability 
Leighton 
Transfield 
John Holland 
Multiplex 
Long Term Service Led Focused on long-term / FM service delivery 
Bilfinger Berger Concessions 
Transurban 
Spotless 
Plenary Group 
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According to Larocca (2004) the Australian PPP Market has had a steady stream of transactions with now a 
greater focus on streamlining bid processes and reshaping of consortia. However the private sector has 
complained about the expensive and drawn-out tender processes associated with PPPs. Bidding costs can 
account for 2-3 percent of the value of the project (Allen Consulting 2007). 
 
“It is hoped that recent steps towards homogeneity throughout Australia, including a standardised approach 
to contracts, will continue. Such homogeneity will bring significant cost savings to all PPP participants and 
stakeholders” (Sharp 2005, pp.20). 
 
Recent trends in the Australian PPP Market according to Larocca (2004) and Banks (2005) include: 
• Movement away from investment bank-led model 
• Introduction of property elements 
• Reduction in bidding consortia 
• Contract and bidding standardisation 
• Development of an equity market, albeit slowly 
• Competition for funding – bank and capital markets 
• Development of discrete asset classes – toll roads, social infrastructure 
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Table 3-8 VIC, ACT / Federal, NSW and SA PPP Project Details 
 
Industry Sector Recent PPP Project Examples – Operational Year & Capital Value* Shaded = Contracted  
  VIC ACT / Federal NSW SA 
Casey Community 
Hospital, Berwick 
$120m 2004  
  NSW New Schools 
Project 1 
$149m 2006 
Regional Police Stations 
and Courts 
$40m 2006 
Melbourne Showgrounds 
$108m 2006 
PPP Construction Started 
  NSW New Schools 
Project 2 
$178m Dates 2009 
Adelaide Hospital 
$1.7bn 2012 
County Court 
$140m 2002 
  Mater Hospital, 
Newcastle 
$132 2007 
Schools PPP 
$134m 2010 
Film and TV Studios 
$40m 2004 
 Newcastle Community 
Health Centre 
2007 
Prisons PPP 
$550m 2011 
Correctional Facilities 
$275m 2005 
 Bonnyrigg Social Housing 
$500m 2006 
  
Emergency Alerting 
System 
$100m 2004-2011 
 Long Bay Prison Forensic 
Hospital 
$140m 2009 
  
Royal Women’s Hospital 
Redevelopment 
$364m 2008 
 Parramatta Police HQ 
$170m 2004 
  
Medical Research Facility 
$230m 2010 
 
  
  
Mobile Data Network 
$140m 2003 
 
  
  
Mobile Metropolitan 
Radio 
$120m 2004 
     
Schools PPP 
2010 
     
Melbourne Convention & 
Exhibition Centre 
(MCEC) 
$1.4bn 2009 
 
  
  
Social 
Melb. Wholesale Market 
Redevelopment 
2010  
     
Eraring Energy Upgrades 
$136m Start 2003 
  Energy     
NewGen Uranqunity 
Power Station 
$450m 2009 
  
 
Table continues over leaf.. 
Jason Gillard Masters Exegeses  Section 3 - Literature Review 
 
  Page 31 of 138 
 
Industry Sector Recent PPP Project Examples – Operational Year & Capital Value (continued) Shaded = Contracted  
  VIC ACT / Federal NSW SA 
Ballarat North Water 
Reclamation (DBO) 
$30m Dates 2008 
Alternative Waste 
Technology Facility 
$70m 2004 
Adelaide Desalination  
$3bn 2012 
Echuca Rochester WTP 
$40m 2005 
    
Enviro Altona 
$15m  
    
Wodonga WTP Upgrade 
$32m 2003 
    
Wyona Water 
- 
    
Gippsland Desalination 
Plant $3.1bn 2011 
    
Environment 
Barwon Water Bio-Solids 
$77.6m Dates 2007 
  
    
Transport Eastlink Frankston-
Mitcham 2008 $2.5b 
  Sydney Airport Rail Line 
2000 $900m 
Northern Connector 
$800m 2012 
  Southern Cross Station 
$405m   2006 
  Lane Cove Tunnel 
2007 $1.5b 
  
      Western Sydney Orbital 
(M7) $1.25bn 2006 
  
      Chatswood Transport 
Exchange $157m 2008  
  
      Cross City Tunnel  
$680m Dates 2005 
  
      Newcastle Multi-purpose 
container terminal 
$250m 2004 
  
      RailCorp Rolling Stock  
$1.5bn + $4bn 
Dates 2007-2037 yrs 
  
      Parramatta Transport 
Exchange 
$100m 2005 
  
Defence HQJOC 
$300m Dates 2008 
Mulwala Munitions 
Factory Redevelopment 
$300m 2009 
Single LEAP Precinct 
$800m 2008 
Defence   
Single LEAP2 Precinct 
$800m 2011/12 
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Table 3-9 QLD, TAS, NT and WA PPP Project Details 
 
Industry Sector Recent PPP Project Examples – Operational Year & Capital Value Shaded = Contracted  
  QLD TAS NT WA 
South Bank TAFE 
$550m 2008 
Risdon Prison  
$90m 2006 
Darwin Convention & 
Exhibition Centre (DCEC)  
2008 $1.1bn 
Perth CBD Courts 
$195m 2007 
New Queensland Drivers 
License $1bn 
2008-2010 
    Perth Convention Centre 
$220m 2004 
Project Vista (Broadband) 
- 
    Joondalup & Peel Health 
Campuses $200m 1997 
Gold Coast Marine 
Development Project 
$235m  2012 
    Fremantle Justice Centre 
$142m 2001 
      Acacia Prison  
$150m 2006-2011 
      ECU Student 
Accommodation 2012 
Social 
      Multi-Purpose Indoor 
Entertainment Stadium  
$500m 
Energy BRAEMAR POWER 
STATION   
JANDOWAE 
$340m 2006 
    NewGen Power Kwinana  
2008 
$400m 
Environment Townsville Recycled 
Water Scheme 
- 
      
North-South Bypass 
Tunnel 
$3.2bn 2012 
  Adelaide to Darwin 
Railway  
2003 $1.3bn 
  Transport 
Townsville Ocean 
Terminal 
$1bn 2009 
      
Defence         
 
3.8.1 Review of Australian Projects 
A review of Australian PPP project examples from each Industry Sector is summarised in Table 3-5. 
This is intended to provide more background for comparison of scope, cost, structure and timeframes 
for PPPs used in Australia at the time of this research. 
3.8.1.1 Social 
The spotlight on Victoria’s PPP projects delivered to-date has been on providing social 
infrastructure through the contracting of six projects to-date (Table 3-8). With the subcategory 
of healthcare the main focus in Victoria (Banks 2005).  
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A recent project which is more analogous to the Case Study project examined in section 5 and 
6, is the Melbourne Convention Centre development (VIC) and the Gold Coast Marine 
Development (QLD). 
 
The Melbourne Convention Centre Development project was awarded to the Multiplex/Plenary 
consortium in February 2006 after a 14 month financial close period and is due for completion 
in 2009. The Victorian Major project’s web page boasts that, the “..$1bn redevelopment of the 
lower Yarra’s southern banks includes: 
• a 5,000 seat, six-star energy rated Convention Centre 
• a five star Hilton Hotel 
• an office and residential tower 
• a riverfront promenade of shops, cafes, bookstores and tourism retail 
• a premium brand homemaker retail complex, and 
• an investment in public spaces including a partnership with the National Trust for a 
revitalised maritime precinct.” (Major Projects 2008, para.12) 
 
The concession period is for 25 years and will cost the state government $519m in total 
(Department of Infrastructure VIC 2007). Annual availability payments would then be in the 
order of $4.24m per annum after the $413m contribution is deducted from the total contribution 
cost. 
 
The Victorian government is contributing $370m and the Melbourne City Council $43m to 
support funding of the public spaces as part of the precinct.  This development is Australia’s 
largest and greenest (six-star) convention and exhibition complex (Victoria Major Projects 
2008). 
 
The Gold Coast Marine Development Project in Queensland with an estimated capital value of 
$235m (Table 3-9) has not yet been awarded to a private sector partner. The Queensland 
Government is currently seeking private sector parties to offer services to plan, design, 
construct, finance, operate and maintain the project. The objectives of the project according to 
the state government, is to strengthen the tourism industry and to improve both 
accommodation for pleasure craft and public amenity.  Government is currently in the stage of 
accessing EoI’s received from private sector consortia after closing on 2 November 2007 The 
government will then select a shortlist (of minimum three proponents) of to provide detailed 
proposals (closing June 2008) in order to then select a preferred proponent in late 2008 – 
allowing less than six months for financial close. According to the Government EoI documents 
(Department of Infrastructure QLD 2007), the vision for the development at the Gold Coast spit 
site adjacent to Sea World includes; 
• A marina for super yachts, recreational and fishing vessels 
• Integrated development (tourism) 
• Aboriginal cultural centre, and 
• Enhanced public recreational facilities. 
 
The EoI documents state that the Queensland Government is seeking the project to be carried 
out at no cost and no risk to the state on the other hand the private sector is to provide a 
commercial return to the state (Department of Infrastructure QLD 2007). 
 
According to Infrastructure Partnerships Australia (IPA), Australia suffers from both a shortage 
and quality in affordable housing stock (IPA 2007). Yet only luxury accommodation such as 
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the Darwin Waterfront and Gold Coast Marine developments (Table 3-9) are to be delivered as 
or part of a PPP project.  
3.8.1.2 Energy 
As the most recent energy sector PPP and one to come out of Western Australia, the NewGen 
Power Kwinana power station project is examined. This power station is due for completion in 
2008 at a capital cost of $400m (Table 3-9). Babcock & Brown as the lead financiers for the 
deal in joint partnership with an energy solution specialist ERM power, reached financial close 
on this 320MW base load power station in July 2006 (NewGen Power 2007). 
 
The NewGen Power Kwinana Power Station is to be a high efficiency, gas-fired, combined-
cycle power station under construction at Kwinana south of Perth. The site is adjacent to 
Western Power’s Cockburn Power Station and will provide power into the South-West 
Interconnected System (Bacbcock & Brown 2006).  
 
The Western Australian energy market has been restructured through reform which the 
government saw “…competition as a means to encourage lower energy prices, and improved 
customer service” (Intersector 2006, para.8). 
 
NewGen Power also operates two similar gas-fired power stations in South-East Queensland 
at Braemar and Oakey, and are in negotiations for a fourth power station at Uranquinty, near 
Wagga Wagga in New South Wales (NewGen Power 2007). 
3.8.1.3 Environment 
Victoria is also well ahead figuratively speaking, in contracting environmental PPP projects 
(Table 3-8).  The majority of these projects have been in water supply and treatment 
infrastructure (Table 3-8) involving partnerships with regional water authorities, the state 
government and the private sector. 
 
The Central Highlands Region, North Ballart Water Reclamation Project (VIC) with a capital 
value of $30m (Table 3-8) became operational in January 2008. Contract execution was 
achieved with the preferred bidder United Water Utilities, in May 2006.  The project was 
established using the Partnerships Victoria framework for private sector involvement, engaged 
under a design, build and operate (DBO) contract, without private finance. This project 
involves a 15 year operational period of the newly constructed plant, which will upgrade the 
existing waste-water treatment facility (Partnerships Victoria 2008).  
 
In 2003 an EoI was put to the market for a Design, Build, Finance and Operate contract of two 
wastewater treatment plants in the Ballarat region. However this process was ended after 
negotiations with the preferred bidder failed (Infrastructure Partnerships Australia 2006). 
3.8.1.4 Transport 
Transport PPPs have been the focus of the NSW government comprising three vehicle 
expressways and three rail infrastructure projects. This total of six PPP transport projects, 
each in excess of $500m, have been delivered in NSW (Table 3-5, Table 3-8) leading the 
Australian market. That was until the turmoil of the Cross City Tunnel project in 2006. This 
project caused the government to review its PPP procurement processes in line with world’s 
best practice (NSW Parliament 2006b) by convening a joint select committee. This project is 
examined further as to why it has suffered such public criticism. 
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The Cross City Tunnel was open to traffic on 28 August 2005 after a 2 year construction 
period. The Cross City Motorway consortium named as preferred was involved in financial 
close negotiations from February 2002 to December 2002 (a 10 month period) when the 
contract was executed and construction began. The Cross City Motorway consortium 
designed, built, financed and operated (DBFO) the tunnel for a contract sum of $680m and a 
concession period of 30 years. The project comprises two separate tunnels 2.1km long run 
east-west under Sydney’s CBD linking Darling Harbour and Kings Cross and surface works 
comprising traffic calming measures to roads made less frequented by using the tunnel (NSW 
Parliament 2006b). The demand risk in the form of public patronage of the tunnel through 
payment of tolls was borne by the private sector concessionaire. In exchange for passing this 
risk on, the government allowed localised road closures to be made and constructed to funnel 
vehicles into the tunnel. Had this been a traditional government procured project the situation 
of insolvency of the concessionaire would have not be borne by the private sector but be a 
problem of government (NSW Parliament 2006a).  
 
The initial project intention of ‘nil cost to government’ was of overriding importance during 
value for money negotiations that the paying public was not adequately considered. The 
original toll advertised by government was planned at $2.00 per car (1998) and the project 
valued at $273m. When the private sector provided detailed bids for the contract the toll 
increased to $2.50, however prior to opening increased to $2.65 after negotiating with the RTA 
for additional works (NSW Parliament 2006a). During the financial close negotiations an 
upfront payment from the consortium to the government Roads & Traffic Authority (RTA) for 
$96m was deemed necessary (NSW Parliament 2006a, 2006b). 
 
To summarise the findings from the joint select committee this following quote is used. “The 
anger and frustration of the community that has been expressed since the tunnel opened in 
August 2005 and was very clearly expressed during the Committee’s inquiry, is a result of this 
funnelling and a lack of direct, toll-free alternative routes” (NSW Parliament 2006a, pp xvi). 
 
3.8.1.5 Defence 
The Headquarters Joint Operations Command (HQJOC) project was the first significant 
Commonwealth PPP and has recently been placed in operation after construction was 
completed in July 2008. The series of ‘LEAP’ projects to provide Defence force personnel with 
greater numbers of on base accommodation around Australia followed in quick succession to 
the HQJOC project (Table 3-8). This was likely due to the successful outcomes achieved with 
HQJOC and also providing Defence with the exposure to the PPP procurement process. 
 
HQJOC is a facility that provides the Department of Defence with a single command post for 
joint army, navy and air force military campaigns, operations and other designated activities. 
The facility is located near Bungendore, NSW on the outskirts of Queanbeyan (Department of 
Defence 2007). 
 
The Department of Defence went through a four stage process to reach financial close with 
other key timeframes produced in Table 3-10. 
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Table 3-10 HQJOC Project Details (Department of Defence 2007 and Praeco 2006) 
 
Stage Timeframe 
1.  RoI process commenced April 2004 
2.  Shortlist for Detailed Proposals September 2004 
Tenders for Detailed  Proposals Closed  February 2005 
3.  Selection of Preferred Proponent 30 May 2006 
4. Contract Negotiations  30 June 2006 
Financial Close 28 July 2006 
Construction Start November 2006 
Operational July 2008 
Capital Value $300 million 
Concession Period 30 years (to 2036) 
Cost to Government  
(total incl. Annual Service Payments) 
$572.2 million (NPV 2006-07) 
 
Three consortia were selected to provide a detailed proposal, with Praeco selected as the 
preferred after a significant period of over 14 months for Defence to evaluate tenders. One of 
the three consortia withdrew from the tender process in November 2005 which may have 
contributed to the delay by the government. The Praeco consortium was contracted to design, 
construct, operate and maintain the facilities. Praeco Pty Limited consortium is made up of 
partners from Leighton Contractors and ABN-AMRO, with key services provided by Spotless 
(operations and maintenance) and Rice Daubney (architects) to provide a five-star 
greenhouse rating (Praeco 2006 and Department of Defence 2007). 
 
Few measures are available to ascertain what Defence considers as achieving VfM, as the 
projects are not in the public realm nor under the same level of scrutiny and rely on Defence 
themselves to disclose its assessment of VfM. A hold point for Commonwealth projects over 
the value of $15m is the Public Works Committee (PWC). The PWC reviews the cost-
effectiveness of the project among many other terms of reference prior to public tender.  
 
The PWC report (Parliament of Australia 2004) for HQJOC was informed that selection of a 
PPP procurement route was the outcome of a business case and a capital cost estimate 
(made in 2003-04) which is still quoted to this day. The ongoing thirty year operational and 
maintenance cost which is valued at $39.99 million for the first year (Department of Defence 
2007) is not considered or reviewed in the PWC report. Furthermore the business case 
identifies PPPs provide Defence with a timely delivery yet the anticipated dates quoted in the 
PWC report where delayed by at least 12 months compared to Table 3-10. 
 
The first LEAP project PWC report (Parliament of Australia 2006) was informed that the PSC 
was the means for ensuring that the Commonwealth received value for money by comparison 
with incoming tenders. In contrast Section 3.4 finds a VfM assessment is more complex than a 
straight one dimensional comparison. Defence therefore continues to use these projects as 
pathfinders in establishing and refining its own guidelines for PPP procurement. 
 
The literature review supports the development of a benchmarking criteria model which presents the design 
attributes and variables, and actions and outcomes that influence PPP projects. This criterion is presented 
in Table 2-1 and shall be compared in proceeding sections with the case study observations to yield the 
research findings. The following section provides an insight into the research methodology prior to the 
presentation of the case study project observations. 
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4. METHODOLOGY 
 
Before presenting and evaluating the case study in the proceeding sections, the methodology supporting 
this approach is outlined and discussed in this section.  
 
Examination of the PPP literature found a theme of secondary issues of shortcomings and benefits with 
current industry practice, these are addressed in the proceeding sections. As presented earlier through the 
literature review of section 3, benchmark criteria of accepted PPP practice was modelled from this process. 
4.1 Approach 
Observations were recorded throughout the entire procurement process of the Darwin City Waterfront 
(DCW) PPP project and this case study is presented to demonstrate Australian PPP practice in section 5. 
 
These observations provide witness to a successful private consortium PPP bid spanning nearly two years. 
The case study observation timeframe involved the following procurement or pre-construction milestone 
stages of a PPP project;  
i) Expression of interest (EoI) 
ii) Call for Detailed Proposals (CDP) or bid phase,  
iii) Request for Detailed Further Offers (DFO) or Best and Final Offers (BAFO) and 
iv) Financial Close, leading to contract award. 
 
The financial close stage signifies the commencement of the delivery phase of the project involving detailed 
design and construction. 
 
This project was awarded by the Northern Territory Government (NTG) in May 2005 at the conclusion of the 
financial close process to the ABN-AMRO led Darwin Cove Consortium.  
 
Observations have been made by a member of the consortium technical advisor team (Connell Wagner 
P/L). Much of the commentary presented in the case study identifies the technical and engineering risk 
issues as opposed to financial matters of a PPP negotiation and bid process.  
 
In section 6 comparative analyses of the benchmark criteria with the project case study observations 
provides an evaluation of Australian practice. 
 
The discussion of the results in section 7 responds to the research objectives and questions surrounding the 
use of PPPs and draws conclusions through an argued case to support the recommendations to improve 
PPP delivery. 
 
Conclusion of the case study, analysis and discussion of the results presented in section 8 is considered the 
extension to the current body of knowledge. 
4.2 Rational for a Case Study Presentation 
A case study approach was selected as it provides a current insight into the local market situation in 
Australia using industry based observations from participation in procurement of a PPP project. 
 
A case study approach is needed when the measuring of relevant variables is complex and labour-intensive, 
which makes large scale surveys impracticable (De Looff 1995). Private consortium participant observations 
have been presented through the case study project. Reflection of such data with the known body of 
knowledge presented in the literature review provides the fundamental grounding for composition of a 
Evaluation of PPP procurment structures – benchmarking delivery of a large public infrastructure project. 
 
 
  Page 38 of 138 
suitable PPP delivery model for specific large infrastructure projects. Case study research is useful as a 
means of explaining contemporary activities such as sourcing decisions within a real-life context where no 
control of independent variables is possible, which makes experiment research indefensible (Yin 1994).  
 
The limitation of participant observations is that the results focus on a situation and not its causes, 
presenting only the process. This approach provides little insight into the pit falls or issues of the subject 
matter observed.  
 
As no interviews or questionnaire was attempted, the findings of this research are neither tested nor 
validated and present only the view of the observer. 
 
PPP projects run for lengthy durations including the concession period usually of 20-25 years. So it is not 
possible to fully assess the success of the case study project as it was beyond the research timeframe. The 
research therefore does not measure the success of the project through completion, operation and turning a 
profit, including public use sentiment, which can not be gauged to provide a true evidence of maturity. 
 
The results of this research focus on the background facts providing the ’what’ not ‘how’ perspectives of the 
case study project, this will provide an insight into the phenomenon of PPP projects. 
 
The outcome of this research provides recommendations for the benchmark criteria for PPP procurement 
based on the observed case study project to improve outcomes generated by a PPP project. These key 
recommendations can be a starting point for further examination by other research. 
4.3 Data Gathering 
Qualitative data was gathered from participant observations and involvement in the DCW project as a 
technical advisor to the private consortium. Similar data is not widely available because: 
• Less than four PPP projects per year nationally are on the market at one time 
• These projects typically have a duration of 2-3 years before commencement of construction 
• Many consortiums bid for these projects, however only one is successful 
• Commercial in confidence nature of the arrangement restricts the availability to the public detailed 
information of the contract structure and concession 
 
PPPs by nature are unique in Australia as they infrequently transpire. Placing on the record the way in 
which these projects function by presenting the ’what’ of PPP projects is valuable knowledge to private and 
public interests alike. 
 
To secure a role in a PPP project requires: 
• Such a project to be on the market 
• The participant to be part of the consortia bidding for the project 
• The consortia to be short listed for a detailed proposal submission 
• The consortia be selected in a negotiation phase and successful in the contract award 
• Participate in project delivery 
 
The case study used in this research was the $1.1b Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) Development project 
located in the Northern Territory of Australia. The Northern Territory Government (NTG) delivered this 
project under a PPP structure following the Territory Partnerships guidelines. The project comprised the 
BOOT delivery of a Convention and Exhibition Centre as the key centre piece of the redevelopment.  
 
The case study is confined to the development of the successful consortium’s bid into a detailed proposal 
and financial close process of the DCW project. 
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According to Yin (1994), multiple sources of evidence can be used to facilitate the process of triangulation to 
improve both reliability and validity of case study findings. This was achieved through use of personal 
journals, meeting minutes, technical reports, memos, emails etc in development of the case study 
observations and qualitative data to test against the literature review findings. Relevant topical items from 
these sources were extracted and placed into a chronological order to present the case study. 
4.4 Processing and Analysis of the Case Study 
The comparisons made in section 6 - Analysis of Case Study address the research objectives and questions 
from the theme of secondary issues of shortcomings and benefits with current industry practice presented in 
section 3. Evaluation of Australian practice (case study) with the benchmark criteria / world-wide best-
practice gives rise to results in the form of recommendations for the design and outcomes of PPPs. 
 
4.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
An argued case to support the findings was presented in section 7. This original contribution forms the 
conclusions reached from this research and provides an extension to the presented body of knowledge into 
the research area. 
 
A matrix was used to present the research findings and identified a recommended approach and structure. 
The recommendations draw upon the observed case study deficiencies and areas for improvement 
identified in the literature review to enhance the delivery of PPP projects. 
 
In section 8, the research is concluded through restating the purpose and objectives together with a 
summary of the recommendations and accompanying discussion. 
 
 
The case study is presented in the following section. 
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5. PRESENTATION OF CASE STUDY 
 
A case study in the form of participant observations of the Darwin City Waterfront Project, are presented in 
this section in a chronological form. These observations are considered to demonstrate the typical 
Australian practice into PPP project delivery. The completion of the case study allows this research to be 
used to evaluate Australian practice against the benchmark model established from the literature review 
(provided in Table 2-1). 
 
The observations provide witness to the private consortium bid spanning from August 2003 to May 2005. 
Within this period the following pre-construction procurement milestone stages of the project were observed.  
1. Expression of interest (EoI) 
2. Call for Detailed Proposals (CDP) or bid phase 
3. Request for Detailed Further Offers (DFO) or Best and Final Offers (BAFO) and 
4. Financial Close, leading to contract award 
 
After financial close was achieved the project entered the construction delivery phase in which the detailed 
design is finalised such that construction can be undertaken. This phase however was outside of the 
observation results presented. 
 
Background to the project development site was presented to provide the context leading up to the NT 
government’s decision to redevelop the site using a PPP procurement approach. 
 
To assist the reader identify the procurement stage referenced through the observations made in this 
section, Figure 5-1 is presented at the start of each section with a (red arrow) pointer marking the applicable 
reference point in the procurement continuum of which the text refers. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 DCW Project Procurement Continuum  
 
5.1 Chronology of key events relating to the Darwin City Waterfront 
A chronology has been drawn from a number of sources including key documents, media reports and web 
sites. It is intended to provide an overview of the important stages in the history of the Darwin City 
Waterfront project. 
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(not to scale and no time marker red arrow indicated) 
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Table 5-1 DCW Project Chronology of Key Events 
Date Event 
1988-1995 Wharf Precinct launched as public space by the Northern Territory Government 
(NTG) 
1999 Central Darwin Land Use Objectives released by the NTG (Country Liberal Party – 
CLP) including details for the Darwin Wharf Precinct redevelopment 
2001 NTG Economic Summit endorses the redevelopment of the Darwin Wharf Precinct 
blueprint 
August 2001 Martin Labor Government wins Office in Northern Territory defeating the CLP after 
26 years in power from 1978 
2003 BIS Shrapnel’s Engineering Construction Report 2002-2017 forecasts a Convention 
and Exhibition Centre as a major project for the NT 
13 August 2003 Northern Territory Chief Minister launches Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) - a major 
CBD redevelopment project 
September 2003 Expressions of Interest (EoI) advertised for private sector consortiums to register for 
involvement 
NTG public consultation process commenced 
Notice of Intent issued for the development by the NTG 
5 September 2003 EoI documents issued by NTG to private sector registrants  
October 2003 20th - EoI period ends 
Minister for Environment and Heritage, determined that and Environmental Impact 
Statement (EIS) was required for the project 
November 2003 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 application by the 
NTG, was made to the Commonwealth Government which determined that an 
assessment was not required 
19 December 2003 Three short listed proponents announced to prepare detailed submissions 
14 January 2004 Detailed Proposal Documents issued by NTG to short listed proponents - 
commencement of Bid Phase 
January 2004 Community consultation period undertaken to identify elements for incorporated into 
Wharf Precinct Redevelopment 
4 February 2004 First Darwin Cove Consortium team meeting in Darwin 
NTG project briefing held in Darwin for all proponents 
May 2004 12th - Call for Detailed Proposals Closes – Bid phase documents submitted to NTG 
by three proponents. 
Draft EIS documents completed by NTG’s consultant URS 
17th - Draft Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) released by NTG with 28 days for 
public comment 
July 2004 9th -Darwin Cove Consortium (DCC) present detailed proposal and outline of bid 
documents to NTG in Darwin 
12th - Conclusion of NTG public consultation process 
Supplement to Draft EIS Completed by URS, incorporating issues raised by 
Government Agencies and the Public 
August 2004 Detailed backroom negotiations ongoing with DCC and NTG 
Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) releases Environmental Assessment 
Report (EAR) for ministerial consideration 
6 September 2004 NTG Environment Minister approves Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for 
DCW redevelopment 
17 September Darwin Cove Consortium announced by NTG as preferred proponent – 
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Date Event 
2004 commencement of Financial Close Phase 
November 2004  Development Applications (DA) lodged to Development Consent Authority (DCA) for 
civil and marine works and convention centre (CI, MI and DCEC works respectively) 
8 December 2004 DCA hold hearing on amendments to 1999 planning scheme to adopt private 
consortium master plan for DCW redevelopment 
January 2005 DCA approves planning amendment to Wharf Precinct 
February 2005 DCA hold hearing into DCW Development Applications lodged (November 2004) 
9 March 2005 DCA issues DA permit conditions required to commence construction works. 
9 May 2005 NTG and DCC sign Project Development Agreement and Financial Close achieved. 
October 2005 Construction of Stage 1 starts for civil earthworks 
April 2006 Construction starts on foundations for Convention Centre 
June 2006 DCW “Highly Commended” award in Best Global Project to Reach Financial Close 
category at the Public Private Finance annual awards 
3 September 2006 $70m of Stage 1 apartments sold to the public 
22 February 2007 Auditor-General's report tabled in NT parliament supporting the way the DCW 
project is being managed 
Early 2008 Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre (DCEC) due to open 
May 2008 Community infrastructure works comprising Public Domain and Wave Pool facilities 
due to open 
Late 2008 Wharf One Residential apartments due for completion 
2009 Hospitality Precinct due to open comprising hotels and commercial tenancies 
2015-2020 Completion of remaining development of DCW site comprising residential 
apartments and commercial tenancies 
2033 End of DCEC concession period (25 years) and hand over to government  
 
5.2 Introduction 
The Chief Minister for the NT Government publicly launched the Darwin City Waterfront redevelopment 
project in August 2003. This major CBD project includes a Convention and Exhibition Centre as the key 
centre piece. The NTG would go to the market calling for Expressions of Interest from the private sector for 
redevelopment of this CBD precinct in accordance with an agreed waterfront master plan. 
 
The $1.1b Darwin City Waterfront Development is the project case study for this research. This project 
includes appropriate project components to be delivered under a Public Private-Partnership (PPP) structure 
by the (Northern) Territory Government. In the government’s vision for the site and to complement the 
Convention and Exhibition Centre as the key focal point of this development, the future tourism needs of the 
city have been considered requiring the master plan to include appropriate accommodation by way of 
serviced apartments and possibly a hotel. The development is to include some restaurants, cafes and other 
such facilities. To realise the full build out of the 25 ha of the site a residential component to capitalise on 
this outstanding waterfront site whilst allowing full public access to the foreshore with the provision of 
significant public open space is necessary. 
 
An extract from an NT government project marketing brochure pitches the project as follows:  
 
“Jobs. Growth. Lifestyle. Three great features of the Darwin City Waterfront development. Numerous 
Territory engineering and construction companies have expressed their interest in working with the 
preferred developer on the waterfront project. It is estimated that about $250 million will be injected into the 
local economy during the first three years of the project, generating 1000 jobs along the way. In all, 40 per 
cent of the total waterfront development will be open public space. The aim is to provide something for 
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everyone so that the waterfront comes alive and becomes a destination that draws locals, business 
travellers and tourists alike. A tropical savannah, showcasing Darwin’s truly unique lifestyle” 
 
5.2.1 Description of the Development Site 
The location and past usage of the site is outlined prior to being set aside for redevelopment. This 
provides and insight into how diverse and prominent the site has been in supporting the growth of 
Darwin. 
5.2.1.1 Site Location 
The development site is located on southern end of the short peninsula supporting the Darwin 
CBD, Northern Territory. The site is located approximately 2 km from the entrance to Darwin 
Harbour at the head of Frances Bay on the north-east shore of the harbour. The development 
site of 25 hectares includes the former Deck Chair Cinema site to the east, the former Stokes 
Hill Power Station site, Stokes Hill, Kitchener Bay and land occupied by industrial activities 
south of Kitchener Drive, including Fort Hill. 
 
The Wharf Precinct has been used for various industrial purposes over the years and storage 
of many different substances has occurred on the site. The site has been used for cattle 
holding yards for export, bulk mineral storage and loading for export, bulk cement, bituminous 
products and still maintains a strategic naval provision resupply, birthing and refueling point – 
taking advantage of the nearby fuel storage tanks atop Stokes Hill. 
 
It is because of these past industrial usages that the site required significant remediation and 
land improvement prior to redevelopment for alternative land usage. 
 
5.2.1.2 Aboriginal History 
The following paragraphs are based on extracts from the URS Corporation (2003) report.  
 
Two aboriginal sites within or adjoining the development areas have been recorded as sacred 
sites. Lameroo Beach is outside of the DCW site while a buffer zone is maintained around the 
sacred site on Stokes Hill. DCW has been fundamentally linked to the establishment and 
development of Darwin and its port. The wharf area as a whole has significant historic values 
and has been recognised as the most historic part of central Darwin. Numerous historic 
heritage features occur in or near the area. Significant marine archaeological and heritage 
objects and sites occur within and adjacent to the project area. 
 
5.2.1.3 European History 
The following paragraphs are based on extracts from the URS Corporation (2004) EIS 
document. 
 
The Darwin wharf precinct has been fundamentally linked to the establishment and 
development of Palmerston Town (to be renamed Darwin in the early 1900s) and its port. Port 
Darwin was named by John Lort Stokes in 1839 when The Beagle sailed from Port Essington. 
The first permanent European settlement was established at Port Darwin with the arrival of 
Goyder and the establishment of his camp at the base of Fort Hill on 5 February 1869. The 
landing of the cable from Britain for the Overland Telegraph occurred on 7 November 1871. 
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The Overland Telegraph inadvertently led to the discovery of gold in the region when the metal 
was found in a hole dug for one of the telegraph poles.  
The first stable jetty at the wharf area was established in 1874 with the hull of the unseaworthy 
Gulnare and fill material at the eastern side of Fort Hill. The construction of the first jetty at 
Stokes Hill occurred in 1886, linked with the development of the railway linking Pine Creek to 
Port Darwin which was completed in 1888. Traffic at the wharf included construction material 
for the new railway, live cattle export and passengers. A cyclone in 1897 and damage from 
torpedo worms led to the replacement of the jetty (with the Town Jetty) in 1904.  
Darwin’s strategic location was recognised with the establishment of the Navy Fuel Installation 
(NFI) consisting of storage tanks and piped distribution system, constructed between 1926 and 
1929. The facility was expanded from four to nine tanks in 1933. The other developments in 
the area during the defensive build-up in the late 1930s included the following. 
• a submarine boom net (which stretched from across the harbour from East Point to West 
Point) 
• a shed to maintain the netting and buoys (‘The Boom Shed’) 
• an extension of the railway line to the boom shed  
• a flying boat terminal at the base of Stokes Hill 
The engagement of Japan in World War II saw a major increase in shipping and other activity 
in Darwin Harbour. The first Japanese air raid occurred on 19 February 1942. Eight of the 47 
ships in the Harbour were sunk, including the MV Neptuna, a munitions cargo ship berthed at 
Stokes Hill Wharf. A total of 46 raids were made on Darwin with twenty eight (28) of these 
directed at the wharf area. These attacks causing widespread damage to the wharves, the NFI 
and other infrastructure, and significant loss of life, estimated to be between 400-500 people. 
The bombings killed many waterside workers, with 22 killed in the first raid alone. These and 
later deaths are commemorated by plaques at the base of Stokes Hill Wharf.  
Oil fuel storage tunnels were constructed in the escarpment from 1943 as more secure 
facilities but were not used before the war ended. Stokes Hill Wharf was rebuilt in the mid 
1950s and opened in 1956, with an extension completed in 1966.  
The wharf area has also been a major focal point for migration to Darwin and regional areas, 
with all people arriving by sea prior to regular air services commencing in the 1930s. 
5.2.1.4 Pre-redevelopment 1988-2004 Site Utilisation 
The project site supports a range of commercial and tourism activities. These activities 
generate some economic and amenity benefits, however much of the area remains in a state 
that does not facilitate active commercial, tourism or recreational use. The project site is used 
by the Darwin community for a range of recreational activities focused on Stokes Hill Wharf 
and its surrounds. Community attitudes to the site indicate an interest in highlighting the 
connection between land and water, Darwin’s tropical environment and lifestyle, and the 
history and culture of the site. The community also indicated an interest in greater recreational 
opportunities for local people and visitors, greater access to the site and enhancement of the 
aesthetics of the site with connection to the CBD (URS 2004). 
Until recently, the Darwin Wharf Precinct was a focal point for trade, communications and 
defence. However with the removal of the major port facilities to the East Arm Port (Stage 1 
completed February 2000), much of the Wharf Precinct has become disused and semi-
derelict. The project offers the opportunity to redevelop the industrial land on the fringe of the 
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CBD into a place of importance to the people of Darwin. It will reclaim valuable and 
strategically situated land into the social and economic framework of Darwin, and utilise the 
site for the economic and social benefit of Darwin and the Northern Territory (URS 2003). 
 
5.2.2 Political Influence and Visions for the Site  
The ownership of the Darwin Wharf Precinct has alternated between the Department of Defence in 
times of war and the Darwin Port Authority (now Darwin Port Corporation) in more recent times. An 
advisory board appointed by the (NTG) Minister for Transport and Infrastructure, advises the Port 
Corporation on its activities and the manner in which it carries out its activities with a trade 
development focus. The completion of a major new port and rail infrastructure shifts freight handling 
from the Fort Hill Wharf of the Darwin Wharf Precinct to the new East Arm Port, the end of the 
Adelaide-Darwin rail line. This has created much debate over the future alternative usage for the site, 
driven both by political and community needs of the time. Of equal importance in the debate of the 
land use were the procurement method and the involvement of the private sector. 
5.2.2.1 Previous (CLP) NT Governments 
According to the Darwin Research Centre (Darwin Research Centre 2005) who independently 
undertakes research and commentary on issues in the Northern Territory and the Asia Pacific 
region, the NT Chief Ministers have grappled with the Department of Defence’s view of the 
waterfront development since Marshall Perron's (1988 – 1995) time when the Wharf Precinct 
was launched. Shane Stone (1995-1999) tried to stop the upgrade of the groin at Larrakeyah 
Naval base in preference to the Navy using the new East Arm Port facilities.  
 
The previous government, the Country Liberal Party (CLP) led government for 26 years, since 
self government of the Northern Territory began in 1978, until 2001. Under the leadership of 
Dennis Bourke, a Central Darwin Land Use Objectives was developed in 1999 to include the 
wharf precinct, now referred to as the Darwin City Waterfront. The Wharf Precinct (1999) 
development had a primary focus for leisure and entertainment activities and included the 
following objectives: 
• Low density, minimal residential and much open space 
• One structure only allowed to exceed the escarpment 
• An open and transparent plan, with community consultation 
• Tax-payer owned and managed 
• CBD integrated with Development 
• Free and safe town beach 
• A tourism and recreation precinct with a working wharf 
• A wharf development that is owned by all Territorians 
• Fort Hill and Stokes Hill Wharves fully integrated 
 
The proposed structure of this project was for the government on behalf of the tax-payer to 
fund, own and manage the site through a traditional design-build-construct principal contract. 
Anecdotal reports that much of the then government’s consultation for the proposed 
development was done through backroom consultation with a single private developer - 
Multiplex Constructions, which went on to bid as one of the private developers for government 
in 2003. This blueprint for the integrated development of the Darwin Wharf Precinct that was 
endorsed at the economic summit in 2001 was seen as the highest priority for infrastructure 
development in Darwin. This blueprint was the result of 18 months of consultation with 
Territorians, and it had their support as documented in the Hansard (Northern Territory 2004).  
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The CLP administration pre 2001, can claim the credit for the first PPP in the Territory – the 
Adelaide-Darwin railway project. This project was initiated and delivered in conjunction with 
the South Australian government. Financial close was achieved in April 2001 with the 
successful consortium Asia Pacific Transport Consortium (consisting of ADrail as the D&C 
Contractor and Freightlink as the Operator), after 3 years and 5 months of negotiations.  
 
The project was however completed in 2003 under the (current) Labor government. 
 
The AustralAsia Railway Corporation is a statutory body established under the AustralAsia 
Railway Corporation Act 1996 and supported by South Australia through complementary 
legislation. The Corporation was established in 1997 by the Northern Territory and South 
Australian Governments to manage the awarding of a Build, Own, Operate and Transfer back 
(BOOT) concession and to enter into contractual arrangements with the successful 
consortium. 
 
5.2.2.2 Current (ALP) Government 
Johnson (2005) surmises that the Martin ’Labor Government’ (ALP) August 2001 – November 
2007, (re-elected for a second term 18 June 2005 with a swing of 6 seats) made history on 
August 18 2001, as the first woman and Labor leader to win an NT election. In its first term, 
according to Hansard (Northern Territory 2002) the ALP administration built its policies and 
image: pro-development, more specifically, policies for a PPP initiative referred to as ’Territory 
Partnerships’ launched in March 2003. The government’s policy is based on the Victorian PPP 
model. Clare Martin resigned on 26 November 2007 and was replaced by the education 
minister, Mr Paul Henderson. 
 
5.2.2.3 Territory Partnerships - Territory Policy on Public Private Partnerships 
BIS Shrapnel released a  report in 2003 into Engineering Construction in Australia 2002-2017 
which forecast major private sector projects for the NT, including a Convention and Exhibition 
Centre for Darwin, tabled among twelve other developments. This presented the government 
with a challenge of putting on the record its views on how much and the type of infrastructure 
the government was willing to let pass into private hands as a means of keeping up its 
commitment to community needs and the tax payer.  
 
In the past, the Northern Territory had encouraged a range of privately financed infrastructure 
projects, including rail, gas pipelines and electricity generation projects. The Alice Springs to 
Darwin Railway was a notable example of such private sector involvement. However, projects 
have been otherwise ad hoc and there has been a lack of policy development. Territory 
Partnerships provides a policy framework for building on those experiences and creating 
opportunities for the private sector for the efficient procurement of infrastructure and related 
ancillary services. Consistent with the government’s Building a Better Territory policy, the 
framework aims to achieve a more strategic approach to infrastructure development, with the 
aim of inspiring private sector confidence and securing improved services and better value for 
money (AAR 2003). 
 
Two common elements to the DCW project and the Adelaide-Darwin Railway is the 
involvement of the Chief Minister’s Major Projects Team - Office of Territory Development, with 
Mr Paul Tyrrell as the Chief Executive. The Department plays a key role in contributing to the 
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strategic directions of Government through the coordination of coherent and soundly based 
advice to the Chief Minister and Cabinet for major projects.  
 
5.2.3 Vision for the DCW Re-development  
The waterfront redevelopment work is to be undertaken in line with demand and is likely to be staged 
over a period of ten to fifteen years. Elements identified by the Territory Government (early 2003) to 
incorporate in the development were: 
• Passive and active areas of open space to encourage a diversity of community- oriented 
recreation, activities and functions; 
• Community uses and tourist attractions such as a visitor centre, cultural / heritage centre, and 
public buildings; 
• A convention and exhibition centre in the central area; 
• Residential ’landmark’ development, likely to occur at either end of the precinct (near the Stokes 
Hill and Fort Hill areas); 
• Commercial and retail activities, such as, cafes, kiosks, and the like; 
• Hotel(s); 
• Serviced apartments; 
• Leisure craft moorings and associated marina-oriented commercial and public transport facilities; 
• Focal ’landmark’ feature; 
• Raising the level of low-lying land, on which buildings are to be constructed, to RL 6.5m AHD 
above the storm surge level for a 0.1 % AEP, including a 0.3 m allowance for rise in sea level to 
take account of long term global warming; 
• Construction of a revetment structure along the coast comprising armour rock, sheet piles, 
precast concrete retaining wall sections or similar. Alternatively a sea wall may be constructed 
off shore; 
• Land reclamation in Kitchener Bay extending out to a maximum distance of about 150 metres off 
shore and requiring dredging of marine mud; 
• Construction of a marina or jetties in Kitchener Bay including dredging of marine mud; and 
• Minor reclamation and/or marine structures such as a jetty adjoining the western side of Fort Hill 
to a limit of 100 metres off shore. 
 
The Government’s Concept Plan included plans for various existing buildings, oil storage tanks, 
industrial plant etc to be demolished in the near term. The original Fort Hill Wharf, Iron Ore Wharf and 
associated dolphins and conveyor system are likely to be demolished in the medium term. 
 
The Concept Plan was developed by private consultants to meet the public consultation outcomes 
and the need for increased residential housing, whilst still providing a publicly accessible foreshore. 
The PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2003) summary report into the benefits of a convention and 
exhibition centre in Darwin, found that the Wharf Precinct was the best waterfront address within the 
Darwin CBD. The site was found to be clearly superior across the full range of criteria. The 
development of the convention and exhibition centre should trigger a project of equal importance to 
Darwin as Darling Harbour is to Sydney. The PWC report summarised their earlier detailed report 
which was not considered by government as acceptable for release to the public because it 
contained a framework for evaluation of private sector proposals. The detailed report is considered 
the business case study for the project supporting the economic viability and need for a convention 
and exhibition centre and supportive elements at the waterfront site. 
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5.3 Structure of the DCW Project – EoI and Tender Process 
The Expression of Interest (EoI) phase was the start of the government tender process calling for the 
involvement of the private sector. This was the first of four stages of which the procurement process was 
observed. This phase concluded with government selecting three consortia from the EoI process to go 
forward into the second (bid) phase to provide a detailed proposal. The EoI phase ran from 13 August 2003 
to 20 October 2003. 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
5.3.1 EOI Phase – ’Going to the market’ 
On the 13 August 2003 the NTG launched the DCW project to the market, with an Expression of 
Interest (EoI) document calling for capable private sector parties to register for consideration.  
 
The key outcomes of the EoI document included the following: 
• Construction of Convention Centre to start within 18 Months (by February 2005) 
• 10-15 year timeframe for full project completion 
• $100 million government contribution 
• Probity Auditor to oversee and sanction transaction with private sector 
• Contract using a PPP mechanism where appropriate for the project 
• A 20-25 year concession period for the Convention Centre 
 
The appointed private sector project team of specialists including, a project manager, lawyers, 
financial advisers, urban planners, engineers and marketing staff are administered by the 
government’s major project group. 
 
The NTG outlines in their EoI document (NTG 2003) that there is no preferred contracting strategy 
for Territory Partnerships however, with respect to the Convention and Exhibition Centre element of 
this project a BOOT arrangement is expected. Otherwise for other project elements a flexible 
approach for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) is appropriate in the Northern Territory context such 
that collaboration between the public and the private sectors can be structured to accommodate a 
variety of roles for the Government and the private sector. This can include publicly-financed 
partnerships and partnerships involving private financing. The Territory’s aim (for the waterfront) was 
to optimise risk allocation between the partners by assigning risk to whichever party is best able to 
manage it, at appropriate cost. 
 
The NTG anticipated that a successful proponent would be selected following a three stage process 
comprising an Expressions of Interest (EoI) stage (Stage 1), a Request for Detailed Proposals stage 
(Stage 2) and a contract negotiations (financial close) stage (Stage 3), these are further outlined. 
5.3.1.1 Stage 1 Expressions of Interest 
Advertisements were placed in national publications by the NTG in early September 2003 
calling for expressions of interest (EoI) to develop the waterfront site - including the convention 
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and exhibition centre - as a build, own, operate and transfer back to the taxpayers after 25 
years. 
 
The EoI document required the following returnable information from interested consortia of 
developers, financiers and operators. 
> A preliminary concept plan 
> How the area would be developed 
> Details of technical and management abilities 
> Financial resources 
> Experience in projects of this magnitude 
 
Bidders also had to outline the composition of the consortium team (including the inclusion of 
local companies), provide capability statements, outline project economics, provide a 
preliminary concept, and outline their project delivery strategy. They also need to provide 
evidence that they can produce a vision capable of achieving the government’s requirements 
for a world class development of the site and operation of the Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre. 
 
Other requirements to be evidenced included significant local industry participation in the 
redevelopment, and that the proponent had the necessary skills and plans for public 
consultation on this important project.  
 
Government proposed that expressions of Interest were to be evaluated and short-listed to 
three proponents by December 2003, who would then be invited to submit detailed proposals 
for the development of the project. 
 
5.3.1.2 Stage 2 Evaluation and Selection of the Preferred Proponent and detailed 
Bid Phase 
The three short listed consortia from the EoI process would then be invited to proceed to the 
detailed bid phase proposed period of between January 2004 to April 2004. 
 
Proponents detailed bid phase development proposals included: 
> Design concept – including master plan, models, site plans 
> Design and documentation of the Convention and Exhibition Centre to development 
consent approval level; 
> Feasibility studies including demand analyses 
> Financial considerations/commitment and parameters 
> Management structure 
> Structure of contractual arrangement 
> Other issues related to the proposed development; and 
> Local industry participation. 
 
It was anticipated that there would be opportunities for proponents to receive briefings from the 
NTG during Stage 2 to ensure that submissions were properly focused on the NTG’s 
requirements for the project. 
 
Proponent detailed bids were required to outline how they would implement the vision for the 
site, develop and operate the convention and exhibition centre and detail the extent of 
contribution they expect from Government towards the construction and operation of the 
convention and exhibition centre, and head works for the site. 
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Detailed bids included a Local Industry Participation Plan, as required by the NTG’s Industry 
Participation Plan Policy. 
 
In addition to detailing government contributions towards siteworks and headworks, the bids 
needed to include the return to the Government from revenue from the sale of land and 
property. 
 
At this stage proponents were required to submit details of their development plans and 
proposed facilities, traffic analysis and design, preliminary designs for the convention centre 
and design for required engineering services, to support their bid. 
 
The NTG proposed that the preferred bid were to be announced in June 2004. 
 
5.3.1.3 Stage 3 Negotiations with Preferred Bidder for Financial Close 
The preferred proponent was offered a period to negotiate and document the contractual, 
financial and other matters related to the project. The government’s legal advisers proposed a 
draft contract documentation for negotiation. These negotiations lead to a Project 
Development Agreement (PDA) being formed. The PDA outlines the responsibilities and Risks 
for the Government and developer, and details the timing of both contributions from the 
Government and revenue returns to Government during the life of the project. 
 
5.3.1.4 Essential Components of the Project 
A Convention and Exhibition Centre was to be constructed with necessary infrastructure as 
part of a substantial first stage, including a pedestrian link adjoining the CBD. The entire site 
was to be a landmark development providing generous family friendly public space (in the 
order of 20 percent of the site) including extensive access to foreshore in the form of 
boardwalks and parks. It was essential that the final master planned development fully extends 
the CBD to the waterfront and does not create a precinct detached from the rest of the CBD. 
 
The Governments contribution to the project was initially set at $100 million, the land, and 
roads and services to the boundary of the development site. 
 
The returns the Government was anticipating included; 
• revenue as the project proceeds; 
• a successfully operating Convention and Exhibition Centre; 
• the developer’s commitment to genuine partnerships with local industry including 
development opportunities under the overall project; 
• funded realistic proposals for quality community facilities; and 
• a plan to create a sustainable and viable precinct which fosters the cultural, social and 
economic dynamics of the community. 
 
In conjunction with the private sector bidding process the NTG held public consultations 
leading to a final agreed Master plan for the area. The findings of the community consultation 
report were provided to the short listed proponents preparing detailed responses to assist 
them in understanding the vision and ideas for use in their master plan development.  
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Through a series of workshops and surveys in January 2004, Sheila O’Sullivan of Socom 
found from discussions with over 100 Territorians, that “the redevelopment would be 
welcomed if it: 
• Creates a special sense of place. Its design and activities must expand on the land/water 
connection of the waterfront. It should present as the Gateway to Darwin and the outback 
from the sea and from the top of the escarpment; 
• Respects the history of the site and makes that accessible to locals and visitors alike; 
• Draws on the tropical savannah climate in the landscaping, the architecture, the materials 
used, and the vegetation selected; 
• Gives the people the ownership of the water’s edge, and accommodates their desire to 
walk, amble, cycle and relax along its length; 
• Provides for a range of dining and drinking opportunities that maximise the virtues of the 
site - the sunset, the waterfront, the wharves and picnic areas; 
• Deals with or masks the mudflats; 
• Locates the bulk of the residential development at either end of the site and maximises 
the public open space in the middle and along the waterfront; 
• Provides for a convention and centre that looks as good from the top of the escarpment 
as it does from the wharves; 
• Draws people to exhibition and performance spaces that showcase local and international 
artists and performers and becomes a home for outdoor music, entertainment and 
exhibitions; and 
• Improves the opportunities for all types of boats and yachts to moor safely and easily and 
provides for temporary stops. 
 
The people of Territory would be disappointed and not be drawn to the site if: 
• The view from the top of the escarpment is a building or a roof top rather than the 
waterfront; 
• The view from the bottom masks any views of the escarpment; 
• Access from the CBD does not flow easily; 
• People from the suburbs cannot easily access the site; 
• Car parking for the site is not an integral and non negotiable part of the plan; 
• Much of the site is turned over to car parking; 
• Pathways are not shaded and at least the key ones are not weatherproofed and 
• Shaded open space is not available for picnics during the day. “ (Socom 2004) 
5.3.1.5 Planning and Environmental Approval Framework 
The development was subject to a formal environmental assessment under the Environmental 
Assessment Act 198 (NTG). This included the preparation and assessment of an Environment 
Impact Statement by the NTG. The preferred proponent was then required to satisfy all 
conditions of the approved EIS, including all government agency requirements and obtain the 
Development Consent Authority (DCA) approval based on the details of the staged master 
plan development.  
 
The preferred proponent’s master plan would form the amendment to be adopted for the 
waterfront precinct planning scheme as it relates to the DCW site. The proposed amendments 
to the Northern Territory Planning Scheme incorporating the relevant part of the successful 
proponent’s master plan would be placed on public exhibition by the Minister and community 
responses sought. The DCA conducts the public hearing and reports to the Minister who then 
makes a determination on the matter. Upon determination (approval) the master plan would 
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become the approved master plan with relevant parts being incorporated into the Northern 
Territory Planning Scheme. 
 
The successful proponent would then submit development applications for the staged works 
including the DCEC, for approval at or about the same time as the master plan is lodged for 
determination, to permit the timely construction of the works as anticipated by the NTG. 
5.3.2 Consortium EoI Proposal and Structure 
The EoI details of the Darwin Cove Consortium (DCC) proposal are outlined comprising the partners 
of ABN AMRO Australia Limited, Walker Corporation Pty Ltd, Sitzler Bros. (Darwin) Pty Limited and 
Barclay Mowlem Limited. The EoI was prepared in its entirety by ABN AMRO in their capacity as the 
bid and financial leader with input from local firms to develop the consortium equity and non-equity 
partners, roles and scope of services. Connell Wagner P/L the consortium technical advisor can be 
credited with bringing to ABN-AMRO’s attention the opportunity that this project presented and for 
selection of many key locally based partners that went on to become members of the consortium. It 
is important to act promptly, before the project goes public to secure local partners of choice. This is 
paramount in such a small market like Darwin, to claim to government that the consortium comprises 
the best local participants in their field of practice. 
 
The Walker Corporation was initially proposed to lead the Master Planning and Integrated 
Development process to enable an extensive community consultation process in both the initial and 
on-going planning phases. The Darwin Cove Consortium Special Purpose Vehicle was expected to 
be the sole contracting entity with the NTG. The Darwin Cove Consortium SPV is underwritten by 
ABN AMRO and Walker Corporation. 
 
The Darwin Cove Consortium was formed and structured with the following key objectives in mind: 
•  Providing certainty of delivery of the Northern Territory Government’s vision; 
•  To provide the best available expertise in each facet of the project; 
•  Allocating roles and responsibilities across Consortium members best experienced and placed to 
manage same; and  
•  Facilitating a clear risk allocation away from the Northern Territory Government to the private 
sector parties best positioned to price and manage the risks associated with the Project. 
 
The structure diagram in Figure 5-2 sets out the key relationships between the Darwin Cove 
Consortium members and the Territory Government. 
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Figure 5-2 Consortium EoI Structure Diagram (ABN AMRO 2003) 
 
The Darwin Cove Consortium SPV was required to undertake the preparation of the broad site 
master planning and integration of this master planning with the neighboring Darwin CBD precinct. 
In turn the Darwin Cove Consortium SPV contracted down to the Convention and Exhibition Centre 
SPV and the Walker Corporation - Master Developer SPV. ABN AMRO was the sponsor, 
underwriter and arranger of the Convention and Exhibition Centre SPV. Walker Corporation was to 
also be a sponsor (however latter withdrew – refer section 5.4), underwriter and arranger of the 
Walker Corporation - Master Developer SPV. 
 
ABN AMRO Australia Limited filled the role of project sponsor for the Convention and Exhibition 
Centre, and would underwrite all debt and equity requirements for this aspect of the Project. ABN 
AMRO would also retain a long-term role as bond, administration and asset manager for the 
Convention and Exhibition Centre. 
 
ABN AMRO as project sponsor was responsible for arranging and delivering all aspects of the 
Convention and Exhibition Centre facility under a BOOT arrangement involving what was 
envisaged to be a 25-30 year concession period.  
 
In its role of sponsor of the Convention and Exhibition Centre development, ABN AMRO is 
responsible for procurement of a suitably qualified convention and exhibition centre operator. ABN 
AMRO undertook preliminary discussions with several local operators who expressed an interest in 
operating the new Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre. 
 
Recognising the potentially competing interests of local operators, ABN AMRO also approached a 
number of overseas operators. Responsibility for marketing the Convention and Exhibition Centre 
and successfully integrating its marketing into the broader context of business, convention and 
incentive tourism was intended to be the responsibility of Convention and Exhibition Centre 
management in collaboration with the Northern Territory Convention Bureau, Northern Territory 
Tourist Commission, the Australian Tourist Commission and other global alliance partners. 
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ABN AMRO is a mature and long-term participant in the infrastructure financing market with a 
record of financing up to ten PPP type infrastructure projects in the Australian market. Support in 
relation to the Project is prospective at the EoI stage, which was formalised as solid underwriting 
approval was obtained during the tender phase. 
 
Walker Corporation Pty Ltd was responsible for site master planning and integration of the 
Convention and Exhibition Centre with waterfront living and supporting retail and commercial 
facilities. 
 
The Walker Corporation role as the Master Developer SPV was to sponsor and underwrite the 
delivery of the urban development element of the project. Such development was expected to be 
conducted in stages over a 10 – 15 year period. The staged nature of the development would track 
the expansion of the Darwin City population and market demand.  
 
The input of Local Developers was critical to Darwin Cove Consortium’s strategy. Local input was 
vital to ensure Darwin Cove Consortium’s delivery on the Northern Territory Government’s stated 
vision for the Project. To this end, a significant element of urban development was planned to 
involve local property developers. 
 
The Darwin Cove Consortium has the necessary skills to address all funding requirements. In the 
case of the residential development, the average size of the residential stages of the project would 
require funding capacity of $50m – $100m. 
 
The Walker Corporation has been the lead developer in several Joint Ventures for major 
government development initiatives, within the bounds of prescriptive development standards. The 
outcome required by government was to achieve high quality design, scheduled delivery of the key 
public infrastructure and the completion of the stages of the project in an agreed time frame. 
 
Sitzler Bros. (Darwin) Pty Limited and Barclay Mowlem Limited 
Sitzler Bros. and Barclay Mowlem were contracted to design and construct the Convention and 
Exhibition Centre as partners under the Sitzler Barclay Mowlem Joint Venture (SBMJV). SBMJV 
engaged design, engineering and other specialist consultants. Darwin Cove Consortium SPV 
subcontracted design and construct risks to SBMJV, via a fixed price, fixed time D&C Contract. 
 
This contractual and management structure was established to ensure that Darwin Cove 
Consortium optimises delivery of the Northern Territory Government’s objectives. 
 
The principle goals of the design and construction team were to: 
• Respond to Convention and Exhibition Centre needs and objectives in a manner that provided 
a value for money outcome for all stakeholders involved in the project; 
• Actively partake in a stakeholder community consultative process that would ensure the 
delivery of a dramatic signature building that is an icon of the complete development. 
• Actively seek to engage the services of local business and labour to achieve a high level of 
local participation  
• Deliver a Convention and Exhibition Centre that meet all operating requirements for the 
convention market as a multi-purpose venue; 
• Deliver the Convention and Exhibition Centre within the agreed contract sum and time 
stipulated; 
• Construct the Convention and Exhibition Centre to the required quality standards; 
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• Execute the works in a manner to minimise the effects of construction on the public, tourists, 
adjacent business and adjoining landowners. 
 
The project organisation structure at the EoI stage was developed to achieve the following: 
• A single contracting entity (Darwin Cove Consortium SPV) with Northern Territory Government 
which was responsible for the overall development of the Darwin City Waterfront precinct. This 
entity has a board consisting of the key consortium sponsors and a management team. 
• Darwin Cove Consortium SPV has contracted the Convention and Exhibition Centre SPV for 
the delivery of the Convention and Exhibition Centre and its long-term operations and facilities 
management. It was intended that the responsibility for all initial infrastructure and certain key 
developments such as the initial public space, wharves and foreshore work and retail and 
restaurant developments would also rest with this entity. 
• Darwin Cove Consortium SPV has contracted with Walker Corporation for all other site 
developments likely to take place over the longer-term time frame. 
 
The following consultants and advisers were engaged by the Darwin Cove Consortium at the time 
of the EoI stage. 
 
Table 5-2 Darwin Cove Consortium – Consultants and Advisers 
Area of Specialisation  Consultant / Adviser 
Project Director  
– Convention and Exhibition Centre 
CW-DC Pty Ltd 
Architect and Principal Consultant  Woods Bagot 
Urban Master planning  Trevor Reddacliff 
Engineering Services  Connell Wagner, Connell Mott MacDonald 
Convention and Exhibition Centre  
Concept Architecture  
Skidmore, Owings & Merrill 
Waterfront Planning Consultant  The Gapp 
Waterfront Development Advisor  V&A Waterfront 
Quantity Surveyors  Rider Hunt 
Legal Advisor  Freehills 
Tax and Accounting Advice  KPMG 
 
The success of this Darwin project is not only dependent on the provision of the Convention and 
Exhibition Centre but the development of ancillary developments which provided an initial critical 
mass for the precinct. These included a hotel or serviced apartments, some retail and restaurants, 
with all major infrastructure such as roads, wharf construction and remediation work carried out to 
the extent necessary for the initial stage to stand alone as a completed facility. 
 
With respect to the ongoing further development of the site, in particular the large residential 
component, this is expected to continue in stages over a period in excess of 10 years. The master 
plan for the site would enable this staggered development to occur in a planned fashion without the 
project resembling a construction site. Expansion would be able to occur within each discrete 
component of the site without damaging the amenity of the remainder of the site. 
 
Walker Corporation is carrying out the longer term residential development, and understand that 
the master plan must allow for control over density and height to ensure that the overall 
development is digestible within the capacities of the real estate demand.  
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The core tenets of the funding approach promoted by Darwin Cove Consortium are as follows: 
• Keep to a minimum upfront payments required to be made by Government; 
• Deliver the Convention and Exhibition Centre, including the connection of waterfront 
development to Smith Street, utilising a privately financed PPP style concession arrangement; 
and 
• Offset such availability payments with the revenue stream flowing from the staged surrounding 
urban development. 
 
Keep Up-front Payments by Government to a Minimum 
The consortium made the offer to government to assume the responsibility of remediation of the 
site provided some upfront payments, or a component of the availability payments be made. Such 
initial remediation is required, at a minimum, for the Convention and Exhibition Centre site and 
surrounding infrastructure. 
 
To the extent that Government would prefer initial remediation and site preparation works be 
funded via deferred payments, Darwin Cove Consortium can accommodate such an approach 
through the inclusion of this element of the Project under the Convention and Exhibition Centre 
PPP described below. 
 
Convention and Exhibition Centre PPP 
Darwin Cove Consortium’s funding approach to the Convention and Exhibition Centre involves the 
Northern Territory Government implementing a privately financed PPP style concession 
arrangement. 
 
Under this approach the rights and risks associated with design, construction, operation, 
maintenance and financing of the facility is primarily borne by the private sector, in return for which 
Northern Territory Government pay a fixed, performance based Availability Charge. Performance 
standards dictating the payment of the Availability Charge are determined at the outset. Availability 
payments are made by the Government over a 25 – 30 year period. 
 
The Northern Territory Government availability charges are securitised and result in the issuance 
of senior debt, the rating on which would be closely related to that of the Northern Territory 
Government. It is expected that the senior debt issue, therefore, would be highly rated, delivering 
the Northern Territory Government with a value-for-money funding solution. 
 
5.3.3 Short Listing EoI Registrants 
It was published in a media release by the NTG, that they received eleven registration documents 
from private consortia up to the closing period for EoI’s on the 20 October 2003. This followed EoI 
documents being issued to all registered parties on the 5 September 2003.  
 
As per the governments initial project timeline on the 19 December 2003, the following three short 
listed proponents were announced by the NTG. 
 Multiplex 
 Leightons 
 ABNAMRO /  Walker Corp 
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Figure 5-3 EoI Consortium Organisation Structure (ABN AMRO 2003) 
 
5.4 Call for Detailed Proposals ’Bid Phase’ 
The second stage of the project procurement process was observed and witnessed the formation of the 
consortium team – the Darwin Cove Consortium and how its detailed bid documentation was prepared. This 
phase ran from 14 January 2004 through to 17 September 2004 when the preferred proponent was 
announced after Detailed Further Offers were considered by government. 
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Detailed Bid Documents were issued to the three short listed consortia by government on the 14 January 
2004 for submission of detailed proposals by 12 May 2004. A negotiation process then follows. 
 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
5.4.1 Understanding the Bid Process Requirements  
The requirements for the preparation of detailed proposals by private consortia and responsibilities of 
both public and private parties are outlined as it stood at the commencement of the bid phase 
process. 
5.4.1.1 Bid Documentation and Project Outline 
The ’Call for Detailed Proposals’ or ‘Bid Document’ was issued on the 14th January 2004 and 
the document contained two parts, Part A and B.  
 
Part A - The Call Document - contained project background and information, objectives and 
evaluation criteria, the call process and returnable schedules.  
 
Part B is a series of twenty-three separate information documents, such as a draft form of the 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), topographical survey and site historical records, to 
name a few key documents, the full list is a follows:  
1.  EIS - Phase 1 Site Contamination and Geotechnical Preliminary Site Investigation Report 
and Sampling and Analysis Plan (still under development) 
2.  Cadastral Survey including easement locations Stage 1 survey is included. Drawing 
03/5732/1E: Boundary, Easement and Pedestrian Linkage Information, URS Australia 
Pty Ltd 
3.  GIS survey 
4.  Topographical Survey 
5.  Convention Bureau data 
a.   Data on NT Meetings by Region (Centre) provided by The NT Convention Bureau, 4th 
February 2003 
b.   Data on NT Meetings by Region (Top End) provided by The NT Convention Bureau, 
4th February 2003 
6.   Information on DCW Site history 
a.    Telling the Story of the Port Darwin Wharf Precinct, Barbara James, November, 1999; 
b.   The Evolution of Darwin, 1869-1911: A history of the Northern Territory’s capital city 
during the years of South Australian administration, Kathy De La Rue, soon to be 
published by CDU Press with financial assistance by Darwin City Council - Chapter 1 
and Appendix B only; 
c.   The Old Darwin Port Area Heritage and History Notes, M A Clinch, August, 1999 
d.   Darwin Wharf and Port Precinct Study, Barbara Mary Pedersen, 
e.   Historical plans overlying aerial photo. 
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7.  Services compilation plan 
8.  Land Title information Record of Administrative Interests and Information and Search 
Certificates. Lots 5225, 5250, 5251, 6521, 6590, 6604, 6605, 7248, 7249 
9.  Building Northern Territory Industry Participation – 2003 
a.  Local Industry Participation Policy Guidelines, 2003 which can also be viewed at the 
following website: 
 http://www.dbird.nt.gov.au/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/DBIRD_TBC/DEVELOP/INVES
TIN/BUILDING/GUIDELINES.PDF 
b.  Local Industry Participation Policy, 2003 which can also be viewed at the following 
website: 
 http://www.dbird.nt.gov.au/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/DBIRD_TBC/DEVELOP/INVES
TING/BUILDING/BNTIP.PDF 
10.  DIPE storm surge map - Northern Territory Floodplain Management Committee DWN 
2495 (based on VIPAC report 24113-1 Greater Darwin Storm Surge Risk August 
1994) 
11.  Port Usage Overview 
12.  Aerial photomap 
13.  AAPA Certificate Aboriginal Areas Protection Authority Certificate No. C 2004/004 
(Doc No. 46125) dated 13 January 2004 
14.  Native Title clearance / opinions. This paper outlines the following: 
• Existence/Summary of Claims 
• Summary of Opinions 
• Confirmation that the Territory would bear the risk 
15.  Guide to Infrastructure Requirements 
16.  Car parking contribution plan Car Parking Contribution Plan, Darwin City Council, 
April 2000 
17.  Pipeline layouts Drawing no. 68501/H1 Rev A, Pipeline layouts, Port of Darwin 
18.  Draft Maritime Transport Security Regulations, DOTARS 2003 
19.  Indicative Headworks Plan 
20.  Draft 10 year cruise vision 
21.  EIS Phase II Detailed Site Contamination Investigation and Field Geotechnical 
Investigation Report 
22.  Northern Territory Tourist Commission Information about the Northern Territory 
Tourist Commission 
23.  Public Art Definition 
 
The details of the required deliverables are presented in the returnable schedules of the bid 
documents (Part A) and are further summarised.  
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Table 5-3 Bid Phase Deliverables 
Item Objective Deliverable 
1 Master Planned 
Development by Private 
Sector 
Exposition of both the Master plan and the urban design 
philosophy adopted in text and drawings. Illustrative 
boards. Scale Model. Outline the two distinct 
development stages. 
2 Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre - Design 
and Function 
Scale model. Identification of specific elements, area 
analysis and functional relationship Schedule of FF&E  
3 Sustainability Principles 
(ESD) 
 
Sustainability (ESD) plan for all elements of the Master 
plan, including the DCEC outlines objectives and KPI’s 
4 Local Industry and 
Indigenous Participation 
 
Outline estimated project value and Northern Territory 
Industry component for businesses and services, 
suppliers and labour utilisation and capacity, regional 
economic development benefits and Indigenous 
participation. A communication strategy to inform, 
educate, and enhance local industry participation. 
5 Business Plan 
 
Business Plans, projections and Financial Models for 
DCEC operation. Demand Analysis and Marketing 
Strategy. Maintenance & Life Cycle Replacement 
6 Partnering Structure 
 
Outline previous experience to deliver similar 
developments, financial and legal structure proposed. 
Evidence of the source and certainty of project funds. 
Company (or other vehicle) structure and financial 
arrangements. Management and delivery team and key 
professional consultants, contractors and advisers and 
their ongoing roles. Outline contracting documentation. 
7 Financial Structuring and 
Territory Funding 
 
Outline cash flow movement and cash requirements 
where expected to be greatest for milestones by lending 
terms and conditions. Sensitivities for using best and 
worst case scenarios, impact on funding constraints and 
conditions. Interest rate, swap margin, financier’s margin 
and other funding costs. 
8 Risk Allocation Strategies 
 
Mark up risk allocation plan confirming those risks which 
are not accepted, the reasons for non-acceptance and 
any proposed alternative. 
9 Project Documentation Review drafts of Concession Deed, PDA and 
Development Lease for acceptance (or otherwise) 
10 Requirements of the 
Territory 
Requirements or exposure of stakeholders either in 
monetary contribution or in kind resulting from proposal. 
11 Statutory Declaration,  
Confidentiality Agreement 
and Intellectual Property 
Rights 
Declaration of conflicting interests for all participating 
parties, usage of confidential information and transfer of 
intellectual rights of the design product. 
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5.4.1.2 Project Constraints 
The NTG identified the following framework for the bid phase and development of the site: 
• Four months to produce the detailed bid proposal (14 January 2004- 12 May 2004) 
• Construction scheduled to commence in January 2005 
• The DCEC is to be completed and operating as soon as practicable, anticipated to be 
late 2006, under a BOOT arrangement 
• Maintaining existing adjoining land / business functionality 
• Height of structures limited to adjacent escarpment height – not a ’Gold Coast’ 
development. 
• Full probity disclosure. Resulting disclosure of information from all individual 
consultations including stakeholders in which discussions of master plan and bid 
details may be had. 
5.4.1.3 Project Deliverables 
The land component of the DCW Site is approximately 25 Ha. Opportunities also exist to 
reclaim adjacent waters within the DCW Site. 
 
An essential element of the DCW Project was the delivery and operation of a purpose built 
world class convention and exhibition centre (DCEC), which is the centre-piece of the 
substantial Stage One. The contractual basis for the delivery of the DCEC is a Build Own 
Operate Transfer (BOOT) structure linked to key performance indicators which maximise the 
economic benefit to the Territory. 
 
The government at the outset of the bid phase anticipated that the DCW Project included, in 
addition to the DCEC, complementary hospitality/retail/tourist accommodation development, 
commercial development, community uses (including a major water/pool feature), residential 
dwellings, marine activities, full waterfront access for the public and open space areas. 
 
The DCW Project must achieve connectivity with the rest of Darwin’s CBD. The final mix of 
development use would depend on market forces and a requirement that the development is 
complementary to Darwin’s CBD. Any development immediately fronting the CBD escarpment 
would not exceed the height of the escarpment. 
 
Redevelop site to maximise the appeal of those parts of DCW Site (designed for such 
purposes) as a new, exciting and distinctive venue for local national and international events. 
5.4.1.4 Northern Territory Government Responsibilities 
The Territory was prepared to undertake at its cost the removal of existing maritime and 
industrial operations related building infrastructure, and progressively upgrade infrastructure 
external to the DCW Site.  The Territory would complete decontamination of the site to a 
standard certified by the Independent Environmental Auditor and in time to the construction 
timetable agreed.  
 
The Territory had budgeted to contribute the DCW site and at least a $100 million to be 
applied to the capital cost of the DCEC, operating expenses, and other major infrastructure 
works for Stage One.  
 
The Territory had allowed to complete the environmental impact statement (EIS) and 
assessment process defining those elements of the environment which may be affected by a 
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development proposal, and of determining the significance, risk and consequences of the 
potential impacts of the proposal. Recommendations arising from the assessment were tabled 
to address methods to mitigate these impacts. 
 
The Territory was prepared to make a payment of $250,000 (plus GST) to unsuccessful 
Proponents where the proposal is compliant and all IP rights are transferred. This represents a 
partial reimbursement of the Proponent’s costs and disbursements incurred in preparing its 
Proposal. 
5.4.1.5 Consortium Responsibilities 
The consortium was to remove remaining on ground structures such as slabs and services 
including redundant fuel lines. The consortium was to design and construct all services and 
infrastructure within the site including re-location of existing services see they remain 
functioning (ie to wharves) such as fuel pipelines. Undertake all earthworks and coastal 
protection works including dredging and disposal of spoil. Provide an all-weather access 
system linking the DCW Site with the Darwin CBD. Document pedestrian and cycle paths 
leading from the DCW Site to established byways. Ensure works on the DCW site do not 
prevent continued operation of existing adjoining businesses.  
 
The Master plan was to be prepared in a manner which minimises the cost of 
decontamination. 
5.4.2 Building the Team and the Vision 
Throughout February 2004 the consortium team, the ’Darwin Cove Consortium’ updated its team 
membership and roles since the EoI process and developed a preliminary master plan after initial 
team meetings in Darwin and NTG project briefings. 
 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
5.4.2.1 Consortium Bid Phase Structure and Roles 
During the bid phase the SPV entities required by the NTG were not established within the 
consortium partners, instead a ’bid team’ was assembled. The SPVs are only established once 
the consortium becomes the preferred proponent and concession holder for the development 
of the DCW site following the execution of PDA’s and financial close is achieved. 
 
The Territory wanted the DCW Site to be developed through a PPP structure. The Territory’s 
objective was to establish a clearly defined partnering structure and contractual and financial 
arrangements. 
 
The contractual basis for the delivery of the DCEC was a Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) 
structure linked to key performance indicators which maximise the economic benefit to the 
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Territory. Various SPVs were established to service the BOOT obligations required by the 
Territory. These SPVs subsequently engage managers, operators and development 
contractors. A Convention Centre (DCEC) SPV was established by the consortium to deliver 
the DCEC and associated infrastructure. An Infrastructure SPV established to deliver the site 
infrastructure and associated land improvements. A residential SPV to deliver the residential 
apartments and associated hospitality developments. 
 
During the bid phase the consortium partners (equity partners) fund their own involvement 
through covering professional staff fees and expenses. ABN-AMRO as bid leaders reimburse 
the professional fees and expenses of all technical advisors (non-equity partners) and other 
bid related costs, such as the scale models and any further investigations. 
 
3 Feb 2004, Consortium kick-off meeting in Darwin. This meeting provided the opportunity 
for consortium members to meet face-to-face for the first time and update the team member 
changes since the EoI was lodged. Roles are outlined and the process and programme Table 
5-4) for the following months to complete the bid phase elements for the submission in May 
2004 are tabled. At the outset of the bid phase the three short listed consortia jostled to secure 
key team members. Notably the consultants Woods Bagot, Trevor Reddacliff and Skidmore, 
Owings & Merrill where replaced by Hassell Architects and Crawfords TVS undertaking 
architectural, master planning and Convention and Exhibition Centre Concept Architecture 
respectively. 
 
Table 5-4 Bid Phase Programme 
 
WEEK DATE TASK 
1 04-Feb-04 Government Briefing 
   First Masterplan & Draft Briefs Stage I & II 
2 11-Feb-04 Draft return briefs stage I & II 
3 18-Feb-04 Present concepts stage I & II 
4 25-Feb-04 Draft Engineering / infrastructure brief  
   Elemental Cost Plan 
5 03-Mar-04 Present masterplan / architecturals / engineering for costing 
6 10-Mar-04 1st cut on overall cost plan 
7 17-Mar-04 Design development to 30% 
8 24-Mar-04 Freeze design 
9 31-Mar-04 Cost plan issue 
10 07-Apr-04 Commence bid documents 
11 14-Apr-04 Conclude deals 
12 21-Apr-04 Review Bid documents 
13 28-Apr-04 Colate Documents 
14 05-May-04 Check deliverables 
15 12-May-04 Submit Bid 
 
Consortium Partner and Consultant Roles. Local industry participation following Territory 
guidelines utilising a Local Industry Participation Plan (LIPP) was important to the Territory 
Government. Sitlzer Bros, Henry Walker Eltin (HWE), Connell Wagner (CW), Knight Frank 
(Commercial Property Consultants), Rider Hunt (cost consultants) and Hassell (Architects), 
are all locally based firms with a national profile. Siltzer Bros have a joint venture agreement 
with Barclay Mowlem, known as SBMJV to provide greater financial capacity. 
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Crawford TVS are specialist large public building designers based in the USA and Melbourne. 
ABN-AMRO has a past relationship with Crawford TVS and have been appointed as the 
principal DCEC Architect. 
 
It was planned that if the bid was successful, Connell Wagner and Group of Companies would 
undertake separate key roles to the DCEC SPV and Infrastructure SPV, utilising its Connell 
Mott-MacDonald and CW-DC P/L entities respectively. This would be similar for consortium 
architects and other design specialists. Through its Management Services section, Connell 
Wagner would also be engaged directly to the developer or concession holder the ’Darwin 
Cove Consortium’ in the role of Project Director overseeing all works, responsible to the NTG. 
 
For the bid phase of the project, Connell Wagner acted on behalf of ABN-AMRO as the Bid 
Manager for the Darwin Cove Consortium. All consortium members assumed responsibility of 
the relevant project elements during the bid phase inline with the assignment SPV entities if 
successful. The consortium members to develop Stage 1 of the DCW site are summarised in 
Table 5-5. 
 
Table 5-5 Bid Phase Consortium Members 
 
Project Elements 
Responsibility 
SPV Leader  
(Equity Partner) 
 
Technical Advisor  
(Non-Equity Partner) 
Project Sponsor  
Bid Leader and 
Developer  
ABN-AMRO Connell Wagner P/L (Project 
Director) 
Hassell Architects (Master Plan) 
Rider Hunt (Cost Estimation) 
Convention Centre 
(DCEC) 
Sitzler Bros and Barclay 
Mowlem JV (SBMJV) 
Crawfords TVS (Principal Design 
Consultant and Architect) 
Connell Mott-MacDonald (Building 
Services Engineering) 
Stage 1 Infrastructure Henry Walker Eltin (HWE) Hassell (Principal Design 
Consultant and Architect) 
CW-DC (Engineering Services) 
Residential Walker Corporation Not established at this stage 
 
 
SBMJV intended to engage Connell Mott MacDonald for full design engineering services for 
Structural only, and Mechanical, Hydraulic, Electrical and Fire services were to a concept 
design stage if the bid was successful. HWE intended to engage CW-DC Pty Ltd for full 
detailed design of all services. 
 
The NTG project team held a project briefing on the 4 February 2004 in Darwin for all 
proponents. Key matters raised during this discussion of the bid process and explanation of 
the bid documents included: 
• Public sector (delivery) comparator (PSC) would not be made public 
• Probity auditor appointed 
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5.4.2.2 Development of the Master plan 
The first master plan developed by the consortium team was issued internally on 16 Feb 2004 
by Hassell with two options for the DCEC location. The first option was water based and 
second a land based option for sighting of the DCEC, both of which differed from the NTG 
concept master plan produced at the EoI stage and after public consultation.  This was a great 
risk for the consortium to take and required some initial consultation with the Territory to 
ensure this proposal was not going to jeopardise the bid process and be ruled out. 
 
Further key concepts of the development master plan included: 
- Residential finger apartments into the sea 
- Mother-of-peal iconic DCEC form, symbolic of a midden (an aboriginal meeting place) 
- Mixed use precinct wet and dry season functionality 
- Alfresco dinning 
- Darwin’s safe beach 
- A space for the family to go free of charge 
 
The consortium was able to obtain feedback from the Territory regarding this initial master 
plan. The Territory found that the master plan did not align with the project constraints such as 
to maintain the use of site’s existing wharves and emphasise the past historical significance. 
Also the development footprint extended into sites of historical importance without any 
consideration. 
 
A preliminary initial cost estimate based purely on the master plan sketch concept without any 
engineering details was provided by Rider Hunt. This estimate was based on the stage one 
master plan gross areas and utilising previous similar project rates. This provided the 
consortium with the first indicative development bid estimate. The cost included $100m of 
government money to develop necessary infrastructure to support the Convention Centre. 
 
 
DCEC   $70 M 
INFRASTRUCTURE  $62 M  
 
TOTAL   $132 M 
Table 5-6 Comparative Cost Estimate 
 
5.4.3 Engineering the Master Plan 
Throughout March 2004, the engineering elements to support the master plan were examined by the 
consortium technical advisors. As part of the development of concept documentation, engineering 
input was required to support the master plan. This involved devising the necessary conceptual 
infrastructure, structures and specifications for an engineering functional design brief which sets the 
engineering parameters. 
 
Jason Gillard Masters Exegeses  Section 5 - Presentation of Case Study 
 
  Page 67 of 138 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
The key engineering design elements in response to the master plan for the DCW project were: 
• New iconic, multi-story building structures and associated building services 
• Overcoming climatic conditions and proximity to marine environment 
• Incorporation of ESD principals for all services requirements 
• Utilisation of co-generation and recycling option development 
• Incorporation of marina and other water activities infrastructure involving dredging and land 
reclamation 
• Traffic management and supporting road network development 
• Environmental controls, rehabilitation and decontamination 
• Provision of public utilities to service required site amenities 
 
The marine environment was a huge obstacle to overcome as the development site is coastal. 
Darwin’s cyclonic conditions (Cyclone Tracey 1974) required raised building flood levels, possible 
breakwater protection, removal of mangroves and visible mud flats, creation of a stationary body of 
water to be created for marina purposes involving a lock to access the marina. Darwin’s tropical 
climate and 8m tidal fluctuations also pose difficult static conditions. 
 
Based on recent developments adjacent the Darwin harbour (ie, Bayview Haven and East Arm Port), 
the decision was made at this juncture to remove the existing mangroves and mud to enable 
construction of structures upon these areas. The mud was to be removed using dredging techniques 
and disposed in a deep sea location. Due to the cost implications of geotechnical investigation in the 
immediate harbour area, this was not considered. Instead existing bathometric data obtained for 
establishment of dredge volumes of mud were used. No investigation works were allowed by 
proponents during the bid phase as the Territory government was still completing the EIS, which 
included detailed environmental investigative work. Visible investigation work may also have 
provided other proponents an insight into what was being considered as part of the proposed master 
plan. Disclosure of the bid details to other proponents, particularly the master plan was to be avoided 
at all costs. 
 
The proximity to the CBD and nature of the development involving significant residential and ’peak 
event’ movements during large public events, required a traffic and car parking study to produce a 
report into future traffic generating volumes and patterns. The difficulty here lies in securing the 
knowledge of just what is the potential usage of the DCEC, ie basketball matches to the Rolling 
Stones concerts. 
 
The NTG released several tender addenda in the form of existing information pertaining to Darwin 
CBD car parking layouts and figures, Darwin City Council el-fresco dining guidelines and further EIS 
investigation data as these investigation proceeded in parallel with the bid preparation process. 
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5.4.4 Funding the Vision 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
April 2004 was the time to finalise the ’vision’ and bring to fruition the ins and outs of the deal in the 
detailed master plan. 
 
The bid team engaged the assistance of commercial leasing and marketing specialists, to create the 
precinct vision as a destination, place of interest and market its benefit to the Darwin community. To 
achieve a real commitment to growth of the local economy commercial retail, leisure and 
entertainment opportunities to complement the project elements of the bid were developed.  
 
Potential commercial tenants ranging from therapeutic services, retail outlets, hospitality outlets and 
restaurants from both local and national franchises were approached to endorse and support the bid 
proposal.  This approach puts a ’soul’ into the precinct master plan ensuring a balanced mix of public 
spaces, services, commercial and retail initiatives, leisure and entertainment attractions and 
residential hubs were considered. 
 
It was through this process of luring retail tenants, that a surfware retail outlet raised the idea for 
holding surfing competitions in Darwin to promote sales of surfboards. However the lack of consistent 
waves in Darwin gave rise to another idea, a wave pool. 
 
All these marketable ideas to endorse the elements within precinct and promote the publics interest 
were fed back into the master plan to build the ’public domain’ elements within the open public 
spaces. 
 
For such a short bid process the time to generate an idea such as a master plan and then develop 
the technical details to enable examination of project risks was very limited. Nonetheless detail of the 
master plan was required to cost the infrastructure build, operation and ongoing maintenance as part 
of a PPP deal in order to create a winning proposal. 
 
With the master plan constantly being refined around the thinking ’to create the vision’, at some point 
in time this creativity needed to be frozen. It was then be backed up with engineering and technical 
advice for the construction partners to provide a guaranteed maximum price (GMP) to the project 
sponsor to confirm fixed financing arrangements. 
 
5.4.4.1 Focus on the Residential Aspect 
At this stage in the bid process limited master planning of the residential elements of the 
development had occurred without any consideration of marketability leading to property sales. 
It was at this point in time that a residential developer with experience in the Darwin market 
provided some focus to the master planners to provide viability input. This included 
incorporation of marina aspects to the apartment developments and a lock for increasing 
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residential land value. The residential elements for the DCW were based on a similar 
development at Walsh Bay in Sydney comprising ’fingers’ of apartments built over the existing 
wharfs. This configuration also lends itself to maximising ESD principals for cross ventilation 
as an example for reducing air conditioning costs. 
 
5.4.4.2 Engineering Risk 
With the time now gone for further engineering development, the focus of the bid moved to 
development of detailed cost breakdowns to cover all issues and gaps. 
 
With a still changing master plan (submitted as part of the proposal), and the short timeframe 
of the bid process, inherent construction risks still remained to be resolved as limited 
engineering details could be developed to inform equity partners of all construction elements. 
These remaining risks included: 
• Interfaces between each construction contract 
• Hydro-geological issues surrounding basement construction in proximity of open water 
• Façade and roof construction to the DCEC to comply with Darwin’s cyclonic conditions 
• Expectations for finishes to DCEC and local capacity of subcontractors 
• Alignment with Operator and FM of building services for DCEC 
• Car Parking (in building) allotments and traffic management 
• Infrastructure not aligning with latest master plan 
• Development of water play and aquatic infrastructure 
• Wave condition, through hydro-dynamic modeling, impacts upon infrastructure design 
criteria 
• Adequacy of water quality infrastructure necessary for new locked bodies of water 
• Impact of existing site contamination upon development 
• Geotechnical conditions 
 
The engineering details were not a requirement of the bid documents returnable schedules. 
 
The revised cost estimate provided by the estimators within each construction partner, was 
based on the developed engineering details for stage one of the master plan and had 
undergone an increase of $47millon from the initial preliminary cost plan developed by the 
quantity surveyor. 
 
Table 5-7 Initial Elemental Cost Estimate 
DCEC   $106 M (QS estimate $90M) 
INFRASTRUCTURE  $73 M  
 
TOTAL   $179 
 
The revised cost estimate made allowances for risks such as the pricing of steel in the future 
(due to the demand in China), possible increases of local labour rates in the future (also due to 
demand) and potential union action. Furthermore where details of the project elements had not 
been engineered, provisional cost (PC) sums were allocated, as is typical for the case of the 
community open space works. Other risks included dredging and cartage of fill material as 
earthworks quantities had only been ascertained based on preliminary information without 
detailed geotechnical investigations.  
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5.4.5 Pulling the Deal Together 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
May 2004 provided only a few weeks to bring all of the deal components together into one detailed 
proposal document. A specialist marketing consultant including a team of technical writers developed 
the written text for the bid documents and returnable schedules, using input from all consortium 
partners and technical advisors. 
 
The Toga Group replaced the Walker Corporation as they pulled out of the bid some 2-3 weeks 
before bid close claiming that they couldn’t make it work for the residential elements. 
 
5.4.6 Contents of the Proposal Documents 
The call for detailed proposals or bid phase closed on the 12 May 2004 as scheduled. As all 
proponents had to personally present their bid details to the NTG tender panel on the 9 July 2004, 
the details of the final bid documents are discussed following the presentation format. 
 
Darwin Cove Consortium Detailed Proposal in the form of each Returnable Schedule ’The 
deliverables’ are contained in Appendix A.   
 
The master plan provided a radical departure from the bid documentation in which the DCEC was 
sited off-centre of the development site and water based to create a visual impact to the public when 
entering the site from the main roadway from the CBD. This location also complemented the footprint 
of the stage 1 separable works from the residential build out in stage 2. 
 
The DCEC building comprising all of the necessary specified functionality took a ’mother-o-pearl’ or a 
’midden’ form which was symbolic of local industry and past indigenous links with the site 
respectively. 
 
Central and shared co-generation plant in partnership with a commercial utility company was 
provided to provide energy generation through solar panels and recovered waste energy for cooling 
and heating of water as a means of addressing sustainability across the development. 
 
Local Industry and Indigenous Participation was afforded in the proposal through utilisation of some 
of the largest locally available industry partners aware of the local community drivers and established 
labour support networks. 
 
The business plan for the success of the DCEC was under pinned through fixed price and time D&C 
contracts for construction, operation, maintenance and debt and equity finance assumed by the 
private sector for a 25 year period. An offer for Community Infrastructure to also be leased back to 
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government for various periods in a similar fashion to the DCEC was provided. The private elements 
while master planned but not funded would be fully underwritten by the consortium at the conclusion 
of financial close as necessary to compliment stage 1 with the remainder delivered inline with market 
demand. 
 
A traditional and proven PPP approach was able to be developed by the consortium using 
experienced local partners for the DCEC and supportive community infrastructure to partner with 
government. With the private elements (residential apartments) delivered separately by a developer 
Toga Developments. 
 
The financing structure adopted took risk on both completion and the long-term asset performance of 
the project using D&C and facility maintenance arrangements with consortium partners SMBJV and 
Honeywell respectively. 
 
A large majority of risks generally had been assumed by the consortium where they can choose how 
to manage, devise processes to assess, give back and share risks with government. Additional 
government assumed risks included archaeological with sharing of interest rate changes and force-
majeure events. 
 
The proposed project contract documentation required significant amendment to address the 
consortium commercial interests and proposal structure. The most significant was the separation of 
the operation of the DCEC from the delivery of the facility. 
 
The consortium’s specified requirements of government included: 
• Site decontamination and preparation issues related to dredging and disposal of marine 
sediments 
• Establishment of a suitable foundation for breakwater structure (during financial close) 
• Unexploded Ordinance 
• Provision of essential services and improvements to the site boundary, incl. telecommunications 
and other necessary headworks 
• Allocation of provisional sums to allow further design development of several community 
infrastructure and public domain elements. 
 
The legal and commercial framework associated with Figure 5-4  contains the following key 
elements: 
• Darwin Cove Convention Centre Pty Limited (Darwin Cove Convention Centre P/L), would 
enter into the Concession Deed with the Territory; 
• Darwin Cove Convention Centre Pty Limited is financed with equity (10%) and bond proceeds 
(90%); 
• AAA would provide construction letters of credit to the bondholders and equity from financial 
close until practical completion (2 years); 
• Darwin Cove Convention Centre Pty Limited would back-to-back its design and construction 
obligations to the D&C Contractor under the D&C Contract and will back-to-back its 
maintenance obligations to the Facility Manager under the FM Agreement; 
Territory pays an availability payment to Darwin Cove Convention Centre Pty Limited during the 
operating phase (subject to abatement for unavailability), which Darwin Cove Convention Centre Pty 
Limited would apply toward payment of the Facility Manager’s fee and capital costs (PPP structure). 
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Figure 5-4 Detailed proposal (bid phase) Partnering Structure  
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Commercials 
A breakdown of the financial commitment offered by the Darwin Cove Consortium to develop both 
public and private elements of the site is explained. 
 
The public elements costs include the DCEC and the Community Infrastructure (CI) are further 
broken down identifying the costs of the individual components (stage 1). Private elements 
comprise the apartment developments staged over a 10-15 year period (stage 2+). 
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Table 5-8 Bid phase commercials 
Stage 1 – Public Elements 
Component  Cost ($AUD million) 
DCEC  143.5 
Community Infrastructure (CI) 87 
Total Commitment  $230.5 million 
 
Stage 1 – Private Elements 
Component Quantity/Apts Cost 
($AUD millions) 
Hospitality Precinct 120 $32.0  
Residential Stage One Precinct 235 $84.0 
* The development cost of the Retail is included in the Hospitality Precinct Development cost 
 
Stage 2 – Private Element Investment 
Component Quantity/Apts Cost 
($AUD millions) 
Stage Two 1,265 $500 million 
 
Apartment Royalties 
All apartment sales would pass a 10 percent royalty payment to Northern Territory Government. 
Total Development Apartments 1500 
Avg Sale Price / Apartment $430,000.00 
Escalation Rate 6% p.a 
Royalty Payment to Govt (10%) $64.5 million 
 
All required funding for the delivery of the Public Elements is fully underwritten by ABN AMRO 
using the following structure; bonds $216m (sold down to Australian institutional investors), equity 
$15m (DAF Social Infrastructure Fund – a union-based industry fund) and construction finance 
$231m. 
 
Table 5-9 Bid phase estimate of public elements 
 BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC ELEMENTS 
DCEC Construction Cost Value ($AUD million) 
        Base Building (DCEC) 75.3 
        FFE 4.6 
        Pre-opening Costs 5.2  
        Other Plant and Equipment 5.8  
        Sea wall & Assoc. Activities 8.3  
        Prof. Fees / Contingency 12.5  
Total Construction Cost $111.5 m 
Other Funding Costs 32.0  
Total Costs $143.5 m 
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CI Construction Cost Value ($AUD million) 
        Breakwater 19.5  
        Apartment Hotel Carpark 8.7  
        Underground Services 6.8  
        Public Domain & Leisure 9.8  
        Preliminaries 5.5  
        Other Construction 15 
Total CI Construction Costs $65.3 m 
Other Funding Costs 21.7  
Total Costs $87 m 
 
Annual Financial Commitment 
Development Component Value 
($AUD million 2004) 
p.a. 
DCEC Availability Charge 11.3 
Operating Deficit Charge 0.85 
DCEC Asset Maint / Capital Ref 0.95 
Operating Equity Buffer 0.3  
Operator Management Fee 0.3 
Operator Risk Premium 0.125 
Community Infrastructure Availability 
Charge 
7.72  
Total Annual Charge * $21.5 million p.a 
* Availability charges commence on completion of the development estimated in 2007/08 
5.5 Detailed Further Offers ’Breaking the Deal’ 
During July – August 2004, the government entered into the process of interrogation of the consortia 
proposals prior to entering into detailed negotiations. 
 
The government requested each consortium provide Detailed Further Offers (DFO) to facilitate selection of 
a preferred proponent. The DFO request was received on the 21 June 2004 with a response due by the 19 
July 2004 and included the following matters concerning the consortium proposals received in general: 
• Difficultly in understanding structure (cross default provisions) 
• Deficiencies 
 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
Matters specific to the Darwin Cove Consortium detailed proposal raised by government where structured 
as per the detailed proposal Returnable Schedules (RS) and are presented in Appendix B.  
 
Generally the government raised the following concerns over the DCCC proposal: 
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• Incorporation of more local architecture, orientation, FF&E, security risk and completion date for DCEC 
• Reduction of buildings heights in master plan in proximity to existing escarpment 
• Clarification of elements delivered in stage 1 master plan 
• Performance of marine structures to resist erosion and wave action 
• Confirm costs of co-generation as part of ESD initiatives 
• Local industry participation tangible KPI’s to be set 
• Government contribution to DCEC to be fixed and clearly scoped 
• Further explanation of financial modelling figures for DCEC events to be provided 
• Demolition scope and funding clarified 
• Default termination position for all partners stated 
• Clarification of affect of DCEC availability payment in relation to meeting KPI’s 
• Reduce availability charges for DCEC to building cost only excluding infrastructure 
• Provide elemental cost breakdown of proposal including bid cost, contingencies and margins 
• Management of risk in regard to loss of DCEC operator 
• Single private element leader to be provided 
• Individual milestones and completion dates for stage 1 elements to be provided 
• Removal of provisional cost sums for CI elements 
 
As the preferred proponent was not as yet announced, the DFO stage was subject to continued probity 
constraints of the bid phase conditions. So it was not possible to know what or if any request or the nature of 
such request was made to the two other consortia to provide a DFO. 
 
During August the government and the consortium spent much time in Sydney brokering the deal in ABN-
ARMO’s and Government’s legal advisor offices respectively. Government were undertaking their own due-
diligence to understand the detailed proposal on offer examining such matters as the applicable scope for 
each elemental cost breakdown, value for money, risks, contracts and premiums. The Government was 
examining the consortium risk issues priced into detailed bid costs to ascertain if the risk was value for 
money or if the NTG were better placed to carry the risk.  
 
Essentially the deal government were seeking involved the consortium reducing its construction and 
associated costs (including corresponding operating / availability annual charges to government) by $4M off 
the community infrastructure (CI) works and $5M off the DCEC works costs. Whilst the costs were not 
reduced a series of agreed target cost items were established to be resolved through design development 
through the Financial Close phase was written into the draft PDA. 
 
Carrying forward any provisional cost (PC) sums to financial close was undesirable by government 
preferring guaranteed maximum price (GMP) sums for all project elements.  
 
The key outcome of these backroom negotiations resulted in the Government removing the Community 
Infrastructure (CI) works of the public elements from the concession arrangement and turning it into a direct 
D&C contract with a GMP. This left only the DCEC as a BOOT arrangement. This came about because 
government had $100m to contribute to the project costs. This approach saved government ongoing annual 
availability payments but presented Government with the cost and time risk for undertaking the works 
through a more traditional form of contracting. 
 
With this key break-through in the deal arranged between Government and the consortium partners, 
Government were then comfortable with the proposal and subsequently announced the Darwin Cove 
Consortium as the preferred proponent on the 17 September 2004. This moved the project procurement 
process into the Financial Close phase. 
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5.6 Financial Close 
As the fourth and final stage of the procurement process observed in the results set, financial close was also 
the last phase of involvement for the financier led team before they handed over to the construction SPV 
partners. This intense phase culminated when the government and the preferred proponent agreed the 
project scope and signed a contract (the PDA) to enter into the delivery phase for the construction of the 
works. A key deliverable for the private sector during this phase was to obtain project approval (consent) 
through the relevant statutory authorities granting a development (construction) permit. Financial close ran 
from September 2004 through to 9 May 2005. 
 
5.6.1 Defining Stage One of the Development 
 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
During September 2004, the NTG and the Darwin Cove Consortium as the preferred proponent, 
agreed to work through the outstanding details of the Bid Phase proposal and moved forward 
through a partnering arrangement over the following months to enable Financial Close to be 
achieved by jointly committing to resolution of the following matters: 
• Reduction in costs for CI works by $4M and include the DCEC pad civil / build ready works 
• Turn PC sums for CI components into GMP in particular the multi-storey car park, wave pool and 
cruise-ship terminal 
• Reduce DCEC costs by $5M whilst incorporating government comments for DFO 
• Agree methodology for disposal of marine sediment (muds) due to the harbour dredging works 
as part of the CI works and outline bathometric impacts for the breakwater construction 
• Detailed geotechnical data under the footprint of the breakwater (underwater) to facilitate 
earthworks quantities for a GMP 
• Provide sufficient levels of design documentation and supporting reports for the stage 1 project 
works necessary for development approvals from the Darwin Development Consent Authority 
(DCA) to enable commencement of construction activities 
 
The Bid Phase nucleus of the (DCC) consortium split from the outset of the Financial Close phase. 
Each technical adviser was assigned to the separate SPV in order to develop the necessary scopes 
of works and PDA’s. Rather than a single entity the risks were spread across the three separate 
SPVs linked to each through the applicable PDA’s and deeds which would be in acted once the 
delivery phase commenced. This approach by ABN-AMRO is taken because they seek to pass on 
the design, construction and operation risk and require their assigned SPV partners to become used 
to managing such risks as soon as possible in the deal structure. This also allows ABN-AMRO to 
retract as consortium leader and put in place a management team to work under the future Project 
Director (PD) representing the Darwin Cove Convention Centre (DCCC). The PD manages each of 
the SPV partners ie the DCEC, CI/MI and Private components of the project to the satisfaction of the 
government. 
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To facilitate the change in the management structure from the Bid Phase, a Project Manager (PM) is 
appointed by ABN-AMRO to act independently across all the consortium partners. As any existing 
partner or consultant team is not considered independent as their loyalties are to their applicable 
client SPV.  
 
The appointed PM represents both of ABN-AMRO SPVs contracted to government and is charged 
with driving all partners and consultants from the bid phase as they are arranged into the SPV 
partners to achieve financial close collectively as quickly as possible. 
 
With the change to an external PM, ABN-AMRO negate the Bid Phase technical consultants 
previously engaged direct to them to a D&C arrangement under the umbrella of the developer SPV 
contracts for the convention centre (DCEC ) and infrastructure (Marine and Community, MI / CI) 
components of the stage 1 works. The hospitality and residential developer has a direct contract to 
the NTG and is removed from the responsibility of ABN-AMRO SPVs. 
 
There was some initial resistance to the consortium restructuring down into the SPV teams taking 
direction from the PM. This was particularly apparent with the DCEC SPV team lead by SBMJV who 
refused to acknowledge and take direction from the PM acting as the developer as this places a 
wedge between direct communication with the government which was previously enjoyed during the 
bid phase negotiations. SBMJV no doubt were frustrated with this approach as they were under 
pressure to resolve cost overruns through a third party in order to achieve financial close. 
 
The restructuring from the bid phase team nucleus of the consortium into the SPVs going forward for 
the delivery of the project components is identified in Figure 5-5, which was adopted at the 
commencement of the financial close phase. The technical / design consultants remain unchanged 
from the final Bid Phase team. 
 
The committed stage 1 of the DCW site development includes three main elements and will be 
staged over 15 years. It will include: 
• The Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre, with a 1500-seat capacity and 4000sq 
metres of exhibition space, 
• Community facilities including seawall, wave pool, swimming areas, public promenade, 
parklands and picnic areas, 
• Commercial developments, including a Medina hotel, harbour side cafes and restaurants 
and a staged residential development. 
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Figure 5-5 Consortium Restructuring Management Lines 
 
 
The $300 million Stage One of the development is to be completed by 2008 and includes the Darwin 
Convention and Exhibition Centre, most of the community infrastructure and commercial 
developments, including the 141-room Medina hotel, 138 residential apartments, restaurants and 
cafes. 
 
NTG had difficulties in understanding its decontamination and environmental responsibilities set out 
in the approved EIS as it used generic development details without the knowledge of the consortium 
master plan. The consortium site master plan needed to be assessed to identify government’s extent 
of responsibility for further investigations.  
 
Notable issues that arose included the approval of the dredge spoil location and land use 
requirements prompting removal of decontaminated material. The matter of disposal of the dredge 
spoil potentially could invoke a Formal Assessment if the planning objectives of the approved master 
plan were deemed outside the intended scope of the original EIS by the Environment Minister. The 
Environment Minister is advised by the NTG Office for Environment and Heritage (OEH), a body 
independent of the project delivery team. This would greatly impact upon the timetable to reach 
Financial Close. 
 
5.6.1.1 Project Approvals and Planning  
These works were largely driven by the PM with the aid of an external consultant engaged 
from Sydney. Connell Wagner became involved in providing the local NTG knowledge and 
review of Development Applications (DA) structure development. The key issue for the 
consortium was to understand and develop the DA structure and inclusions based on the 
requirements of NTG’s Department of Planning and Infrastructure (DPI), planning guidelines. 
 
The true spirit of the partnering approach of a PPP arrangement started to become apparent 
through government’s willingness to assist the consortium in achieving the project approvals 
from relevant government agencies, to facilitate commencement of construction. This was 
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evident by DPI’s planning personnel providing advice and detailed guidelines, and reviews of 
the draft content of the consortium’s development application. 
 
Lodgment of DA’s and subsequent approval of DA’s is central to the signing of the Project 
Development Agreement (PDA) between the consortium and the NTG – which is a critical 
element to Financial Close. The lodgment of DA’s was scheduled for early December 2004 to 
meet the bid program construction commencement date at start of next dry season (April 
2005). 
 
The NTG now started to massage the consortium master plan prior to the first viewing by the 
public as part of the DA documentation. These matters include reduction of building heights in 
relation to the adjacent escarpment to maintain existing view lines. 
 
The appointed NTG government architect as agreed in the DFO process prior to the preferred 
announcement, now engaged with the DCEC design team to resolve cost savings and to 
produce a more Darwin look to the building. Local Darwin building features involving 
corrugated sheeting, skillion style roofing with extended eaves and open external walls to 
facilitate cross ventilation, referred to arguably as ’Troppo’ architecture are the nature of such 
features to be incorporated. These features assist with the creation of larger external areas to 
the periphery of the building with increased areas of shade to enhance the el-fresco 
functionality. 
5.6.1.2 Environmental Approvals 
The NTG provided regular briefs to the consortium team of the required project approval 
process and program to avoid the risk of triggering an Ecological Risk Assessment (ERA) in 
addition to the environmental impact study (EIS) process for which the NTG is contractually 
obligated to provide.  
 
The NTG does not have an established environmental protection agency or legislation. The 
only environmental body (at the time) was the Office of Environment and Heritage (OEH) 
which provided consent to the development based on the presented findings of the EIS. The 
government appointed an independent environmental auditor and adopted the Victorian EPA 
guidelines for the purpose of decontaminating the site to meet the requirements of the 
consortium master plan. 
 
The main focus of the environmental issues related to the impact of dredging the bay for the 
breakwater construction and disposal of dredge material off site in either a deep sea confined 
or unconfined dump, or to an alternative marine environment. Similarly the NTG needed to 
satisfy the external environmental auditor that the site had been remediated to the intended 
land use characteristics, ie residential or public open space. 
An environmental consultant (URS Australia) was commissioned by the NTG to meet the 
necessary environmental investigations, studies and reports required for the project approval 
process. These works by URS pertained to issues which were related to existing conditions of 
the site. As such the proposed development works needed to be understood for impacts upon 
the existing environment and what these ramifications were to the NTG.  
 
The dredging and disposal of the marine mud as a key element of the development had to be 
resolved by URS/NTG to the satisfaction of stakeholders. Issues to be resolved in relation to 
disposal of this mud included, understanding the toxicity of the mud and the impacts it may 
impose on its receiving environment. Secondly it needed to be understood if the material 
contained any unique organisms that may be specific to site and should be protected by some 
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means. Hydro-dynamic and ground water modelling formed part of this study to understand 
the changes to the site resulting from the proposed development footprint. 
 
5.6.1.3 Environmental Approval Process 
The proposed development of the Darwin City Waterfront Development was subjected to a 
formal environmental assessment under the Environmental Assessment Act 198 (NTG).  
 
This included the preparation and assessment of an Environment Impact Statement, including 
the Draft EIS, Supplement EIS by URS Australia Pty Ltd and the Formal Assessment and 
Recommendation Report - Environmental Assessment Report # 43 by the Office of 
Environment and Heritage (OEH) August 2004. OEH presented its conditions for project 
approval in the Assessment Report #43 providing a list of recommendations, including further 
guidance on key elements which detail required further investigation and specific 
management.  
 
During this process, the proposed development and capability of the site, particularly the 
capacity of the land and water resources, was assessed. This was informed by a number of 
detailed investigations. As a result documentation produced during the EIS process provided a 
detailed description and assessment of the attributes of the site and identifies potential 
environmental risks. 
 
Following the approval of the EIS (September 2004), there were ongoing studies and 
investigations which further informed the design and management framework process. Critical 
to this approval was the sanction by the Minister for Environment that the proposals did not 
require further formal assessment under the Environmental Assessment Act 1982. This 
included the proposed Marine Infrastructure works (reclamation, dredging and water quality 
etc) as a part of the Community Infrastructure works (open space, swimming lagoon, pools, 
boardwalks and paths, carparks etc). 
 
Key environmental issues resulting from the development proposal that required mitigation 
and all activities on site, including construction and operation of the facility were to be subject 
to ongoing Environmental Management Plans. The following environmental issues as they 
relate to the proposed Stage 1 Residential/Mixed Use development included: 
• Environmental Management Framework 
• Soil Contamination 
• Acid Sulfate soils 
• Groundwater 
• Hazard analysis 
• Air quality 
• Noise 
• Terrestrial environment 
• Heritage and archaeological. 
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5.6.2 Development of the Project Approval Process 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
During October 2004 the Consortium push to develop the full scope of infrastructure offered and 
based on previous agreed NTG instruction needed to remove all PC sums offered to the NTG from 
the Bid Phase. This required the consortium and the CI SPV to firm up the price accepted by the 
NTG in bid of $69M which was negotiated in the DFO phase in August 2004 with a $4 M discount. 
 
Provisional sum items to firm the price were: 
• Smith St Pedestrian Bridge 
• Water Recreation Pools , including wave pool 
• Shade structures 
 
The consortium Financial Close Target was revised to the 31 December 2004. 
 
The PM was responsible for securing the services of a specialist aquatic consultant to join the team 
to engineer the wave pool and develop the water recreation scope to provide a GMP for this 
component of the works. 
5.6.2.1 Project Approvals and Planning  
The structure and development of required project DA’s began to firm with five applications 
envisaged as follows for Stage 1: 
 
Public Elements 
• Community Infrastructure 
• Marine Infrastructure 
• DCEC 
Private Elements 
• 138 Residential Apartments (Wharf One) 
• Hospitality Precinct  
 
A key issue to be resolved was the sloping breakwater wall footprint within the marine environs 
and subsequent demarcation areas for each DA. As the breakwater depth was not able to be 
locked in without geotechnical data identifying the appropriate founding layer depth, the 
footprint area had some uncertainty. 
 
Draft DA’s were developed by the consortium for review by government agencies. The review 
outcome resulted in the documentation being held back as further details and supporting 
evidence were required to ensure a full explanation of works and impacts were provided for 
public consumption and to avoid rejection by the DCA. 
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5.6.2.2 Environmental Approvals 
The consortium arranged access to NTG’s environmental consultant URS, through a tri-partite 
agreement to reduce timeframes and share the understanding of existing environmental 
conditions. Formation of a management framework for the proposed development to address 
the environmental constraints was produced with the help of this agreement. 
 
5.6.2.3 Stakeholder Negotiations 
The Government Waterfront Project Office was formally put in place and provided with 
additional personnel levels from that employed during the bid phase. This team provided a 
technical review and management capacity in working with the consortium to ensure at this 
stage that adequate consultation occurred with all stakeholders during the negotiation process. 
 
Key stakeholders for the project included: 
• Darwin Port Corp – Port Operator 
• Australian Navy – Fort Hill Wharf Access for Naval / Army operations 
• Customs / Immigrations – Cruise Shipping 
• PowerWater – Service authority for electrical, water and sewer reticulation 
• DIPE – NT Government State land development body roads and lands 
• OEH – NT Government Office of Environment and Heritage 
• Darwin City Council – future owner of public infrastructure. 
 
The NTG Darwin City Waterfront project team and the consortium technical members 
commenced regular meetings with stakeholders to discuss the proposed development impacts 
and achieve an understanding of issues to be addressed to ensure the development proceeds 
smoothly. Similarly the stakeholders were regularly briefed on the elements of the 
development by the consortium members so as they could contribute to the understanding of 
the potential impacts to existing infrastructure and the environment. 
 
A key stakeholder for the site was the Darwin Port Corporation (DPC) as they were 
relinquishing their role as land-lords and prime user of the site. At this juncture concerns were 
raised by DPC due to the significant impacts from marine structure construction activities 
imposed upon the remaining functioning wharves adjacent to the site. DPC also needed to 
understand the nature of the development and become comfortable with the impact upon their 
remaining infrastructure by the future changes in the land use of the site.  
 
The new breakwater included in the marine infrastructure works DA imposed limitations to 
shipping movements and berthing at wharves and the possible hydrodynamic impacts to tide 
and current regimes were to be determined. The DPC required an understanding of the 
potential changes this structure may impose to navigation and pilotage of maritime vessels. 
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5.6.3 Development Application Preparation 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
The consortium with assistance from government agencies issued DA’s for the CI, MI and DCEC 
works during November 2004.  The Residential and Hospitality components for Stage 1 were held 
back.  
 
These DA’s were structured in the same way comprising a suite of project information including a 
critique of environmental studies to-date. What was to follow and impacts of the works and other 
development issues for the project structure were as follows: 
• Introduction 
- Proposed Development 
- Land Ownership 
- Structure of Document 
• Existing Context 
- Site Location, townscape, utilities services 
- Physical features and conditions 
• Development Proposal 
- Objectives, description, design statement, materials and finishes, management 
• Development Assessment Criteria 
- Planning scheme, amendments, suitability of land, facilities, amenity, public interest 
• Conclusion 
• Supportive Documents 
- Survey Plan, Architectural and Engineering Drawings, Site Condition Assessment 
Report, Archaeological, Traffic and Car Parking, ESD, Noise, Environmental 
Assessment and Hazard, Air Quality, Groundwater, Environmental Management Plan 
structure 
 
Further detailed investigation and modelling  by NTG commenced into the marine mud contamination 
levels and dredge / handling techniques to facilitate removal of 400,000 cu m of marine mud to a 
suitable disposal site. 
 
Wave modelling and resolving further marine bathometric issues were the main focus of the 
consortium technical team. These studies were required to confirm marine structure design criteria 
and the quantities of fill for the proposed breakwater by determining the acceptable founding layer in 
the bay. 
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5.6.4 Detailed Site Investigations 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
With the release of the DA documentation for comment, more of the project details such as the 
master plan in December 2004 were placed into the public domain through media releases and 
parliamentary debate. Scrutiny over the master plan building heights was raised and caused much 
debate over the process due to the apparent private sector control ignoring past community 
concerns. 
 
The Development Consent Authority (DCA) hearing was held to review the amendments to the 
current planning scheme (1999) to adopt the land use and planning scheme of the proposed 
development master plan. 
 
Preliminary geotechnical investigations of the marine mud were completed and funded by the 
consortium. This information informed the founding level of proposed breakwater in Kitchener Bay to 
provide some certainty of dredging and excavation depths to calculate earthworks volumes and 
hence confirm the GMP for this portion of the MI works. 
 
5.6.5 Development Application Supplementary Information Preparation 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
Government approval of the planning amendment for Waterfront Site was announced during 
January 2005. This completed all of government’s responsibilities to allow the development 
proposed by the consortium to proceed. The remaining actions were with the consortium to achieve 
DCA approval. 
 
Supplementary information reports for each DA application (DCEC, MI, CI) was provided to the DCA 
by the consortium to address DA queries lodged by community members, key stakeholder and 
statutory authorities.  A response was necessary prior to the DCA hearing in February 2005 to 
support the application and ensure the DCA did not reject or defer the application delaying 
commencement of construction and award of financial close. Concerns and queries provided by 
stakeholders for each DA included: 
 
MI Application 
         Stage 1           Stage 2     Stage 3                    Stage 4 
A
U
G
 2003 
O
C
T 2003 
JA
N
  2004 
M
A
Y
 2004 
A
U
G
 2004 
S
E
P
 2004 
M
A
Y
 2005 
          EoI         Bid Phase      DFO                   Financial Close 
         Stage 1           Stage 2     Stage 3                    Stage 4 
A
U
G
 2003 
O
C
T 2003 
JA
N
  2004 
M
A
Y
 2004 
A
U
G
 2004 
S
E
P
 2004 
M
A
Y
 2005 
          EoI         Bid Phase      DFO                   Financial Close 
Jason Gillard Masters Exegeses  Section 5 - Presentation of Case Study 
 
  Page 85 of 138 
• Management of the proposed locked body of water 
• Contamination and acid sulphate soil management 
• Dredging issues in particular an appropriate disposal site 
• Effect of seawall of water and sediment movement and coastal sediment transport 
• Biodiversity 
• Neighbouring developments 
• Breakwater design 
• Clarification of building development infrastructure requirements 
• Adoption of an integrated environmental management system 
• Construction noise and lighting 
• Prevention of mosquito breeding during construction and in design of infrastructure 
• Security implications associated with vessel movement around marina 
• Navigation Considerations around the leeward face of existing wharves 
• Water and Sewerage infrastructure capacity to existing wharves 
• Handling, transport and disposal of dredged materials 
• Preservation of significant historical sites 
• Continued access by Defence to existing fuelling storage and wharf Ro/Ro infrastructure  
 
CI Application 
• Proposed road network improves car parking and pedestrian movement particularly 
adjacent to the DCEC site 
• Intersection performance to be demonstrated 
• Bus management 
• Contamination and acid sulphate soil management 
• Ownership and operational responsibilities of water recreation and car parking facilities 
• Identification of subdivision development infrastructure requirements for ultimate water and 
sewerage demands 
• Capability to manage waste from berthed military and cruise ships  
• Development of master plans for water and sewerage reticulation 
• Continuity of access to wharves and adjacent public areas 
• Construction noise and lighting 
• Prevention of mosquito breeding during construction and in design of infrastructure 
• Preservation of significant historical sites 
• Amendment of building heights adjacent to escarpment 
• Need for NTG to update EIS to accommodate actual positioning of buildings 
• Aboriginal custodians approval of works is required 
 
DCEC Application 
• Impacts upon operation of adjacent wharves and shipping navigation 
• Public and alternative (non-private vehicle) transport provisioning 
• Energy efficiency and climatic responsiveness 
• Integrates with surroundings and desired future development 
• Basement Car park circulation and layout 
• Adequate undercover areas for shading and wet weather drop off 
• Construction staging and noise management 
• Integrated environmental management and operation details 
• Contamination and acid sulphate soil management 
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HWE the principal contractor and consortium partner for the CI and MI works went into voluntary 
administration during January 2005. All technical consultants working on the public elements for 
HWE suspended all commissions to them and were engaged direct to ABN-AMRO/DCCC to ensure 
the financial close process is not derailed. Financial close and the entire deal was seriously 
jeopardised by the threat of this significant SPV partner pulling out if a third party buy-out could not 
be secured to continue their involvement in the project. 
 
The DCEC DA submission lodged in November 2004 was withdrawn as significant changes to the 
building form are required because the D&C contractor (SBMJV) and the financier were unable to 
reduce the construction costs of the original proposal without significant architectural changes. 
SBMJV relationship with the bid phase architect (Crawfords TVS) became more frustrated due to 
their reluctance to adopt significant design changes to their original building form. Isolated individuals 
resorted to development of their own DCEC concept direct with CI/MI architects (Hassells) in which 
control was passed to the contractor. The outcome was a change in team architect and significant 
building elements were refined in response to external pressure from financiers to reduce costs to 
break the deal with government. The target lodgement date for the amended DA design was revised 
to April 2005. 
 
Without all three DA’s approved, financial close was not achieved as a GMP for construction of each 
SPV work package could not be determined by the contractors without full knowledge of the 
conditions that would be imposed upon them during construction. 
 
5.6.6 DCA Hearing February 2005 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
The DCA hearing for the MI and CI DA’s went ahead on the 23rd February 2005 without the DCEC 
application. This session was held to hear public and DCA member concerns of the DA and for the 
developer / consortium to address or take on notice such issues. The supplementary information 
report prepared addressed most of the concerns of the DCA and facilitated a smooth hearing. 
 
ABN-AMRO and the PM decided to exercise their contingency plan to replace HWE and issue an 
information memorandum (IM) to selected companies to price the works intended for HWE in the 
event that they become insolvent and need to be replaced on the team. A preliminary set of 
engineering drawings and specifications are provided by all technical consultants to support the IM. 
 
The pressure to achieve Financial Close becomes even more apparent with potential major team 
partners dropping out of the consortium deal. To bring in a new player, requiring time for full 
disclosure and due-diligence to occur at this juncture in the project would have imposed significant 
delays. So the envisaged best outcome the consortium was for a take-over of HWE which would 
maintain their personnel involvement under whatever new business form resulted. 
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5.6.7 Value Management Workshop 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
The pressure built during March 2005 for all consortium SPV construction partners representing the 
MI, CI and DCEC components to complete sufficient design development to resolve the package 
interface issues. This was necessary for ABN-AMRO to inform government that the bid phase 
undertaking of achieving the reduced target costs was going to eventuate. 
 
To facilitate the price reductions the consortium PM called a value management workshop (2 March 
2005) to cut some $10M off the CI and MI budget to meet the government target cost. The 
construction and technical team determined that a significant sea wall alignment change was the 
only way a significant cost reduction could be tabled. Any significant changes from the already 
lodged DA application required a variation amendment to the MI DA permit. Again without this 
approval financial close was not possible. 
 
To provide assurance to the construction partners to enable sign-off on a GMP for MI and CI works, 
the technical advisors were required to instigate internal verification of current design documentation 
for development of a schedule of risk issues and exposure in order to discuss mitigation measures 
and assign contingency. Major risks identified were: 
• Earthworks volumes and rock armour sizes for the breakwater structure 
• Increase in scope for water and sewerage infrastructure to meet authority approvals as part 
of the DA conditions 
• Expected scope of contamination works to be completed as a result of not being undertaken 
by government  
• Provision for realignment of existing bulk fuel handling pipeline 
 
The DCA issued (9th March 2005) permit conditions for the MI and CI works allowing the consortium 
to commence construction once relevant conditions were satisfied. These conditions included: 
 
MI Works 
• Preparation of a Construction and Operation Environmental Management Plan framework 
(EMPF) 
• Develop a coordinated program in consultation with relevant stakeholders for all essential 
service reticulation infrastructure 
• Appoint a Health and Safety Manager 
• Obtain a waste discharge license 
• Agree maintenance of local roads used to access site 
• Maintain water quality of harbour waters in proximity to site 
• Provision of overspill public car parking 
• Works undertaken during 6:30am-6:30pm Monday – Friday and 7:30am to 5:30pm on 
Saturday and Sunday 
• Access to site only via Mavie Street 
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• All imported fill to be certified clean fill 
• Provision of a site master plan, subdivision plan and staging plan for water and sewerage 
 
CI Works 
In addition to the above conditions: 
• Amend road and car parking plans to accommodate recommendations 
• Detailed plans for shade structures, pedestrian bridge link and water recreation facilities 
• Details of interface of road with existing heritage steam pump house  
 
Government environmental specialist (URS) finalised the decontamination scope and impacts upon 
the proposed development in the form of a Remediation Action Plan (RAP). This document detailed 
Government’s responsibility to remediate the site to address the layout of the consortium master plan 
open space and building footprint locations. 
 
To the benefit of the consortium team, HWE’s Darwin operations were bought out by Macmahon 
Contractors (18th March 2005) a Perth based national mining and civil contracting operation. This 
was the best possible outcome given the predicament faced by the consortium, causing minimal 
impact to the timeline of achieving financial close. 
 
The Darwin City Council announced their objections of any possible takeover of ownership public 
elements once constructed by government. The Council’s position was based on their belief that 
another swimming pool was not required in Darwin and would impose an unnecessary burden on the 
taxpayer.  
 
The NTG was left to establish its own body corporate / council to take over responsibility of the site 
and in particular the operations and management of the common public elements of the development 
site, such as the multi-storey car park, water recreation (incl. wave pool), breakwater and public 
domain elements. 
 
The only matter now holding up financial close was the DA approval for the DCEC. The DCEC SPV 
team targeted re-lodgment of the amended DA application for early April 2005. 
 
5.6.8 Breaking the Deal 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
The amended DA for the DCEC was lodged and the public hearing for the development scheduled in 
early May 2005.  Throughout April 2005 the process of negotiation took place again in Sydney (as it 
did during the bid phase) between the consortium equity partners (SPVs), legal and financial 
advisors and government’s key personnel and advisors. The consortium could only provide savings 
of $7.5M (as opposed to the $10M target) for the MI and CI portion of the works. Government closely 
scrutinised the scope to further detail exactly the materials and specifications to agree that each 
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elemental cost schedule was providing value for money against scope of works. The negotiation 
process with the DCEC SPV went on for nearly two continuous weeks before a deal was struck. 
5.6.9 Signing of Contracts 
 
Reference Point in Project Procurement Continuum (above) 
 
The DCEC DA application was accepted on issue of conditions precedent by the DCA in early May 
2005 and allowed financial close to be achieved as of the 9 May 2005.  
 
In relation to the CI PC sum elements, NTG and the consortium agreed to proceed with execution of 
contracts with these PC sum amounts included. This course of action was agreed, as the time for 
development of a detailed design to a sufficient level to provide a GMP would have taken several 
more weeks for the wave pool structure in particular.  
 
NTG were now determined that reaching financial close was more important than resolving PC sums 
and in order to meet the opening dates for the DCEC in early 2008, construction of the earthworks 
for the building foundations needed to commence immediately. 
 
Waterfront Work Starts (NT News, 10 May 2005), “Construction work on the $1.1b Darwin City 
Waterfront development will start today after the deal was signed off yesterday. The Territory 
taxpayer contribution has doubled to almost $200 million – to be spent over the next three years. But 
the NT Government was expected to get property returns valued between $62 million and $88 million 
over the 15-year life of the projects. The net cost to the taxpayers is tipped to be as much as $144 
million. After signing off on the financial closure, Chief Minister Clare Martin said ”Its really is a most 
magnificent project for Darwin. It means we will have a new dimension to our city – this is a very 
significant day.” 
Table 5-10 Financial Close commercials 
Stage 1 Component  Bid Cost 
($M) 
Financial Close 
($M) 
DCEC (Concession Period of 25 years) 143.5 102.8 
Community Infrastructure*  87 94.6 
Residential and Hospitality (estimated) 116 103 
Total 346.5 300 
* - includes provisional sum allowances of 33 mln for wave pool, multi-storey car 
park, avenue of honour, and public domain. 
The cost reductions to the DCEC package included: removal of bulk earthworks / reclamation 
(undertaken by CI/MI contractor), changes to the roof super-structure, alternating a tanked reinforced 
concrete basement with block work stub walls and reduction of the extent of automatic fire detection 
sprinkler system. 
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Darwin City Waterfront Development
Overall Structure Diagram
TERRITORY
Darwin Cove
Convention Centre Pty Ltd
Darwin Cove
Community Infrastructure Pty Ltd
Stage 1 Resi Developer 
(Toga SPV)
Stage 2 Resi Developer 
(Toga SPV) 
ABN AMRO
entities
Ogden IFC (Darwin) 
P/L
Facility Manager 
(Honeywell)
D&C Contractor (SBM 
JV)
Civils Contractor
Hotel Operator (Medina)
Hotel Consortium  Toga, Barclay Mowlem, 
Sitzler)
33. Precinct Management and Marketing Agreement
28 & 29 (Preferred builder for Stage 1 residential & hotel development)
32.  Hotel Consortium 
Agreement
31.  Hotel 
Operating 
Agreement
4.  DCEC Operation 
agreement
5.  DCEC FM 
agreement
6.  DCEC D&C 
Contract 16. CI civils
sub-contract
8.  DCEC Project
Lender Tripartite Deed
25. Hospitality PDA
26. Hospitality 
development 
Lease
27. Hospitality 2nd 
charge
21. Stage 2 PDA
23.  Stage 2 
PDA 1st 
mortgage
24.  Stage 2 
PDA 2nd 
charge
17. Residential 
PDA
18.  Residential 
development 
lease
19.  Residential 
development 1st 
mortgage
20.  Residential 
development 2nd 
charge
7. DCEC civil 
works contract
13. [Letter of 
Credit]
12.  [Letter of  
Credit and issue 
document]
22. Stage 2 
development Lease
15.  CI PDA
11.  Equity 
under-writing 
agreement
10.  2nd 
DCEC 
charge
1.  Concession Deed
2.  DCEC development 
lease
3.  DCEC term lease
9.  Bond 1 (DCEC) financing & 1st 
ranking security documents, [LC]
Private 
Elements
Public 
Elements
14. Charge 
(1st or 2nd)
External debt financiers
Hotel  Developer
Bond/Security Trustee
Cost reductions to the MI & CI packages included: narrowing of breakwater resulting in a reduction in 
fill material quantities, alternative cheaper fill material sourced, reduction in rock armour sizes and 
disposal of dredged material to an on land option via a pipeline in lieu of a deep sea disposal location 
using barges. 
 
The cost risk of the Residential and Hospitality precincts are indicative only and provided as a means 
for the extent of commitment by the developer who would assume all cost risk and scope 
acceptance. 
 
 
Figure 5-6 Financial Close Contract Structure 
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5.6.9.1 Milestone Dates 
The critical dates for the CI D&C Contractor were: 
• Completion and handover of DCEC pad 14 November 2005 
• CI Works Complete 31 December 2006 
• Completion of Services connections for DCEC Site to commence building services 
commissioning works to commence from May 2007 
• DCEC open April 2008 
 
5.6.9.2 Contract Structure 
The agreed form of the contracting structure is provided in Figure 5-6. This structure is divided 
vertically by the public (DCEC, MI and CI) and private elements (residential apartments and 
hotels), which have very different contracting structures. 
 
The MI and CI works basically cover the build ready elements of the development site, 
including the bulk earthworks for the DCEC building, marine breakwater, open space 
landscape / hardscapes, roads and essential infrastructure services. 
 
In essence the government were now contracting with three entities, Darwin Cove Convention 
Centre P/L and Darwin Cove Community Infrastructure P/L (both ABN-AMRO entities) and the 
Toga Group for the DCEC, CI/MI works and the residential / hotel elements respectively. 
These ABN-AMRO entities then entered into D&C arrangement with contractors SBMJV for 
the DCEC works and Macmahon Contractors for the MI/CI works. 
 
The contracted PPP elements of the DCEC include the construction, facilities management 
and operational management including marketing for a 25 year period. The DCEC was the 
only package of the entire development which was contracted using a BOOT mechanism and 
private finance, under a long term service agreement with government. 
 
There was a warranty to be provided by the CI contractor to the DCEC contractor that the pad 
works for the building are fit for purpose so that the ground works are isolated from the 
responsibility of DCEC concessionaire. 
 
5.6.9.3 Consortium Bid Expenses 
Anecdotal evidence suggests the final consortium cost for involvement in the project up to the 
end of the Financial Close (May 2005) phase totalled near $14 million, however this can not be 
substantiated at this time. Indicative costs calculated in October 2004 some seven months 
before financial close are presented in Table 5-11. 
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Table 5-11 Consortium Bid Expenses 
Cost Centre Bid Phase
Development 
Application
Financial 
Close Total Fee
Architectural $417,104 $213,900 $330,532 $961,536
Public Art $1,100 $1,100
Engineering $280,529 $168,361 $220,360 $669,250
Environmental $111,413 $200,000 $311,413
Gov Fees $2,000 $20,000 $22,000
Financial $127,387 $578,456 $705,843
Tourism $9,266 $9,266
Legal $295,251 $895,659 $1,190,910
DCEC SPV $652,788 $962,462 $1,615,250
CI SPV $283,901 $407,528 $691,429
Planning $26,000 $26,000
Project Mgmt $177,000 $235,100 $105,900 $518,000
Public Relations $195,084 $195,084
Promotional $105,614 $30,000 $135,614
Property $152,220 $152,220
Quant. Survey $97,688 $29,306 $126,994
Miscellaneous $50,000 $50,000
Grand Totals $1,860,243 $1,741,463 $3,780,203 $7,381,909  
 
5.6.9.4 Project Milestones 
A summary of project milestone dates as they developed and changed throughout the 
procurement process is presented in Table 5-12. This table highlights the differences between 
what government wanted to achieve through this project ie ‘planned’, with what the private 
sector was able to provide ‘offer’ and negotiate ‘contracted’ in the final project delivery 
agreement (PDA) with government (actual / revised column). 
 
The delays in the timeframes of the project, particularly financial close, commencement of 
construction and ultimate operational date for the DCEC and CI works changed significantly. 
The DCEC availability charge, the ongoing cost of the delivered facilities to government, was 
able to be negotiated to an ’acceptable’ value-for-money position through passing of non-
building elements over to the MI and CI works. The overall value of the project increased due 
to revised land valuations at the time of financial close. As the MI and CI works were delivered 
separately from the DCEC works under a sub-contract D&C arrangement, the bulk earthworks, 
marine structures and various provisional cost (PC) sum items where packaged together for 
ongoing design development with delivery risk assumed by government. These PC items 
included the public domain (PD), water recreation / wave pool facility (WR), cruise ship 
terminal (CST), pedestrian bridge (PB) and multi-storey car park (CP). 
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Table 5-12 Achievement of Project Milestones 
Procurement Stage  
Milestone EoI 
(Planned) 
Bid Phase  
(Offer) 
Financial 
Close 
(Contracted) 
 
(A)ctual or 
(R)evised 
Preferred Proponent June 2004 June 2004 - (A) September 
2004 
Financial Close December 
2004 
- - (A) May 2005 
Commencement of 
Construction 
February 
2005 
February 
2005 
May 2005 (A) July 2005 
DCEC Operational November 
2006 
December 
2007 
1st QTR 2008 (R) 1st QTR 2008 
Community 
Infrastructure Works 
Complete 
Late 2006 End 2006 December 
2006 
(R) late 2008 
Concession Period 20-25 years 25 years 25 years (R) 25 years 
Availability Charge 
p.a.  
NA $13.78M 
DCEC 
$7.72 CI 
$3M DCEC 
Nil CI 
(A) $3M 
Consortium 
Commitment 
$600M $846M $800M (R) $1.1b  
(including land 
value $210M 
2005) 
NTG Contribution  $100M $100M $144M  
 
(R) $354M 
(including land 
value 2005) 
Value of PPP 
Component 
$200M $230.5M $103M (R) $103M 
Value of Community 
Infrastructure Works 
(remaining public 
elements) 
$100M $87M $94.6M (R) $120M 
(includes $64 M  
+$14M PD  
+$15M WR  
+$4M CST 
+$3M PB  
+$10M CP) 
Value of Residential 
Component 
- $116M 
Stage 1 
$500M 
Stage 2 
$103M Stg 1 
- Stage 2 
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The case study presented in this section has demonstrated the workings of a PPP project in Australia. This 
was based on observations made from the successful private sector consortium team involved in the Darwin 
City Waterfront (DCW) project in the Northern Territory.  
 
The DCW project was unique due to it being the first PPP under the NTG PPP policy, a mixed use 
development, a complicated commercial arrangement and unresolved project provisional sum elements at 
financial close. None-the-less this project provides a typical Australian PPP project example. This case 
study is analysed in proceeding sections by evaluating the case study design and outcome against the 
benchmark model criteria established from the PPP literature. 
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6. ANALYSIS OF CASE STUDY 
 
This section presents an evaluation of the benchmark criteria (noted in italics from Table 2-1) as determined 
by a literature review, against the project case study presented in section 5. 
 
This comparison evaluates Australian practice with the benchmark criteria / world-wide best practice and 
provides recommendations for structuring the design and outcomes for PPPs as presented in subsequent 
sections. 
6.1 Procurement Approach 
PPPs typically use BOOT (Akintoye et al. 2003) or a DBFO contractual arrangement where private finance 
is involved. 
 
The Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) project used a BOOT arrangement to partner with the private sector to 
provide a new convention centre (DCEC) (section 5.6.9.2). The government opted out (section 5.5) of the 
private sector offer to expand this scope to include the supporting civil works and adjacent public domain 
(Section 10. Appendix A – 5 Business Plan). Instead the government used novated D&C arrangements and 
funded the works from public funds. Therefore only the DCEC component was delivered via BOOT and the 
remaining components under traditional contracts as discussed in section 5.6.9.2 and 5.6.9.4. 
 
Although there are other commercial contract considerations, such as fixed price, cost reimbursable and 
mixed incentive contracts within the available mix of contracts, von Branconi (2004) finds that the LSTK 
contracts like the BOOT and DBFO are more favoured by clients for large infrastructure projects. 
 
A partnering approach is likely to have been greater VfM to share the high risk civil works which comprised 
of decontamination and marine works discussed in section 5.4.1.4 and 5.4.3. This approach is likely to have 
avoided the delays in CI works construction program whilst disputes were resolved over scope and means 
to address cost over runs as shown in Table 5-12. 
 
Packaging the entire scope of works, MI, CI, DCEC and residential components into a BOOT did not 
achieve VfM in government’s (NTG) assessment during the DFO process as demonstrated by the exchange 
of issues in section 11. The MI and CI contracts used a novated D&C arrangement and the Residential 
elements developed via a development license adopting a Managing Contractor (MC) approach (Figure 5-
6). 
6.2 Structure, Contractual Arrangements and Government Frameworks 
Private sector forms a consortium and establishes an SPV to deliver project elements (Akintoye et al  2003) 
through a four stage tender process unique for each project (Sharp, 2005). 
 
The procurement process follows guidelines which are not specific enough to suggest the use of non-
adversarial frameworks for large projects. This was evident by the multiple entities engaged under different 
procurement arrangements such as BOOT and D&C using lump sum and provisional cost sum 
arrangements (Section 5.6.9.2) which dissuade contractual flexibility compared to an alliance partnering 
arrangement.  The extent of the partnering arrangement is limited to risk allocation or responsibility for a 
problem, should it occur, rather than working together to solve the problem for the benefit of the project.  
 
An example of this lack of partnering approach was evident in the contract with government and the CI 
developer SPV. If government questioned the fitness for purpose of any element of the works, they could 
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instruct the developer to undertake testing to satisfy the government of conformance. The party proven at 
fault would bear the testing costs and be liable for costs and delays to rectify the situation. 
 
The financial close phase of the DCW is used to develop the project requirements and risk identification, 
similar to requirements used to tender for a D&C contract, only more rigorous. This creates a similar 
adversarial arrangement during construction. A BOOT arrangement provides incentives to the contractor to 
provide quality workmanship and materials to reduce ongoing maintenance costs (in the case for the DCEC) 
however this was lost elsewhere on other project components where engaged under a D&C arrangement. 
 
The NTG procurement process used to involve the private sector in the project was well run and kept to 
stated timeframes in general (Table 5-12). The financial close phase was delayed by up to six months and 
arguably only achieved the May 2005 date so the government could use the project award as political 
propaganda for the June 2005 elections. Nonetheless the content of the returnable schedules set by 
government (Table 5-3) requested deliverables such as expensive scale models and four hour 
presentations which vary from project-to-project, “..the non-standard nature of contractual documentation for 
most PPP projects is one of the factors which contributes to the high costs of bidding for PPP projects” 
(Vann 2004, pp.15). 
6.3 Costs of PPP and the Public Sector Comparator 
The PSC is prepared through an outline business case (OBC) process to provide government with the 
gateway check that a PPP is an appropriate delivery mechanism (Leiringer 2001) and VfM. 
 
The DCW PSC was completed but only functional elements released to proponents in the form of a 
summary report (PWC 2003) as the PSC contained criteria of how government should select its private 
sector partner (section 5.2.3). The justification to the wider public for the PPP approach was kept to internal 
government circulation. The NTG decided from the PSC study that a PPP was the best way forward with a 
commitment of $100m to the project and a land concession (section 5.3.1). 
 
The $144m government contribution will likely be exceeded due to the contractual mechanism used to 
deliver the CI components without providing incentives to the contractor to save money. This has created a 
public concern over the use of the PPP approach as the private sector is perceived to be driving the project 
details rather than government on behalf of the public interest. 
 
Criticism by the opposition government (December 2004) into the agreed concept plan developed by the 
private consortium and put on display in the form of a model accused the government of passing control of 
the development to the private sector and losing control over what was included in the development (section 
5.6.4). This dissatisfaction by the opposition may be due to the government using a PPP procurement 
model for the development instead of the tax-payer funded model preferred by the opposition. In particular 
the opposition claims the developer has increased building heights to maximise private profits over those 
interests of existing land owners (section 5.2.2). 
 
Furthermore the government has been criticised for not engaging a key stakeholder of the wharf precinct the 
Department of Defence, who are major stakeholders at the Wharf and adjoining properties (section 5.2.2.1). 
Existing pipelines enabling navy vessels at the wharves to be refuelled from the tanks atop of Stokes Hill, 
run through the proposed development site presenting a consultation headache for the government which 
need not compromise Defence’s interests in the Territory when the local economy needs all the assistance it 
can get – the question this raises is whether the government knows what it is doing? (Darwin Research 
Centre 2005). 
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6.4 Design and Construction Risk 
Government when reviewing major project risk seek to transfer as a general rule design, construction and 
operation risk to the private sector (Akintoye et al. 2003, Private Finance Panel 1995). 
 
For the DCW project the private consortium assumed generally all design and construction risks based on 
an extensive geotechnical investigation undertaken during financial close (section 5.6.4), to determine a 
suitable foundation layer under the marine sediments for which the breakwater could be constructed upon. 
 
Although the NTG undertook an intensive investigation process as part of the EIS requirements (section 
5.3.1.5 and 5.6.1.3), the probity nature of the bidding process restricted the consortia details from being 
considered by the government environmental consultants until after financial close was achieved. 
 
Much established knowledge is written regarding risk and value management for PPPs (eg. Akintoye et al. 
(2003), Bing et al. (2004) and Grimsey et al. (2001)) as these techniques are employed to allocate cost in 
devising the financing mechanism to achieve financial close. Yet little consideration is provided for the most 
suitable contracting arrangement to deal with the complex technical nature of a project to ensure success. 
 
Financial close requires all construction risk to be priced (section 5.4.4.2) and passed from the consortium 
financier to the construction partner. This allows the financer to take a back seat through the remaining 
delivery and operation phase of the project. The design development is not complete and continues to 
progress with construction placing the entire carriage of unforseen site risks on the construction partner. 
This either leaves the construction partner ‘high-and-dry’ or imposes unnecessary risk premiums upon 
government to cover all possible construction eventualities. However this is the nature of the D&C 
arrangement to which the construction partner has agreed, placing them in an adversarial position with 
government and with no support from the once consortium leader who has done the deal and passed on the 
risk to those best able to deal with it.  At financial close the deal may be well structured and locked in to 
support private financing arrangements covering all possibilities through construction and operation, but the 
mechanism to deal with unforseen construction eventualities is approached from a selfish perspective to 
protect each parties rigid commercial position unlike a partnering arrangement done in the spirit of ‘best for 
project‘. This arguably erodes VfM presented at financial close if both private and public parties become 
embroiled in a long waging struggle to achieve the PDA’s (as presented in Figure 5-6) required of each 
party in an arduous environment. 
 
Decontamination and removal of existing wharf refuelling services were not risks assumed by the private 
sector in the DCW project. 
6.5 Stakeholder benefits 
Community benefits when infrastructure is provided sooner and of a better standard providing greater 
functionality of the site by increasing the public amenity (Burrow, 2002). 
 
Fast track construction of the DCEC allows for operation of the facility within 5 years from start of PPP EoI 
process (Table 5-12). Other benefits of the PPP approach for the DCW project include a fully developed, 
committed and funded master plan for the entire 25 hectare site staged over a 10-15 year construction 
period (section 5.6.1). 
 
Under a PPP consortium structure (Figure 5-6) in place to financial close, access to specialist skills needed 
to address all aspects of the development to provide the means to master plan the entire site locking in the 
strategic planning guidelines was achieved. This meant the long term nature of the development was 
assured to the public through consultation during the development consent approval process (section 
5.6.1.1). As the team is in place delivering the construction of the facilities, the public is provided a greater 
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assurance that with suitable market forces the entire site redevelopment would be achieved rather than in a 
piecemeal approach more likely under traditional contract forms constrained by public funding. 
 
6.5.1 Enhance government’s capacity to develop integrated solutions 
Procurement of infrastructure without confines of public coffers (Perspective 2004) allows for a 
greater number of projects to be delivered (Akintoye et al  2003). 
 
The DCW project delivered several other supportive elements for the DCEC such as public 
accessible park lands, hospitality precinct, hotels and an aquatic precinct including a wave pool as 
part of the stage one commitment (refer Section 10 Appendix A, item 10 Proponents Requirements 
of the Department/Territory – Provisional Sum items).  
 
These additional components were able to be delivered concurrently due to the capacity for the 
private consortium to provide the technical skills, resourcing and the contractual interfaces. The build 
ready works including the land decontamination and the reclamation of land to form the building pad 
for the DCEC was funded by government under the CI works valued at $95m. This decision was 
made by government during the DFO process in order to reduce its annual availability charge for 
stage one works to just the DCEC component for a 25 year concession period (section 5.5). 
 
6.5.2 Facilitate creative and innovative approaches 
Additional built in functionality and improved lifespan of delivered asset (Perspective 2004). 
 
Facilities management (FM) services and serviceability key performance indicators (KPI’s) are 
fundamental to the PPP deal for the DCEC over the 25 year concession period. The building 
contractor has materials and workmanship issues in mind over the full life-cycle costs of the asset 
under a PPP arrangement rather than the usual one year defects liability period typical under 
traditional contract arrangements. 
 
Arguably the aquatic precinct comprising a wave pool and an enclosed static water body created by 
a 500m long breakwater structure in the harbour, were features of the consortium master plan that 
won them the project . Indeed when the project details were made public the front page of the local 
Darwin newspaper headlined “Waves, beach at $1b centre” (NT News, 10 February 2005, p.1) 
making only a passing reference to the much need stimulus to the local economy provided by the 
centrepiece $103m convention centre. 
 
However unlike other convention centres developed in Australia which have achieved a six-star 
green star building rating (section 3.8.1.1), ESD initiatives proposed by the consortium (section 10 
Appendix A - 3 Sustainability), in particular co-generation and grey water reuse systems were not 
included into the design development in order to reduce annual availability costs payable by 
government. 
 
It was evident through the financial close negotiations that the consortium technical team was under 
pressure to reduce DCEC construction costs through changes to the building architecture and 
finishes (section 5.6.5). This led to the original consortium architect Crawfords TVS, being replaced 
with Hassell architects to provide a fresh look at the concept design for the DCEC which resulted in 
construction savings. 
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6.5.3 Reduce the cost to implement the project 
The PPP cost benefit is greatest in regards to reductions in project timeframe and risk allocation 
saving 20-30 percent when compared to traditional means (Jones 2002, Perspective 2004). 
 
All bid costs (section 5.6.9.3) were carried by the private sector and involved the design development 
sufficient for the consortium to provide government a fixed lump sum price. This allows for private 
financing structures to be arranged, facilitating financial close and immediate commencement of the 
delivery phase. 
 
The only up front costs for government to implement the DCW project consisted mostly of tender 
documentation production and tender administration, and also the environmental process costs 
including production of the EIS and decontamination of the existing site (estimated at $3 million). 
 
The ultimate cost to taxpayer did increase as the project was delivered to $144m, from $100m 
estimated at the inception of the project (Table 5-12) with the value of stage 1 reducing from 
$346.5m to $300m (Table 5-10). The taxpayer costs exclude public servant management and 
decontamination expenses stated above for rehabilitation of land in readiness for reuse and 
construction. For the convention centre concession the government will incur an ongoing annual 
payment of $3m for 25 years (Table 5-12). However these costs are offset by the royalty payments 
received by government totalling in the order of $64.5m for apartment sales (Table 5-8). 
 
The Allen Consulting (2007) cost saving figures for a PPP over traditional procurement range from 
30.8-11.4 percent. The former figure demonstrates that the tendering phase or pre-financial close 
period is where the real cost saving occur for the public sector. However a true indication of the most 
efficient measure of a project’s procurement structure is the VfM assessment (Lin 2005, Clifton 2006) 
which is examined further in section 6.3.  
6.5.4 Reduce Project Timeliness 
Time reduction is achieved using PPPs by producing efficiencies in the procurement process 
(Akintoye et al  2003) through the ability to complete the project ahead of time (Allen Consulting 
2007). 
 
Once financial close was awarded for the DCW project, construction commenced as the necessary 
approvals were in place. This stage was reached without development of full design documentation 
which occurs concurrently with construction (Tables 5-1 and 5-12). Elements of construction were 
staged until supportive information required from the project approvals process could be provided 
which included additional supportive investigations in some cases (section 5.6.2.1). 
 
Government assumed the risk for obtaining and funding the EIS approval process in parallel with the 
private sector tender call and financial close periods (Table 5-1). This approach was criticised by 
peak non-government groups as a backwards approach as the details of the development were not 
concurrently developed in parallel with the environmental approval process (section 5.6.1). Instead 
the community were only provided draft project proposal details for which to comment on. Due to the 
tender call probity constraints, private sector bid details could not be released for public 
dissemination until the preferred consortium was announced (September 2004). The preferred 
project master plan scheme details were then developed through the negotiations between 
government and the consortium leading to financial close. The government worked in partnership 
with the private sector to obtain development approval (DA) through the independent planning 
authority in the Northern Territory the Development Consent Authority (DCA). 
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On the surface the DCW process post-financial close follows a D&C process (section 5.6), which is 
noted as a quick to market approach to involve the private sector. However a D&C arrangement is 
high risk to government where uncertainties and complex matters remain unresolved (section 3.2.1). 
Additional cost and disputes may eventuate resulting in project delays and increased costs. The 
financial close process in the PPP procurement process effectively runs until all uncertainties are 
resolved or passed to the party best suited to carry the risk and locked in for execution in the delivery 
phase (section 3.6). 
 
The DCW DCEC component under a BOOT arrangement is scheduled for completion on time as per 
the private sector construction program (1st qtr 2008 – Table 5-12). Government greatly under 
estimated the completion date (November 2006) in the EoI documentation they produced. It is 
unlikely that government would not have considered that reclaiming land would be necessary in the 
preferred master plan preparatory civil works, when determining the planned milestone date. 
 
Government has been faced with delays on other DCW project components, particularly the CI works 
delivered under a novated D&C arrangement. Budget cost over runs (section 5.6.9.4) requiring 
changes to the scope of agreed works to achieve budget is delaying the construction and hand over 
for public use. The inevitable result will be to delete some elements such as the fully shaded 
walkways in the public spaces, which were identified through the public consultation process as key 
requirements for public endorsement. Had a PPP arrangement been utilised for all project elements, 
serious contractual and commercial ramifications would have been enacted due to any reductions in 
project scope. This implies that a form of guarantee for the works is provided to government by the 
SPV as per the full scope of works in the financial close agreement. 
6.5.5 Transfer certain risks to the private project partner 
Design, construction, commissioning, operating, ownership and financing risk is passed to private 
sector under a PPP structure (ABN-AMRO 2003). 
 
The BOOT deal for the DCEC has been uncontroversial and for the most part out of the media’s 
attention. This is because these risks have been transferred to the SPV responsible for the DCEC. 
As a result this has restricted government’s involvement in the design development process beyond 
financial close or penalties for changes would be incurred. This has allowed the DCEC SPV to 
deliver the works by achieving the minimum PDA requirements from a contractual perspective. As 
mentioned previously, other components delivered under more traditional means have been delayed 
due to financial, operating and ownership risk remaining under government management, 
constrained by allocated budget amounts. 
 
Government through the DFO process (section 5.5 and Appendix B in section 11) negotiated at 
financial close for the public elements under the CI works to be removed from the PPP concession 
arrangement. This meant that the design development risk of the multistorey car park and wave pool 
remained with government which is now faced with a cost blow out. This has been highly publicised 
of late (in Hansard) and the government is facing criticism for diverting public funds away from other 
services in the community in order to cover additional funding for these elements in the development. 
 
6.5.6 Attract Expertise to the Project 
Expensive bid costs combined with a unique tender process and requirements for each project 
restricts involvement from small organisations (Sutherland 2002) unable to cope with the risk of 
throwing away many millions of dollars in bidding this work. 
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In bidding and reaching financial close for the project, the DCCC consortium incurred significant 
costs in the order of 2-3 percent (circa. $14 million) of the project capital cost (section 5.6.9.3). 
 
Bid costs ultimately are factored into the overall project costs when the private sector calculates its 
fees to government, so it’s in the public sectors best interests to keep these costs low when 
considering tender call requirements. The NTG provided a consolation fee of $250,000 for 
unsuccessful bidders, which was an insignificant amount in comparison to actual bid costs. 
 
The DCCC consortium was arguably the only consortium that was able to make this complicated 
deal stack up within the bid phase period by providing the required full team capacity and 
demonstrating the supporting operational term sheets for all components of the proposal (section 10 
– Appendix A). This perhaps provided government with the confidence to work with this consortium 
over others. 
 
Government was prescriptive and detailed about the DCEC requirements within its Detailed Bid 
Documentation (Section 5.4), down to the functionality and space sizes within the convention centre 
building. The supportive elements comprising the bulk of the development site footprint however 
were only described in general terms (output based) around the public consultation comments 
supported by a basic master plan land use concept issued at the EoI stage (section 5.2.3). Therefore 
the private sector was faced with the task of master planning a scheme to provide enough details of 
development to fund, build and operate (section 5.4.2.2 and table 5-3). The bid documentation was 
structured around meeting governments master plan of a centrally located convention centre without 
information of marine mud depths, decontamination scope and a draft EIS (section 5.4.1.1). 
 
Understanding government’s bid document requirements (Table 5-3) was difficult for the consortium. 
The time provided was short (five months as per Table 5-4) and without the ability for direct 
stakeholder negotiation (outside the assigned government project team members) it was difficult to 
obtain an understanding of existing site uses and constraints to develop an innovative and alternative  
master plan approach from that of governments vision. Sizing and scoping the stages for delivery 
presented the problem of identifying necessary elements to support the build which would be 
included in the first stage. These difficulties included understanding the scope of demolition of 
existing site infrastructure ranging from industrial sheds, wharves, fuel lines and whose responsibility 
it was if it was within the footprint of the stage 1 works (section 5.4.1). 
 
Highly detailed and expensive scale models of both the full master plan development and of the 
Convention Centre (DCEC) were also needed to support each consortia bid (Table 5-3). 
 
6.5.7 Access Skills, Expertise and Experience 
PPP delivery allows government to focus on core delivery services and not major projects (Jones 
2002; Larocca 2004; Perspective 2004; Vann et al. 2004) by entrusting the private sector through a 
long term partnership approach. 
 
The DCW project provided the opportunity for long term contracts and partnerships to be created 
with a secure source of income for both equity partners and advisors and consultants to the SPVs. 
These partners were generally seen to remain with the consortium from the outset EoI phase through 
financial close to the delivery phase, by comparing Figure 5-2 with Figure 5-5 for the EoI and 
Financial Close organisation structures respectively. 
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The continued presence of the same team provides efficiencies over traditional contract forms such 
as DBB and D&C, where at each stage a tender is let for new participants (section 3.2.1).  
 
The preparation of detailed proposals by each consortium at the bid phase process creates 
innovation through true competition and demonstration of the project packages and interfaces. The 
urgency to secure well known suitably skilled partners among consortium members provides 
government access to true turn-key services (section 5.3.2). Furthermore through a single tender 
process the government was able to ultimately contract with three entities to deliver the DCEC, public 
and private elements, starting from a consolidated team approach (section 5.6.1). 
 
Once financial close was negotiated and a commitment between public and private partners made, 
the display of this partnership approach fostered through a PPP arrangement was evident when 
government agency resources were made available to assist the consortium with the DA (section 
5.6.1.1). This assistance greatly reduced the scoping requirements for the DA documentation in 
order to obtain project approval (granting of a development / construction permit) through the 
Development Consent authority during the financial close process.  
 
Once the project reached financial close the NTG established a project office of 6-10 full time 
resources to administer the delivery period through construction.  
 
6.6 Issues against PPPs 
Public sector loses control of PPP projects in exchange for a better level of service (Burrow 2002, Sheil 
2002) through risk transfer to the private sector however at greater cost. 
 
The DCW observed the public consultation comments presented by the Socom (2004) consultations. This 
public sentiment was embedded into the EoI documents (section 5.3.1.4) when advertising for private sector 
interest and reviewed against the successful proponent’s master plan before being presented for public 
comment and approval by the DCA for construction. 
 
The public desire the ability to choose their lifestyle and if necessary will pay for the convenience of new, 
improved and efficient services. With the DCW project the public was concerned that the land would be lost 
to private residential apartment towers and become another Gold Coast development. This restricts 
accessibility to the waters edge only by the owners, locking out the public and blocking ocean views. So a 
40% public space mandate was made by government and observed by the private sector developed master 
plan. The approved master plan included a public domain space adjacent to the convention centre 
comprising a wave pool as a central feature proved very popular as Darwin has limited surf. If the public 
lose the right to be able to access or choose otherwise to use what was once public as a result of a project, 
a public backlash is likely to occur as was the case with the Sydney Cross City Tunnel (section 3.7.2). 
 
Governments need to be savvy to negotiate with the private sector in order to structure a long-term 
partnership (section 3.7.1) which will withstand public scrutiny. The norm has been for the PSC and PDA not 
to be made public with only certain pieces released to substantiate government’s position. A move to make 
public the financial models, contract summaries of the PDA and the PSC (NSW Parliament 2006b) is seen 
to address public concerns, whilst also holding government to account during these contract negotiations 
knowing the outcomes will no longer remain confidential. 
 
The core of public resentment is taxation not providing for all necessary public infrastructure. The shift in 
public mindset needs to adjust to non-core government services being outsourced provided the OBC / PSC 
can demonstrate this is the best outcome. Simple justification of ‘the project need’ is not enough and VfM 
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must be proven to be provided throughout the entire lifecycle of the project. The value of competition in the 
private sector competing for public work has been proven to provide VfM, however the cost of the public 
sector to borrow money and bid large projects can distort the perceived trade-offs in risk mitigation cost 
savings borne by PPPs as discussed in section 3.5. 
 
Standardisation of the PPP process (as per the UK 4ps 2006) can lead to assisting government in 
positioning themselves for outcomes that suit the public and provide the pathway to follow in order to 
correctly structure the arrangement, closing out all the issues along the way. Similarly the private sector can 
reduce the bidding costs by having to provide less information and development of project details up front, 
ultimately resulting in a reduction to the project bottom line and resulting service charges to the public 
(Section 3.4). 
6.7 Australian PPP Market 
Several convention centres have been delivered in Australia (Table 3-8, Table 3-9) and other similar large 
infrastructure projects in Australia have used an investment bank-led model  (Larocca, 2004) as there is no 
requirement for long-term service providers to be part of the financing (Banks 2005). 
 
The DCW DCEC package was delivered via BOOT with significant site development constraints and civil / 
marine preparatory work involving decontamination / rehabilitation. This made it a difficult project for an 
investment bank led team to manage to financial close (section 5.6). 
 
The core local Darwin based team consisted of the contractors, engineering consultants and project 
managers. The legal, financial and architectural teams were led from Sydney (Figure 5-5). 
 
During the EoI, Bid Phase and Financial close, ABN-AMRO as the lead project financier, led the consortium 
even to the point of shaping the components within the master plan. ABN-AMRO assumed a very active role 
through these preliminary phases to ensure the deal was made with the signing of the PDA at financial 
close. Once financial close was achieved ABN-AMRO provided a fly-in–fly-out representative on an as 
needs basis to represent the developer SPV. ABN-AMRO continued the appointment of an external project 
manager from the Financial Close phase to act as their day-to-day coordinator of the project construction 
partners, government and stakeholders. 
 
Comparison of Darwin’s and Melbourne’s Convention and Exhibition Centre projects (DCEC and MCEC 
respectively) is made in Table 6-1.  
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Table 6-1 Comparison of DCEC and MCEC Projects 
 
 DCEC 
(Refer section 
5.6.9.4) 
MCEC 
(Refer section 
3.8.1.1) 
Capacity (seats) 1,500 5,000 
Annual Payments 
($m per annum) 
$3 Circa $4-5 
Concession period 
(years) 
25 25 
Period of Financial 
Close (months) 
11 14 
Year of Financial 
Close 
2005 2006 
Year of Operation 
(Due) 
2008 2009 
Government 
Contribution ($m) 
$144 $413 
 
The DCW project proved VfM to the government with supportive developments provided in addition to the 
DCEC. This supports that the Australian PPP participants operate in a mature market (Banks et al. 2004) 
providing government with value added alternatives to make large projects attractive and beneficial to the 
public. It is possible to conclude from the data in Table 6-1 that the market participant’s capabilities evolve 
after each project leading to improved VfM and outcomes for governments. 
 
Bid costs remain high which may otherwise reduce the competition to only the larger organisations limiting 
VfM outcomes. Certainly the bid costs of 2-3 percent of capital (DCW Stage 1 value $300m, 3% = $9m) are 
replicated with the DCW project (section 5.6.9.3) which are arguably passed onto government in some 
shape or form by the successful consortium’s financier in developing the project costs in the PDA. 
 
Standardisation of the bid requirements is likely to assist in ensuring the procurement structure and 
timeframes for award of financial close is a smoother process and not specially devised for each project 
situation. Furthermore standardisation would making bidding available to more participants and competition 
would be increased which is more likely to provide governments VfM according to Grimsey et al. (2005). 
 
Australia’s state based approach of individual development of PPP guidelines and framework places 
unnecessary impediments on the competing national private sector market. In the UK, national bodies are in 
place such as ‘4ps’ to assist governments in establishing that PPP are an appropriate mechanism and arm 
them with the necessary support, guidelines and advice to deliver the project. 
 
 
This concludes the comparative analysis of the benchmark criteria with the project case study observations. 
The outcome provides an example of Australian practice, which will now be discussed within the context of 
the established benchmarks in PPP delivery in the proceeding section. 
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7. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
This section discusses the findings and presents the research results based on the evaluation of the 
benchmark criteria and the case study presented in previous sections. 
 
This section also responds to the research objectives and questions surrounding the design and outcomes 
of PPPs and draws conclusions through an argued case to support the resultant recommendations. 
 
Presentation of the research outcomes and conclusions are summarised in the following final section. 
 
7.1 Findings 
All bid costs for the Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) project were carried by the private sector and involved 
the design development sufficient for the consortium to provide government a fixed lump sum price. These 
bid expenses are included in the overall project costs when the private sector calculates its availability 
charge to government. This makes it the public sectors best interest to keep bid costs low when considering 
tender call requirements. In bidding and reaching financial close for the project, the DCCC consortium 
incurred significant costs in the order of 2-3 percent (circa. $14 million) of the project capital cost. The 
DCCC consortium proposal was able to provide a fully prepared term sheet for all elements of the 
redevelopment scheme which arguably provided government with the confidence to work with this 
consortium over others. Understanding governments bid document requirements was difficult for the 
consortium, particularly where innovative changes were being considered such as the siting of the DCEC. 
Procurement efficiency was achieved by government through a four stage tender process, allowing the 
government to ultimately contract with three entities to deliver the DCEC, public and private elements, 
starting with a consolidated ‘consortium’ team approach.  
 
Once financial close was awarded for the DCW project, construction commenced as the necessary project 
approvals (EIS and DA) were in place. Government assumed the risk for obtaining and funding the EIS 
approval process in parallel with the private sector tender call and financial close periods. The preferred 
project master plan scheme details were then developed through the negotiations between government and 
the consortium leading to financial close. The government worked in partnership with the private sector to 
obtain Development Approval (DA) through the independent planning authority in the Northern Territory the 
Development Consent Authority (DCA). Once the project reached financial close the NTG established a 
project office of full time resources to administer the construction delivery phase.   
 
Financial Close required all construction risk to be priced and passed from the consortium financier to the 
construction partner. The DCW used a BOOT arrangement to partner with the private sector to provide the 
DCEC as the centre piece of the development with the ‘build ready pad’ – civil works provided by others. 
The government opted out to expand this scope to include these civil works and adjacent public domain in 
the concession arrangement, instead using D&C arrangements and funding the collective CI and MI works 
from public funds.  
 
The justification to the wider public for the PPP approach was kept to internal government circulation. This 
raised public concern over the use of a PPP approach as the private sector was seen to be driving the 
project master plan development rather than government on behalf of the public interest during the DA 
approval period. 
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Government was faced with delays on other DCW project components, particularly the CI works delivered 
under the novated consortium D&C arrangement. Additional cost and disputes may eventuate resulting in 
further project delays and increased costs to government.  
 
The DCW project proved VfM to the government with supportive developments provided in addition to the 
DCEC. Certainly the bid costs of 2-3 percent of capital (DCW Stage 1 value $300m, 3% = $9m) were 
replicated with the DCW project (Table 5-7) which are passed onto government by the successful 
consortium’s financier in developing the project costs in the PDA. 
7.2 Contribution 
The Australian public sector has been frequently made aware of the inadequate serviceability and capacity 
of its aging and in demand infrastructure. Water restrictions and traffic congestion are more common place 
arguably due to over stretched infrastructure, whilst rural areas suffer from insufficient telecommunication 
services coverage. Such infrastructure sectors often appear in the media and are likely to benefit from the 
implementation of PPPs to expand much needed public infrastructure and services without diverting public 
funds and resources away from fundamental public services and governance. However public controversy 
continues as the traditional system of ’taxation pays’ moves to ’user pays’ as increasing numbers of public 
services are delivered through a PPP arrangement. 
 
The research questions are restated in Table 7-1 together with the summary of benchmark criteria and 
Australian practice, and the resultant recommendations. The recommendations (Table 7-2) are considered 
the contribution made by this research from evaluation of Australian practice with the benchmark model for 
consideration in future projects or for further supportive examination.  
 
Table 7-1 Research Questions 
 
 Research questions 
1. Which procurement methods and consortium roles are more suited for PPPs?  
2. How should governments structure the PPP deal? 
3. How can PPP projects provide value-for-money (VfM) in achieving the best outcome for the public? 
4. Is the allocation of design and construction risk entirely to the private sector the best project 
outcome? 
5. What are the unique benefits for participants under the PPP approach? 
6. What are the drawbacks for PPPs? 
7. Which particular consortium arrangements lead to successful PPPs? 
 
Table 7-2 Results and Recommendations Matrix 
 
Research 
Question 
Benchmark Criteria Australian Practice Recommendation 
1.  Government engaged 
consortium under 
BOOT (DBFO) where 
private finance is 
involved 
Three separate contracts 
formed –  
1.  DCEC delivered via BOOT 
2.  Infrastructure and MI/CI 
works through a novated 
D&C  
3.  Residential elements 
through a Managing 
Contract using Partnering and 
Target Cost procurement 
methodology to alleviate 
adversarial relationships  
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Research 
Question 
Benchmark Criteria Australian Practice Recommendation 
Contractor (MC) type 
approach. 
2.  Community access to 
enhanced services 
leaving government to 
focus on core services 
Supportive facilities for the 
DCEC will be provided through 
a staged master plan under a 
long term relationship with the 
residential developer of the 
‘private elements’ 
Minimise participant interfaces in 
contractual arrangements to 
enhance time, cost and risk 
outcomes provided by a PPP 
procurement route 
3.  Four staged process to 
select preferred  
consortium to negotiate 
financial close involving 
a fixed lump sum cost 
for private finance 
structuring 
Protracted financial close 
period delayed operation of 
DCEC by close to 12 months 
Tender process costs to be 
reduced to facilitate competition 
through standardisation of 
responses and processes for 
participation 
4.  PSC prepared to 
provide a comparison 
with traditional 
approaches using an 
OBC. 
Feasibility study identified 
most attractive site for DCEC 
to leverage ‘supportive’ 
developments provided public 
access is maintained with co-
government contribution 
Nil cost to government outcomes 
are inequitable and should focus 
rather on public perception of 
VfM through adequate consultation 
5.  Private sector assumes 
majority of design and 
construction risk 
Financial close period used to 
investigate and eliminate 
uncertainties in design for 
lump sum items.  
Unnecessary risk premiums can be 
avoided if equitable risk sharing 
through development of a pain/gain 
mechanism 
6.  Control of service 
passed to private sector 
in exchange for ongoing 
serviceability charge 
2-3 percent of capital bid costs 
passed to government within 
project availability and delivery 
charges 
Where public charges (ie. tolls) are 
payable, free alternatives are 
provided to allow freedom of 
choice by citizens 
7.  Financer-led private 
sector consortium 
establishes project 
specific partnership 
Financier-led consortium 
achieves financial close and 
then subcontracts other 
partners to perform long-term 
operation and maintenance 
functions 
Establish service-provider led 
consortiums during procurement to 
structure deal to suit long term 
commitments rather than short 
term broker commissions 
 
7.3 Argued case for recommendations 
Supportive discussion of the recommendations is provided to respond to the research questions drawing 
upon the key issues provided by the evaluation of the benchmark criteria against the presented case study 
analysis. 
7.3.1 Alleviate adversarial relationships 
Utilisation of a Partnering type procurement arrangement is time consuming up front to develop a 
project ’target cost’ (similar length to the financial close process), which is not a lump sum amount 
and is subject to further rise and fall. Under a PPP arrangement to reach financial close a hard fixed 
dollar budget is required in order to secure financing. In the DCW case instead of continuing a 
partnering structure with the private sector, negotiations between parties resulted in a traditional 
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contracting means (D&C) in order to deliver all components outside the DCEC scope. This type of 
approach may have been undertaken as it was known to the governments delivery team which 
included provisional cost amounts which has impacted negatively on the program (delays) and 
relationships (disputes). 
 
7.3.2 Minimise participant interfaces 
To achieve the full benefits provided through a PPP procurement route, the complex contractual 
mechanism established for the project should seek to minimise the interfaces with each major SPV 
participant. Ideally government would engage a single SPV with coverage over all specialist equity 
and non-equity partners and providers. However this is not the case for most projects and extensive 
vertical project hierarchies are necessary which incur uneconomical management fees. Naturally 
governments seek to restructure into horizontal ranks in order to achieve VfM, but this approach 
increases the burden of government’s management resources – so a balance must be assessed. 
PPPs provide government a single point of access to a multitude of private sector skills packaged 
into a consortium capable of providing the full range of a large project needs, whilst also delivering 
associated complimentary or supportive elements, such as residential or commercial property 
development. Therefore government must keep the project objectives in mind and not let the private 
sector or the complex legal structures impede upon accessing the development of delivery 
efficiencies of integrated solutions through creativity and innovation. 
 
7.3.3 Standardisation 
Simplification and standardisation of the PPP tender process is likely to save time and perhaps a 
further 2-3 percent of project capital in delivery charges to government. While each of the Australian 
state government PPP guidelines have broad similarities, each PPP project requires development of 
costly unique deliverables by the private sector in order to participate in the competitive tendering 
process. Establishment and development of an authority in Australia like the ‘4ps’ in the UK is likely 
to assist the Australian market to grow the numbers of participants in the PPP market place. This 
could potentially drive up competition as costs to participate are able be absorbed by more bidders if 
unsuccessful. Support to governments by such an authority could also provide the confidence for 
governments to expand the use of PPPs into other asset classes not normally considered. The 
recent election of the new Labor government in Australia in November 2007, saw the establishment 
of Infrastructure Australia an authority given the task among others to develop means of 
standardising PPPs across the country and the ‘4ps’ could be just the approach it should consider. 
 
7.3.4 Public perception 
A misguided partnership is likely if government seek a service or asset provided without any public 
financial stake in the project or upfront payments made by the private sector. Such structures in all 
likelihood is not able to achieve its original objectives to improve and benefit the public. Buy-in by all 
parties must be achieved. Especially government as the party to drive the public interest and see to it 
that the private sector are held to account and provide a true VfM outcome for the public. Control of 
the operational phase of the service is provided through performance measures and penalties 
incurred by the private sector operator. However in the up front project development, scoping and 
design work, the public sector must impose the will of the public to ensure they are not locked out of 
the scheme or forced into untenable concession arrangements. The public must be fully consulted 
and made aware of the impact the new service or infrastructure will have on their lives with full 
disclosure of the arrangements made by the project team. 
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7.3.5 Equitable risk sharing 
The assurance that PPPs provide VfM to government in terms of risk transfer to the private sector 
requires (under a financier-led consortium) that technical, price and delivery risk be fixed at the 
conclusion of financial close. The technical elements of a large project are complex making if difficult 
to determine all design and construction requirements during the tender period. This requires 
allocation of a cost contingency for each identified risk that may or may not eventuate. Unnecessary 
risk premiums can be avoided through a pain/gain mechanism which accompanies the target cost 
concept with a partnering approach. This however raises the issue of how private sector finance 
could be secured if provided on an upper and lower range for the anticipated capital cost.  Cost 
uncertainty affects the availability charge determination which would have to be reassessed once the 
capital cost is realised as the conclusion of the delivery phase. 
 
7.3.6 Freedom of choice 
Where public charges (ie. tolls) are payable, anti-competitive actions by government to force the 
public to use the new facility can create a public backlash against what is perceived to be a 
monopoly and likely impact upon patronage and the future viability of the private sector operator. If 
the project outcome will take away existing free services in place for the new (improved) project 
services then wide public consultation should be undertaken. This will allow the project to manage 
and gauge the public perception of the change to the status-quo and ascertain if any existing 
(competing) public service or asset should remain to provide freedom of choice by the public. 
 
7.3.7 Service provider-led consortia 
Establish service-provider led consortiums during procurement to structure a deal to suit long term 
commitments rather than short term broker commissions. The key service provider such as the 
facility manager for a building asset should be instrumental in establishing the contract structure 
during financial close with the government as they will be the SPV responsible and accountable to 
see out the concession period for the service. The ongoing payment mechanism for the concession 
period which commences from the time the asset is placed in service is between the service provider 
and government. This payment is the only form of control government retains in the deal unless other 
specific arrangements are included in the contract. In the Australian context these service-provider 
companies include Bilifinger Berger Concessions, Transurban (both toll road operators), Spotless 
(facilities management) and Plenary Group (an investor, developer and operator). The service 
provider partnership with government should have primary control to progress with the procurement 
process and contract deliberations, and not be a secondary participant as is the case under a 
financer-led consortium. Large and complex project success is based on getting the structure right 
with the right team members from the outset, so critical is this approach that it is mandated in the UK 
for PPP delivery.  
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An argued case to support the research findings has been presented. This original contribution forms the 
results of this research and provides an extension to the presented body of knowledge into the research 
area. A matrix was used to present the research findings and identified recommendations which impact the 
structure and outcomes of PPP projects. 
 
In the following final section the research objectives and findings are restated to conclude this research 
paper. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this final section the research objectives and findings are restated through review of the outcomes from 
the benchmark criteria modelled from the literature review, case study observations, analysis and discussion 
of the results forming conclusions presented as recommendations. 
 
A summary of the recommendations to address design attributes and variables, and action and outcomes 
for PPP projects is discussed together with the findings of this research leading to areas for further 
consideration in continued research. 
 
8.1 Objectives 
The purpose of this research was to benchmark Australian PPP practices against world best practice. This 
has been achieved by examining the workings of a PPP bid process to record a case study using the PPP 
procurement route to deliver major public infrastructure. The case study allows subsequent evaluation with 
the modelled benchmark criteria accepted as best practice found in PPP literature. 
 
The objectives of this research were to: 
• Identify key attributes and variables that influences the design of a PPP Project 
• Identify key actions and events that influence the outcomes generated by a PPP project 
• Model design attributes and variables, and actions and outcomes found in PPP literature 
• Evaluate Australian practice as demonstrated in a case study, using the benchmark model 
• Discuss findings and present conclusions 
 
By examining these objectives through a proven and grounded research methodology, secondary issues 
and short comings and benefits surface to provide common issues surrounding industry practice for PPP 
projects. 
 
8.2 PPP literature and benchmark criteria 
The literature review provided benchmark criteria for PPP structure (as presented in Table 2-1) by 
examining the following areas.  
• Project procurement process and structure 
• Roles of stakeholders contributing to those projects 
• Contractual relationships and arrangements 
• Design and construction risk 
• Public interest and perception 
• Maturity of the marketplace 
• Examination of PPP deals within Australia 
 
The literature review expanded upon the well documented risk management considerations of Akintoye  et 
al. (2003) and Grimsey (2001) for PPPs to present the benchmark structure and approach.  
 
Australia’s state based approach of individual development of PPP guidelines and framework places 
unnecessary impediments on the competing national private sector market. In the UK, national bodies are in 
place such as ‘4ps’ to assist governments in establishing that PPP are an appropriate mechanism and arm 
them with the necessary support, guidelines and advice to deliver the project. 
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Standardisation of the PPP process can lead to assisting government in positioning themselves for 
outcomes that suits the public and provide the pathway to follow in order to correctly structure the 
arrangement, closing out all the probity issues along the way. Similarly, the private sector can reduce 
bidding costs if they were to provide targeted information of project details up front through an open two-way 
consultation process, ultimately resulting in a reduction to the project bottom line and resulting service 
charges to the public. 
 
Australian state and federal governments now consider contracting large infrastructure projects through a 
PPP method equally with traditional procurement means. This has led to a mature market that has grown in 
capability beyond delivery of transportation projects and further into industry sectors such as social 
infrastructure. As such it is important to review PPPs project examples and analyse the domestic PPP 
market so that both public and private participants can refine and improve the process to a more formal 
structure for wider adoption, rather than developed in isolation on a project-by-project basis. 
 
The original data gathered which formed the case study was presented in the form of participant 
observations from the $1.1b Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) redevelopment project located in the Northern 
Territory of Australia. Analytical triangulation of the observations was achieved through use of personal 
journals, meeting minutes, technical reports, memos, emails etc in development of the case study 
observations and qualitative data. Relevant topical items from these sources were extracted and placed into 
a chronological order. 
 
8.3 Case Study of Australian PPP practice 
The case study relates to the private consortium bid spanning from August 2003 to May 2005. Within this 
period the following pre-construction procurement milestone stages of the project were observed: 
1. Expression of interest (EoI) 
2. Call for Detailed Proposals (CDP) or bid phase 
3. Request for Detailed Further Offers (DFO) or Best and Final Offers (BAFO) 
4. Financial Close, leading to contract award 
 
After financial close was achieved the project entered the construction delivery phase in which detailed 
design was undertaken such that construction could commence. This phase however was outside of the 
observation results presented. 
 
Background to the project development site was presented to provide the context leading up to the NT 
government’s decision to redevelop the site using a PPP procurement approach. 
 
The case study is considered to provide the example of Australian PPP practice and a more complete 
record of events and analysis into the often ’secretive nature’ of the procurement of PPP projects. In 
particular the case study puts on the record the area where PPPs provide the most effective public savings 
according to the Allen Report (Allen Consulting 2007) which is during the tendering / bid phase prior to 
financial close. 
 
The Darwin City Waterfront (DCW) project used a BOOT arrangement to partner with the private sector to 
provide a new convention centre (DCEC). The government opted out from the private sector offer to expand 
this scope to include the supporting civil works and adjacent public domain. 
 
The findings show that underneath the complex structure of PPPs, traditional and adversarial Design & 
Construct (D&C) forms of contract underpin the agreements among construction partners or SPVs. These 
contractual arrangements are imposed by private financiers whose involvement diminishes at 
commencement of construction but require a fixed price to secure equity and bond finance. 
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Access to specialist skills needed to address all technical aspects of the development is provided under a 
PPP consortium structure up to financial close. These skills provide the means to master plan the entire site 
to achieve lock down of the strategic planning guidelines. This provided the public with the certainty of the 
long term development based on the detailed master plan and scale model put to public comment during the 
development consent approval (DCA) process. 
 
Additional project components were able to be delivered concurrently due to the capacity for the private 
consortium to provide the technical skills, resourcing and the contractual interfaces. Arguably these 
components including the aquatic precinct comprising a wave pool and an enclosed static water body 
created by a 500m long breakwater structure in the harbour were features of the consortium master plan 
that won them the project. 
 
The Government negotiated at financial close for the public elements under the CI works to be removed 
from the PPP concession arrangement. This meant that the design development risk of the multistorey car 
park and wave pool remained with government which is now faced with a cost blow out. The financial close 
process in the PPP procurement process effectively runs until all uncertainties are resolved or passed to the 
party best suited to carry the risk and locked in for execution in the delivery phase. In bidding and reaching 
financial close for the project, the DCCC consortium incurred significant costs in the order of 2-3 percent of 
the project capital cost (circa $14m). 
 
Through a single tender process the government was able to ultimately contract with three entities to deliver 
the DCEC, public and private elements, starting from a consortium team approach. However the multiple 
entities engaged under different procurement arrangements such as BOOT and D&C using lump sum and 
provisional cost sum arrangements lack contractual flexibility due to the interfaces created, when compared 
to an alliance partnering arrangement.  
 
At financial close the deal may be well structured and locked in to support private financing arrangements 
covering all possibilities through construction and operation, but the mechanism to deal with unforseen 
construction eventualities is approached from a self-centred perspective to protect each parties rigid 
commercial position unlike a partnering arrangement operating in the spirit of ‘best for project‘. 
 
8.4 Findings and Conclusions 
Recommendations outlined from the discussion of the results of this research provide new frameworks for 
consideration by all project stakeholders. These recommendations are formulated from evaluation of the 
Australian practice with the benchmark model to strengthen the relationship of the public-private partnership 
as presented in the table below (Table 7-2 Results and Recommendations Matrix).  
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Research 
Question 
Benchmark Criteria Australian Practice Recommendation 
1.  Government engaged 
consortium under 
BOOT (DBFO) where 
private finance is 
involved 
Three separate contracts 
formed –  
1.  DCEC delivered via BOOT 
2.  Infrastructure and MI/CI 
works through a novated 
D&C  
3.  Residential elements 
through a Managing 
Contractor (MC) type 
approach. 
Contract using Partnering and 
Target Cost procurement 
methodology to alleviate 
adversarial relationships  
2.  Community access to 
enhanced services 
leaving government to 
focus on core services 
Supportive facilities for the 
DCEC will be provided through 
a staged master plan under a 
long term relationship with the 
residential developer of the 
‘private elements’ 
Minimise participant interfaces in 
contractual arrangements to 
enhance time, cost and risk 
outcomes provided by a PPP 
procurement route 
3.  Four staged process to 
select preferred 
consortium to negotiate 
financial close involving 
a fixed lump sum cost 
for private finance 
structuring 
Protracted financial close 
period delayed operation of 
DCEC by close to 12 months 
Tender process costs to be 
reduced to facilitate competition 
through standardisation of 
responses and processes for 
participation 
4.  PSC prepared to 
provide a comparison 
with traditional 
approaches using an 
OBC. 
Feasibility study identified 
most attractive site for DCEC 
to leverage ‘supportive’ 
developments provided public 
access is maintained with co-
government contribution 
Nil cost to government outcomes 
are inequitable and should focus 
rather on public perception of 
VfM through adequate consultation 
5.  Private sector assumes 
majority of design and 
construction risk 
Financial close period used to 
investigate and eliminate 
uncertainties in design for 
lump sum items.  
Unnecessary risk premiums can be 
avoided if equitable risk sharing 
through development of a pain/gain 
mechanism 
6.  Control of service 
passed to private sector 
in exchange for ongoing 
serviceability charge 
2-3 percent of capital bid costs 
passed to government within 
project availability and delivery 
charges 
Where public charges (ie. tolls) are 
payable, free alternatives are 
provided to allow freedom of 
choice by citizens 
7.  Financer-led private 
sector consortium 
establishes project 
specific partnership 
Financier-led consortium 
achieves financial close and 
then subcontracts other 
partners to perform long-term 
operation and maintenance 
functions 
Establish service-provider led 
consortiums during procurement to 
structure deal to suit long term 
commitments rather than short 
term broker commissions 
 
These recommendations are in response to each of the seven research questions from Table 7-1 and 
present the contribution made by this research by carrying out the research objectives. 
 
Jason Gillard Masters Exegeses  Section 8 - Conclusions 
 
  Page 115 of 138 
It has been argued that whilst PPPs develop long term relationships the strength of this relationship comes 
into question. Incorporation of alliance partnering approaches to alleviate ’adversarial contractual 
relationships’ and moves to service provider led consortiums rather than finance-led, could provide 
enhanced value-for-money and public perception outcomes. Addressing these criteria and adoption of 
standardised processes in structuring PPPs can provide greater public acceptance and allow use across a 
broader range of industry sectors. 
 
Project structure was established as a key factor (Miller et al. 2000) for a successful large engineering 
project, yet over complicated structure can lead to inflexibility of the project should difficulty arise. This can 
be to the detriment of project outcomes. A driving reason for governments to adopt a Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) procurement route is the mitigation and allocation of risk to the private sector whilst 
saving time, cost and delivery of integrated and innovative outcomes. 
 
It is acknowledged that this research has limitations. To judge the effectiveness of the PPP approach, the 
entire life cycle of the project from delivery through to operation for the concession period of some 20-30 
years should be examined. However, this was not possible for this research. For the scope of this research 
the procurement phase of the case study project was the time span of the PPP deal examined concluding at 
financial close. 
 
PPPs are a relatively new mainstream approach taken by governments around the world and consequently 
few texts are available on the subject. Those that exist are from the UK and focus on UK policies and project 
case studies. For this reason Australian government policies serve as the best outline of how PPPs are 
undertaken on a domestic basis. Much debate into the effectiveness of PPPs is currently circulating in the 
Australian media, as the momentum builds in the domestic market. Similarly this is reflected in industry key 
note publications provided on the internet by advisors who consult to both public and private sectors. 
 
8.5 Suggestions for further research and investigation 
What for the future? Well in response to the public backlash on several recent PPP projects in Australia 
notably the bankruptcy of the Sydney Cross City Tunnel operator, the future of Australia’s PPP market has 
been placed into the hands of the newly elected (2007) Federal Labor Government. In response the 
government has formed a statutory advisory council Infrastructure Australia (IA), to investigate the 
standardisation of PPPs and to provide support to agencies looking to procure through the PPP route. This 
should provide both public and private sector players with the confidence to undertake large infrastructure 
projects using PPP structures that have been developed in consideration of the range of project 
circumstances and best practises. 
 
The recommendations established in this research provide direction for future PPP projects and areas for 
further investigation. Particular focus is warranted in the Australian context to a shift to adopting a uniform 
approach in identification and delivery of projects of national significance.  
 
PPPs will play a role in this approach and the federal government’s IA body will look to PPPs where 
appropriately selected through a business case process, as a means to deliver these projects. As IA is 
currently in the establishment process and yet to develop policy on these matters further research and 
investigation to influence IA in the following matters should be considered: 
• Standardisation of the bid process through development of national policy which assists both private 
sector bidders and government authorities in reducing time and bid costs This will also open the PPP 
procurement options to other levels of government such as utility authorities and local government 
through provision of a robust process and guidelines to follow. This should also extend to the business 
case process in order to justify a PPP procurement route is suitable for the project. 
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• Examine the appropriateness of the UK’s ‘4ps’ PPP guidelines and identify changes or enhancements 
required for adoption by the Australian market 
• Reduction in probity restrictions to allow interaction and consultation during bid phase between private 
and public parties to ensure proponents have understood the objectives of the bid documentation and 
desired project outcomes 
• Examine means for governments both federal and state levels to contribute public funds in the interest 
of the project scheme to cover the high risk nature and time consuming bureaucratic elements of the 
project such as land readiness, decontamination, statutory approvals etc, to ultimately reduce project 
costs 
• Establish conditions for superannuation funds to invest in infrastructure projects to balance interests of 
investors and the cost to the public for the use of such infrastructure. 
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10. APPENDIX A – DCC DETAILED PROPOSAL 
Darwin Cove Consortium (DCC) Detailed Proposal breakdown within each of the Returnable Schedules 
“The Deliverables”. 
 
Returnable 
Schedule 
Contents 
Introduction This section of the proposal contains an overview of the returnable schedules 
and supportive documentation submitted for the tender. This includes outside 
the returnable schedules: 
• 1:1000 scale set of illustrative boards depicting the master plan, stage one 
elements and infrastructure at each stage 
• 1:500 scale physical model of the entire site master plan 
• 1:500 scale physical model of the DCEC building including removable 
sections such as the roof and internals etc 
• Darwin Cove: Share our Vision – “coffee table book”. This marketing book 
outlines the vision for Darwin Cove and introduces the master plan, financial 
and non-equity partners and business partners 
 
1 (a) Master Plan  
Darwin Cove has created an exciting 
precinct, a must-see attraction for 
visitors and a favourite hot spot for 
locals. The excitement of the 
development is created through a 
careful and integrated balance 
between the Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre to draw business 
tourists, the apartment hotel which provides convenient, high-quality 
accommodation to conference delegates and other visitors, residential 
apartments which create a permanent population to invigorate the area, public 
domain activities such as a public swimming beach, family lagoon areas, 
amphitheatre and foreshore, and a strong mix of retail and hospitality operators.  
Most importantly, the master plan integrates these offerings into a sustainable 
mix which activates the precinct around the clock and around the year, and 
draws interest from around the world. 
Darwin Cove reflects a strong commitment to public art, including heritage and 
cultural themes. In particular, development of an “Avenue of Honour” along 
Smith Street, between the Smith Street Mall and the Escarpment, which pays 
tribute to the people who have helped make Darwin the great place that it is: 
from pioneers and entrepreneurs to those that have sacrificed their lives in 
military conflict. This Avenue plays a critical role in activating the area back 
towards the CBD and creating a strong between the CBD and Darwin Cove. 
Another critical element of the Darwin Cove master plan is the bridge and 
viewing platform from Smith Street, over the Escarpment, connecting with the 
slimline residential signature tower. This viewing platform offers a breath-taking 
view of the precinct, looking over to the iconic Darwin Convention and Exhibition 
Centre, the public domain amphitheatre and beach area, and over to the Wharfs. 
This is a perfect spot for watching the vivid sunsets of the Top End, or the 
exciting wet season storms as they roll in. 
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Returnable 
Schedule 
Contents 
Some other important points to note are the following: 
• A sea wall which creates a locked body of water, thereby controlling tidal 
influence and creating a stable body of water over which the Darwin 
Convention and Exhibition Centre projects; 
• A second controlled body of water which forms a year-round swimming 
beach, with wave machine; 
• Lagoon and children’s water play area; 
• Unrestricted access to the complete foreshore; 
• Ample shading and shelter provided throughout the precinct, including on 
boardwalks and promenades throughout the precinct; 
• Ample structured, on-grade and underground car parking; 
• A Cultural Centre and amphitheatre space which provides additional 
performance space to complement the Darwin Convention and Exhibition 
Centre, and houses The Darwin Experience; 
• Apartment hotel which provides high quality, convenient accommodation 
for conference delegates and other visitors to Darwin;  
• A stand-alone restaurant building adjacent to the Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre which provides an additional alternative to the convention 
centre for functions and catering; and  
• A strong, balanced mix of retail and hospitality, providing much needed 
amenity to the permanent residential population of the precinct and visitors 
to the precinct. 
Importantly, along with producing a stunning, world-class master plan, Darwin 
Cove Consortium has devised some exciting marketing and partnership 
strategies to attract quality operators to the precinct, develop new tourism 
campaigns, and provide quality activities to visitors of Darwin Cove.  Some of 
these exciting initiatives include The Darwin Experience (a drawcard cultural 
tourist attraction), the wave machine that creates a new surf beach for Darwin, 
and creating a calendar of new conference and tourist events such as the 
“Annual National Indigenous Arts, Culture and Dance Festival”. 
 
1 (b) Stage one 
development 
commitment 
The consortium focussed on 
developing a master plan which is 
fully self-sustaining in Stage 1 so that 
the success of the precinct is not 
dependent on any future 
developments.  
As a stand-alone development, 
Darwin Cove is able to create and 
maintain a vibrant, dynamic precinct 
which is only enhanced and improved 
through the subsequent stages. Stage 1 includes: 
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Returnable 
Schedule 
Contents 
• The Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre; 
• The apartment hotel; 
• The Darwin Experience; 
• The signature residential tower; 
• The residential finger wharf which projects from the tower to the sea wall; 
• The stand alone restaurant building adjacent to the Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre; 
• The sea wall, delivering the permanent body of water; 
• The beach and lagoon areas; 
• The amphitheatre; 
• The viewing platform from Smith Street over the Escarpment; 
• The Avenue of Honour along Smith Street; 
• Promenades and boardwalks throughout the site;  
• Shade and shelter structures; and  
• 1350 car parks. 
 
2 Detailed Design – 
Darwin Convention 
and Exhibition Centre 
 
The power of an iconic building is undeniable, and creates a tourism attraction in 
its own right. The Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre is inspired by the 
curved beauty of a shell. Perched dramatically over the sea, the reflection in the 
water below presents the illusion of a completed and open shell. Being so 
closely aligned with the natural history and commerce of the area, the design 
has meaningful significance to the people of Darwin, including the traditional 
owners the Larrakia. This affinity with the community should evoke a sense of 
ownership and pride.  Darwin Cove’s proposal for the Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre offers maximum flexibility for a convention and exhibition 
center of this size and intended market and is closely attuned to our operator’s 
requirements (Ogden IFC has been directly and intimately involved in the design 
of the Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre), fully meeting the needs of the 
anticipated uses across the broad spectrum of likely events. 
3 Sustainability (ESD) In undertaking this project, one of the key objectives of the Northern Territory 
Government is the application of sustainability principles to both the Darwin 
Convention and Exhibition Centre and the wider waterfront precinct 
development. The consortium devised a range of mechanisms to incorporate 
Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) principles within the development 
of the precinct, and provides a balance between social, environmental and 
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Returnable 
Schedule 
Contents 
economic benefits. Darwin Cove Consortium fervently support the Northern 
Territory Government’s commitment to ESD. We have worked hard to embrace 
and incorporate environmentally sustainable design initiatives at every 
opportunity during design, construction and operational phases of the project. 
The Darwin Cove Consortium also recognises the importance of the Year of the 
Built Environment (YBE). Darwin Cove easily represents the largest inner city 
urban development project in Darwin, and therefore must feature as a 
cornerstone initiative for the Year of the Built Environment.  
Darwin Cove Consortium recognise that due to the prominence of the project, 
and the direct involvement of the Chief Minister’s office in both the YBE and the 
DCW, that this project must actively embrace and promote the principles of 
sustainability, community consultation and community ownership. To facilitate 
and achieve the objectives of both the YBE and the DCW, subject to Northern 
Territory Government approval, Darwin Cove Consortium would seek to 
immediately commence a community education and consultation program about 
the proposed precinct development immediately upon award of preferred bidder 
status. We would seek to undertake this commitment to ensure the project is 
promoted during the Year of the Built Environment, maximising the promotional 
and marketing benefits for both the NT Government and Darwin Cove 
Consortium.  
Our master plan has particularly considered the local design implications of 
building in a tropical environment.The Darwin Cove master plan has adopted the 
following ESD objectives in terms of urban design: 
• Maintenance of access to the foreshore; 
• Provision of open space and recreational opportunities; 
• Mixed use to create vibrancy; 
• Pedestrian and cycle facilities; 
• Traffic and car parking management to facilitate a pedestrian friendly 
environment; 
• Linkages with surrounding areas including CBD; 
• Retention of cultural and historical features; 
• Providing a safe and accessible environment; and 
• Providing quality open space. 
One of our key initiatives is a co-generation energy plant developed in 
conjunction with Origin Energy, brought about by the scale of the proposed 
development which warrants the consideration of potential energy generation 
from renewable energy sources, and/or the use of recovered energy from a co-
generation plant. Our proposal by Origin incorporates both of the key 
sustainability objectives by incorporating renewable energy generation via solar 
PV panels and the use of recovered waste energy from a co-generation plant.  
4 Local Industry 
Participation Plan 
This project is about more than just building infrastructure: among other things, it 
is about growing the local economy, developing local expertise, creating local 
job opportunities, and capturing a feeling of local pride and ownership. The 
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consortium is fundamentally a local team, supported and augmented by the 
expertise of world-leading experts in a few specific fields.  The Darwin Cove 
Consortium confirms its wholehearted commitment to a Local Industry and 
Indigenous Participation Plan (LIIPP) to maximise participation of local Northern 
Territory industry throughout the life of the Darwin City Waterfront project.  
Our commitment to Local Industry and Indigenous Participation delivers the 
following benefits: 
• A better end result due to the design, construction and operation of the 
precinct being managed and lead by people with Darwin-specific expertise 
and understanding; 
• A strong and positive message to the community; 
• A passionate sense of ownership by the community; 
• The important economic impact due to goods and services being 
purchased within the Northern Territory; 
• The ongoing economic impact and the broadened range of retail, dining, 
entertainment and service operations introduced to Darwin through 
partnerships, joint ventures, franchises and licences with locals; 
• The critical community and economic impacts of medium-term and long-
term employment opportunities, including increased opportunity for stable 
employment through all seasons; 
• Enhanced skill and knowledge base for locals due to their involvement in 
the design, construction and operation of the precinct, including the 
encouragement of international quality standards through working with 
consortium partners; and 
• The ability for local operators to develop important networks and alliances 
throughout Australia and the world through relationships and contacts built 
through this project. 
 
5 Business Plan Darwin Cove Consortium’s fully underwritten offer for the delivery of the Darwin 
Convention and Exhibition Centre is underpinned and secured by the following: 
• The fixed price, fixed time design and construction contract, to be executed 
by the Sitzler Barclay Mowlem Joint Venture, designed and engineered by 
Crawford/TVS and Connell Wagner respectively.  Henry Walker Eltin 
provide significant subcontract services in respect of the required DCEC 
civil works;  
• All operating risk accepted by Ogden IFC Pty Limited as evidenced by the 
Operator Term Sheet executed Ogden IFC; 
• All maintenance risk accepted by Honeywell Pty Limited and guaranteed by 
Honeywell Inc of the US as evidenced by an executed Maintenance Term 
Sheet; and  
• With all debt and equity finance underwritten pursuant to the terms of Debt 
and Equity Term Sheets executed by ABN AMRO. 
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The design of the Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre delivers an iconic 
water based public building that becomes instantly recognisable world wide as 
Darwin’s own.  The above mentioned organisations have the proven capacity, 
depth of local experience and balance sheet strength required to deliver this 
world class project with certainty. 
The financing for the Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre is fully 
underwritten by ABN AMRO under a traditional public private partnership, similar 
to a variety of recently executed project across Australia.  Under the Concession 
Deed, Government pays for the use of the Darwin Convention and Exhibition 
Centre, subject to meeting various maintenance related performance hurdles, 
over a 25 year period.  At the end of 25 years of operations the Darwin 
Convention and Exhibition Centre is transferred to Government’s ownership. 
The PPP delivery mechanism ensures the optimal transfer of risk to the private 
sector for the design, construction, maintenance and whole of life costing for the 
Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre. 
Community Infrastructure 
Darwin Cove Consortium’s fully underwritten offer for the delivery of the CIPD is 
underpinned and secured by the following: 
• The fixed price, fixed time design and construction contract to be executed 
by Henry Walker Eltin, designed and engineered by Hassell Architects and 
Connell Wagner respectively; and   
• With all debt finance underwritten pursuant to the terms of Debt Term 
Sheet executed by ABN AMRO. 
The ABN AMRO financing offer provides Government with the opportunity to 
lease the CIPD for periods ranging from 5 to 25 years, depending upon the 
needs of Government.  This allows Government to match the cash flow 
obligations of paying for the CIPD with the economic benefit that is expected to 
accrue from the investment in Darwin Cove. 
 
Private Elements 
Darwin Cove Consortium has broken down the commitment in respect of the 
Private Elements into a Stage 1 component which is to be fully underwritten at 
Financial Close (rather than Bid Date) and the Stage 2 component which is not 
underwritten and is to be undertaken in accordance with the approved Master 
Plan and delivered over time in accordance with market demand.  As evidenced 
by the HASSELL Master Plan, the Darwin Cove Consortium proposal details the 
development of a vibrant, mixed use international waterfront precinct, anchored 
by the Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre and other public domain and 
community infrastructure, and comprising the following significant elements: 
1. A hotel/apartment hotel designed to allow for 202 apartments or 235 
rooms on a dual key basis; 
2. A signature residential tower and two low rise residential buildings 
comprising a maximum of 235 apartments, but scaleable down to as low 
as 102 in Stage 1; and  
3. Retail comprising approximately 7,800m2 generally at board walk level 
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under both the three residential buildings and the apartment hotel; and 
4. The individual elements of the abovementioned Stage 1 Development. 
At bid date, Darwin Cove Consortium has not underwritten any of the Private 
Elements. 
6 Partnering 
Structure 
The members of the Darwin Cove Consortium have extensive experience in the 
delivery of projects of similar size and complexity to the proposed Darwin Cove 
and, together, have the financial capacity and expertise to ensure they meet and 
exceed the Territory’s expectations.  The Consortium has adopted a traditional 
and proven PPP approach to the delivery of the Darwin Convention and 
Exhibition Centre and related Community Infrastructure and has allowed 
sufficient flexibility in its delivery of the balance of the development to ensure an 
efficient outcome in tune with market demands and conditions and in line with 
the Territory’s broader objectives. 
Darwin Cove Consortium has assembled the best local and national builders, 
managers, operators and specialist consultants in its preparation of the 
Submission and, if successful, in its delivery of the Project.  Fully negotiated 
term sheets have been agreed with key suppliers, contractors and underwriters 
to ensure that the Consortium is able to achieve financial close well in time with 
the Territory’s proposed plans. 
The delivery of the Private Elements is through a development partnership 
comprising Toga, ABN AMRO, Sitzler Barclay Mowlem Joint Venture and Henry 
Walker Eltin. 
7 Financial 
Structuring and 
Funding 
The financing structure for the Darwin Convention and Exhibition Centre is 
similar to the financing structure ABN AMRO has implemented on a range of 
recent financings including the Spencer Street Station, Wyuna Water, Berwick 
Hospital, Victorian County Court, Parramatta Police Headquarters and the 
recent NSW Schools Project. This structure broadly requires the D&C Contractor 
to take the delivery risk of the project, with such delivery risk being underwritten 
by ABN AMRO, while the long-term maintenance risk on the asset is accepted 
by the Facilities Manager (Honeywell). The financing structure therefore takes 
risk on both completion and the long-term asset performance of the project. 
8 Risk Allocation Plan The consortium accepts the large majority of the risk allocation proposed by the 
Territory, subject to amendments below. The proposed allocation is justified 
based on the following principles of risk transfer: 
• Whichever party is allocated risk, that party must have the freedom to 
choose how to handle and minimise risk; 
• Special processes should apply to the assessment of risk, where they 
materialise and have a material adverse effect on the project; 
• Reconciling risk allocation may involve the Government taking back those 
risks which it is best placed to manage, or can manage at a lower cost than 
the private sector; and 
• For risks which are outside the control of either party, risks may be shared 
using special risk-sharing mechanisms. 
Changes to Government Risk Allocation Profile: 
• Site works impacts associated with archaeological discoveries to be bared 
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by Government. The proponent is issued a scope change and extension of 
time. 
• Interest rates change impacting financial agreements. Margins are shared 
between Private and Government parties. 
• Force-majeure event leads to increase to insurance premiums or that a risk 
becomes uninsurable is shared 
9 Project 
Documentation 
The project documentation comprising the Concession Deed, the PDA, and 
Development Lease as draft forms of contracts provided by government are 
commented and alternative forms / structures and amendments are proposed by 
the consortium. 
 
The key issues raised are due to: 
• Separation of operation (by the Operator) from design, construction and 
maintenance duties of the Concession Holder under the DCEC Concession 
Deed and Operation Contract to reflect two separate parties undertaking 
these activities 
• Community Infrastructure (CI) be financed through a separate bond issue 
underwritten by ABN AMRO, and that the property developer’s obligations 
in respect of the CI is moved from the PDA to a standalone CI lease 
agreement. Community Infrastructure P/L (CI SPV), enters into a 
Community Infrastructure Lease (CI Lease) with the Territory. 
• Amendment of the Stage 1 / DCEC cross default. Considerations to be 
made regarding timing of the practical completion of the various 
components of Stage One and their integration with completion of the 
DCEC, as plans for Stage One residential, retail and hospitality facilities are 
substantial and can not be achieved concurrent with the DCEC. 
• Changes to the payment and performance regime under the DCEC 
Concession Deed so it only relates to the FM Services, not the Operating 
Services. The only payment payable under the Concession Deed is a base 
Territory Availability Payment, payable quarterly. The Concession Holder is 
to comply with the KPI Monitoring System (a self-monitoring system 
developed by the Concession Holder).   
• The Territory pays the Operator an annual Management Fee in four 
quarterly installments. The amount of the Management Fee will be fixed in 
the Operation Contract for all installments for the concession term and 
adjusted only for CPI increases.  
• Completion obligations for DCEC and Stage 1: 
- Sunset date set to 12 months after practical completion and that it 
is adjusted for extensions of time 
- Extensions of time would be granted for: 
 tests show the DCEC Works comply with the Project 
Requirements. 
 Territory initiates a Scope Change 
 We also seek financial adjustments where an EOT is 
given for: 
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 tests show the DCEC Works comply with the Project 
Requirements. 
 discovery of Relics. 
• Deleting the provisions which indicate that the Territory is claiming the 
Builder’s float 
• The Force Majeure related definitions have been amended to reflect an 
acceptable risk allocation consistent with current market practice.  Where 
Force Majeure results in suspension of Territory Availability Payments 
provision be made for Territory Availability Payments to be adjusted to take 
account of the cost of the delay in receipt of those payments.  The 
Territory’s termination right for continuing Force Majeure be also given to 
the Concession Holder and that the right be able to be exercised after 12 
months. 
• Definition of Uninsurable Events changed to be consistent with market 
practice. The Concession Holder should be relieved of its insurance 
obligations to the extent a risk becomes uninsurable and the cost effects of 
the event be dealt with through a material adverse effect regime similar to 
that proposed by the Territory in respect of Qualifying Change in Law. 
• Voluntary termination of Concession Deed is offered to the Territory as a 
right to terminate the concession in a non-default scenario, to provide it with 
the maximum flexibility. This proposal is subject to such a voluntary 
termination not having an adverse effect on our tax position.  
• Changes to the Step In provisions to bring them more in line with market 
practice, while still giving the Territory the powers it reasonably requires. 
Which includes; Step in only to apply during the Operating Phase; 
Distinctions to be drawn between the ramifications of emergency step in 
and step in for Concession Holder default; Territory to be responsible for its 
actions during step in 
• Changes to the default and termination provisions to bring them in line with 
market practice. The key changes are; events which the Territory proposed 
lead to immediate default and in some cases moving them to the Show 
Cause regime. Show Cause which cannot be remedied to result in default if 
acceptable demonstration of mitigation and avoidance strategy not 
provided. Change in ownership/control. Missing the Date for Completion 
should not be a default. Clauses which conflicts with the notion explained at 
Territory briefings that the Lenders have the opportunity (and therefore the 
right) to cure during stated cure periods. The Concession Holder should 
have a right to terminate following 12 months of a Force Majeure Event 
having effect during the Operating Phase. 
• Compensation on Termination regimes: 
- Where default by the concession holder occurs during construction 
that party will be liable for Capital costs to complete the DCEC at 
the date of termination 
- Where default by the concession holder occurs during operation 
that party will be liable for full debt liability plus financing breakage 
costs less any amounts owing to the Territory 
- Where Default by the Territory or Voluntary termination by the 
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Territory occurs during construction that party will be liable for 
Capital costs already expended by the Concession Holder building 
the DCEC. 
- Where Default by the Territory or Voluntary termination by the 
Territory occurs during operation that party will be liable for Full 
debt liability plus financing breakage costs, return on the equity 
projected in the original model, third party costs incurred by the 
Concession Holder. 
• Compensation is given for Native Title, Relics or Force Majeure Event the 
same as for Territory Default, except during the Operating Phase there will 
be no return to Equity. 
• Contamination is not well defined. Territory decontamination obligations 
contained in the Project Delivery Agreement need to be clearly set out in a 
schedule annexed to both the Concession Deed and the Project Delivery 
Agreement. As the parties to both agreements are not identical this would 
make sure the Territory Accepted Contamination position is consistent in 
both documents. 
• No requirement for a sinking fund for the operation of the DCEC. As 
facilities management contract will provide “back-to-back” responsibility for 
the asset management and life cycle maintenance. 
• An Independent Certifier be jointly appointed by the Territory and the 
Concession Holder and be responsible for key decisions under the DCEC 
Concession Deed, Funding Documents and the D&C Contract, it will 
promote uniform resolution of issues between all key parties.  This 
Independent Certifier will be responsible for valuing Scope Changes during 
the Construction Phase if the value cannot be agreed by the parties. 
• Financiers require adequate control over the insurance proceeds in the 
event of a claim. A Security Trustee is the initial recipient of all significant 
insurance proceeds and that it be required to disburse those proceeds in 
accordance with a mechanism to be agreed and documented in the 
Concession Deed. 
• The key changes made to the change in law regime bring the position more 
in line with market practice: Qualifying Change in Law - Concession Holder 
to receive financial adjustment and extension of time. Change in Law other 
than Qualifying Change in Law - MAE regime applies. 
 
10 Proponents 
Requirements of the 
Department/Territory 
Specifications of Risk 
Site Decontamination and Preparation 
• Dredged marine sediments from within the site boundaries are disposed of 
at sea using overflow trailer hopper barges at the NTG nominated location. 
Alternatively, East Arm Port should be considered as a disposal site.  No 
allowance has been made for decontamination of these marine sediments 
if required to meet statutory requirements or any other requirement of the 
Territory. 
• Containment of possible ground water “leaching” into proposed lagoon 
water body. 
• Any findings of EIS and supplementary reports which vary from project 
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information available at bid close that impose further scope responsibilities 
on the Darwin Cove Consortium. 
• Founding the breakwater foundation at the top of the clay layer underlying 
the mud. Initial geotechnical data during the Bid period indicates that this is 
feasible. However, detailed investigations are required to confirm this. 
Should such investigations disprove this assumption, compensation for the 
additional excavation, fill, and rock armour would be required. This 
assumption has been made following the proven details of East Arm Port 
Stage 2 works that were recently completed by the civils and services 
infrastructure contractor, Henry Walker Eltin. 
• Allowance for the removal of mud to the breakwater rock toe only (ie 
excludes additional five metres each side of wall as shown on the design 
drawings) is included in the offer.  Further mud removal is deemed 
unnecessary. 
• Offer is based on the location of the breakwater as shown on the drawings.  
Should this be altered, compensation is required. 
• Survey, recovery and removal of Unexploded Ordinance (UXO). 
 
Site Infrastructure Including Services and Improvements 
 
Responsibility of Territory, any Authority or Darwin City Council: 
• Provision of Indicative Headworks Services Infrastructure as outlined in 
Part B Documents  
• Telstra to provide necessary Headworks Telecommunications 
infrastructure to DCW site boundary 
• Use best endeavours as required by the Darwin Cove Consortium’s 
development and construction programmes to secure all necessary 
approvals and otherwise to facilitate the consortiums proposals, in 
particular for co-generation initiatives. 
• Capacity sizing of services headworks infrastructure for the ultimate master 
plan development. 
• We have been instructed not to confer with the Navy in relation to its fuel 
pipelines and other services. We have not allowed for removal or relocation 
of any fuel pipe lines including Navy. 
Off-Site Infrastructure and Street/Facilities Improvements 
 
Responsibility of Territory, any Authority or Darwin City Council 
• NT Government to fund all initiatives for connecting the site to the CBD 
(including bus services) that are outside the DCW site. 
• Clearing of vegetation on escarpment edge at the end of Smith Street for 
public access bridge and viewing requirements, including approvals. 
• Upgrade of Tiger Brennan Drive / McMinn St Intersection if required to 
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meet capacities of DCW full development 
• Provision of all services to the DCEC Works boundary will be by others for 
connection by D&C Contractor.  It is assumed that these works will be 
installed in a timely manner to enable the full functionality of the DCEC in 
accordance with the D&C Contractor’s programme requirements. 
Other 
Responsibilities of Territory (or other relevant Authority): 
• Effective Date occurring on or before 30 November 2004 to allow a 
construction period of 154 weeks with the Date for Practical Completion 
being 15 November 2007 and Sunset Date being 15 November 2008  
• Heritage Conservation Works and signage – Territory’s responsibility for 
amounts above a provisional sum $200,000. 
• Achieve development approvals (including town plan amendment) to meet 
the design and construction program dates. 
• The Asset Management Plan in respect of the Community Infrastructure 
including costs is indicative and not warranted by Darwin Cove Consortium 
at close of Bid. In addition, Public Liability Insurance has not been costed. 
• Agreement to participate in a 2 day workshop to commence immediately 
following the appointment of preferred Proponent with the purpose to plan 
and agree the process, activities and key milestones that are needed to 
achieve financial close on both the Public and Private Elements by the 
earliest possible date and in any event before 15 December 2004. 
• The Lagoon Flushing Structure shown on drawing M001 is not included in 
the DCEC Works. 
• The DCEC Works are defined as those enclosed within the hatched zone 
shown on the marked-up drawing C001 Rev02 (Note: Sitzler Barclay 
Mowlem Joint Venture reference, 07/05/04) 
• Stockpiled fill material: We have allowed to incorporate material from the 
existing stockpile on site into the works and have based our calculations on 
the volume available at 40,000 m3. 
• Fuel lines: No allowance has been made for the removal and relocation or 
any other works associated with the existing fuel lines in the project area. 
• Treatment plant: We have excluded the cost of the treatment plant and 
associated TCW piping detailed in Option 2 of the proposed sewerage 
works for Stage One.  Should this plant be required, the cost is $5.2 million 
for the plant specified.  Should our offer be of interest we would also 
undertake to investigate further options to fully explore the ESD objectives 
outlined for the project. 
• The following items have been denoted as not being sufficiently detailed for 
costing purposes and have been allocated provisional sums in our pricing 
proposal for the Community Infrastructure and public domain.  These 
values are based on the values included in our quantity surveyor’s cost 
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plan.  All costs and savings resulting from cost differences to the 
provisional sum shall be the responsibility of the Territory: 
Item Provisional 
Contract 
Sum 
Safety Barrier / Handrail or similar 250m $75,000 
Allowance for lighting walk 250m $71,250 
Safety Barrier/ handrail or similar 250m $75,000 
Allowance for lighting walkways 250m $71,250 
Floating connection between residential and seawall $200,000 
Target rate for excavation, battering, path, lighting  $900,000 
Wall separating locked water from beach $440,000 
Filtering system $1,000,000 
Water play $500,000 
Recreation Pool $700,000 
Wave Pool $1,750,000 
Shade structures to recreational pool / water play $200,000 
External paving / carparking/ landscaping/lighting $3,750,000 
Shade structures $1,750,000 
Elevated boardwalk around cultural centre – assumed 
timber structure 
$562,500 
Boardwalk from residential terrace to seawall N/A 
Pedestrian bridge $1,000,000 
Glass fronted lift $1,000,000 
Heritage – Place name signage $180,000 
Excavate mud / clay $504,296 
Seaside pontoons  $1,000,000 
6 storey carpark behind hotel $8,683,875 
 
 
11(a) Conflict of 
Interest Statutory 
Declaration 
Conflict of Interest Statutory Declarations provided by equity partners 
11(b) Confidentiality 
Deed 
Confidentiality Deeds provided by equity partners  
12 Intellectual 
Property Rights and 
Release Deed 
Transfer of all developed information and knowledge for detailed proposals to 
government 
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Matters raised by government (June 2004) in request for Detailed Further Offer (DFO), specific to the 
Darwin Cove Consortium detailed proposal documentation submitted May 2004.  
 
RS 1 - Master plan 
1. Master plan  
- Style of DCEC architecture not conducive to regional references – consortium to engage with 
government architect to explore changes 
- Storey heights and position of the residential elements creating a barrier across the site – 
amendment of master plan 
- Inwards nature of DCEC orientation – provide comment on sustainability 
2. Stage 1 Hotel 
- Confirm if part of Stage 1and how accommodation for DCEC delegates will be managed 
3. Fort Hill Staging Area 
- Confirm this area is retained for Defence use and not part of development 
4. DCEC Completion Date 
- Desire for DCEC operational as early as possible – explore means of achieving an earlier start 
to design documentation 
5. Cultural / Public Arts Facilities 
- Clarify government contribution and return – impacts to proposal if no contribution is made 
6. Exposure to Storm Surge / Wave and weather action 
- Clarify design philosophy for sea walls and ability to resist erosion and other wave and 
weather action 
7. Connectivity with CBD 
- Confirm which of the three options (travelator, tug-train and continuous shaded link) is 
committed and who will assume the funding responsibility  
8. Creating a Locked Water Body 
- Confirm that a second barrier to isolate the beach water is part of the financial commitment 
 
RS 2 – DCEC 
9. Schedule of FF&E 
- Confirmation of funding inclusion for all FF&E items scheduled 
10. Security Risk 
- Confirm a security risk management plan is included 
11. Main Kitchen 
- Confirm HACCP requirements are factored into design 
 
RS 3 – ESD 
12. Extend of commitment to sustainability principles 
- Identify further hard and soft sustainable initiatives beyond hard engineering related initiatives, 
and how budgeted and managed 
13. Extent of commitment to public art 
- Need to develop a public art strategy and develop a schedule of proposed elements 
14. Public art budget 
- Provide element budgets and ongoing maintenance regimes to clarify scope which is unclear 
15. Heritage and History 
- Some heritage sites have been built out in the master plan. Confirm how the master plan 
responds to all heritage and historical sites 
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16. Cogeneration and chilled water 
- Confirm cost and status of cogeneration and chilled water incorporated into the site 
 
RS 4 – Local Industry Participation Plan (LIPP) 
17. LIPP definition and enforcement 
- A best endeavours basis proposed by consortium needs to be turned into quantifiable targets 
with enforcement mechanisms develop 
 
RS 5 – Business Plan 
18. Requirements of Government 
- The government is seeking to cap its contribution to the DCEC 
- The government contribution to the DCEC is unclear and in particular the marketing support 
expected to be provided by government prior to opening needs to be clarified 
- The funding structure for the Darwin Experience element of the community infrastructure 
requires clarification of funding and commercial structure 
19. Transportation 
- Clarify the operation of suggested shuttle buses and how these are funded and managed 
20. Management and ownership of public infrastructure 
- The management, funding, ownership and maintenance of public infrastructure is to be further 
explained, to confirm if a body corporate structure is envisaged 
- A breakdown of all elements and associated costs and ongoing maintenance is to be provided 
- Clarify how Darwin City Council and the proposed precinct association will interact  
21. Safety and Security 
- Outline the safety and security provisions, insurance, funding and implications of swimming 
pools compliance with regulatory conditions 
22. Financial Model 
- Confirm consortium will absorb DCEC demand/ P&L risk and not funded by government as an 
operating subsidy 
- Explain the DCEC conference and delegate figures, event mix, pre-opening marketing 
expenses, equity buffer and operating risk premium figures within the model 
- How will a potential conflict of interest and operational synergies be managed as the proposed 
DCEC operator Ogden, also operates similar facilities in Newcastle Cairns and Brisbane 
23. External Headworks 
- Ensure costs for telecommunications, gas and other services not provided by government are 
costed 
24. Demolition of existing structure 
- Confirm scope of demolition and funding in proposal outside government ‘s commitment 
25. Exhibition Space 
- Justify the reduction of the DCEC exhibition space 
 
RS 6 – Partnering Structure 
26. Termination 
- Proponent default position is to be clarified for all phases of DCEC, public infrastructure and 
property development, including roles and obligations of parties and those parties which will 
sign the PDA 
27. Risk Transfer 
- The affect of the DCEC and infrastructure availability payments with respect to achieving the 
asset and operational KPI’s needs to be clearly identified 
- The management fees for the DCEC operator is to be broken down identifying each element 
28. Competing Projects 
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- Government support of other projects can not be restricted – comment of how this will affect 
the business plan 
29. Structure / underwriting / guarantees 
- All consortium partners providing guarantees are to be identified including corporate  and 
ownership structure, and term sheets 
- Management and operating entities to be established are to be identified including legal name 
and ownership structure 
 
RS 7 – Financial 
30. Variable CPI and payments 
- Confirm if availability payments can not be subject to CPI and any flow on effects this may 
have 
31. Separation of infrastructure costs 
- Government needs to understand applicable availability charges if infrastructure costs are 
separated, particularly for the DCEC to reduce these charges and be more efficient  
32. Head-works contribution / responsibility 
- The requirement of infrastructure head-works is to be further identified outlining roles, 
responsibilities and risks of each party 
33. Elemental Cost Summary 
- A breakdown of bid costs, contingencies and developer margins to be recovered as project 
costs are to be identified 
34. Operation contract 
- The DCEC operator cost components of base fee, incentive fee and capex are to be explained 
35. Structured Car Park 
- The funding for this building is to be explored further 
 
RS 8 – Risk Allocation 
36. Change in law 
- Advise the effect of government not accepting the risk of Commonwealth Law changes. 
37. Loss of DCEC Operator Replacement Risk 
- Confirm what test will be put in place to provide government the comfort that a systemic 
problem relating to the management or maintenance of the DCEC will be remedied. 
 
RS 9 – Project Documentation 
38. PDA Lead Developer 
- A single lead developer for the private elements is to provide a commitment to the PDA 
39. Cross Default 
- Government will relax the link for completion of DCEC and stage one private elements 
(property development) provided milestone and completion dates, and security is provided. 
40. Document mark-up/ comment including revisions 
- The proponent’s comment of “minor” drafting issues with the PDA may be considered by 
government as a material concern and these matters should be address for completeness and 
be exhausted. 
41. Management involvement in the DCEC 
- Confirm no adjustment to charges if government is prepared to change its proposal and have 
the operation functions as part of the Concession Deed and subcontract an Operator, rather 
than direct to government. 
42. Definition of DCEC and Hand Back Assets 
- Provide a detailed breakdown of the building components, sub lease areas and improvements 
which constitute hand back to government at the end of the concession period. 
43. PDA / Titling issues 
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- The details of titling and the suitability of two development leases for the relevant construction 
period is to be agreed. 
44. Key Issues Raised 
- A security bond amount is to be provided as a percentage of construction costs 
- A KPI’s regime is to be provided and fully negotiated 
- Concession Holder ownership changes will not be allowed without government  entitlement 
- Costs for a joint independent certifier are costed in the proposal 
 
RS 10 – Proponents Requirements of the Department/Territory 
45. Provisional Cost Sums 
- Provisional cost sums are to be removed and additional information provided. 
 
 
 
